The future has already been spent: who will pay for borrowed prosperity

The future has already been spent: who will pay for borrowed prosperity

Natalia Reznikova, Volodymyr Panchenko / Tyzhden

The global economy increasingly resembles a person convincing themselves of their own financial well-being by showing off a full fridge, a new car, and a renovated apartment. The problem is that all of this was bought on credit, and next month they’ll need to borrow again to pay off previous debts.

On a state level, such a model can function for decades. Governments issue new bonds, central banks support the financial system, investors buy government debt, and statistics continue to record economic growth. But the ability to meet obligations on time does not necessarily mean that the economy is creating enough new opportunities for further development. Most dramatically, those who haven’t even had the chance to benefit from past prosperity are left with the bill for the economic well-being of previous decades.


Resilience That Is Growing More Expensive

The main conclusion of the September interim forecast for the 2026 development of the global economy by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) looked quite optimistic: despite energy shocks, geopolitical conflicts, and trade uncertainty, the global economy continues to grow.

The OECD forecasts an increase in global GDP by 2.9% in 2026 and by 3% in 2027. The eurozone economy is expected to grow by 1% annually. Government support measures, favorable financial conditions, and investments related to AI play a significant role in sustaining economic activity. In macroeconomic statistics, this is called resilience.

But resilience and prosperity are different things. Resilience means that the economy withstood the shock. Prosperity, however, means that people have the opportunity to live better. The economy might show the former while increasingly failing to provide the latter.

The problem is that much of the crisis resilience of developed countries has relied on borrowing. After the global financial crisis of 2008, central banks maintained an exceptionally low cost of money. Governments had the opportunity to borrow cheaply, finance budget deficits, support social programs, and postpone unpopular decisions.

Central banks did not necessarily finance governments directly. For example, the European Central Bank purchased government bonds on the secondary market. But the economic result was tangible: the presence of a large buyer supported demand for bonds and lowered the yields that investors demanded from governments.

For politicians, these were almost ideal conditions. They could promise more than current budget revenues allowed and defer payment for what was received to subsequent years. The problem with such prosperity is that the future has no voice when today’s budget is being decided.

Now this carefree period is ending. According to the OECD, long-term interest rates in many major developed economies have reached their highest levels in at least 15 years.

The average yield on ten-year government bonds of G7 countries rose to 4% for the first time since 2008. This is influenced by inflation risks, government borrowing volumes, concerns about budget sustainability, and the growth of corporate debt in technology companies.

As long as the economy grows faster than the cost of servicing debt increases, the situation may remain manageable. However, when interest rates approach or exceed the rate of nominal economic growth, fiscal arithmetic becomes significantly stricter.

Every additional billion in interest payments begins to compete with billions that could be directed towards education, healthcare, housing programs, or infrastructure.

Borrowing to Repay Borrowed Funds

According to OECD estimates, in 2026, governments and corporations are expected to raise a record $29 trillion USD in bond markets. Meanwhile, 78% of gross government borrowings in OECD countries are intended for refinancing previous debt obligations. This means that a significant portion of new loans is needed not for building hospitals, modernizing schools, or developing infrastructure, but for repaying previously accumulated debts. The financial system increasingly resembles a person taking a new loan to repay an old one. The only difference is that governments can sustain this practice for much longer.

Refinancing itself is not a sign of financial insolvency. Governments regularly replace bonds that are maturing with new issues. The problem arises when new borrowings become more expensive while economic growth remains weak. In such a case, the state must allocate more and more budget resources to debt servicing. Consequently, the space for financing new programs is reduced without additional taxes or further borrowing.

Of particular importance is the change in the structure of government debt holders. According to the OECD, from 2021 to 2024, the share of central banks among the organization’s holders decreased from 29% to 19%. Meanwhile, the share of households increased from 5% to 11%, and foreign investors from 29% to 34%. When government bonds are held by the central bank, part of the interest income received can under certain conditions be returned to the state through profit transfers. However, when the debt shifts to private investors, interest payments become the income of financial capital owners.

Of course, among these holders are pension funds and ordinary households. But financial assets are unevenly distributed in society. Therefore, increased debt servicing costs have not only budgetary but also distributive consequences.

The state may continue to meet its obligations to creditors while simultaneously limiting its ability to fulfill social obligations to citizens. This is especially important for Europe, where an aging population, rising medical expenses, defense needs, and energy transformation already create additional pressure on budgets.

The OECD recommends governments to restrain and redistribute expenditures, improve the efficiency of the public sector, and strengthen budget revenues. In the language of economic policy, this sounds entirely rational. However, in everyday life, such recommendations may mean revisiting social programs, tax incentives, public investments, and ways of financing public services.

Citizens are essentially being asked to pay for yesterday’s stability with tomorrow’s income.

Artificial Intelligence: New Debts Against Future Profits

Amidst these challenges, the global economy has found a new source of optimism—artificial intelligence. Its advocates promise a productivity revolution, automation of complex labor, acceleration of scientific research, reduction in production costs, and the emergence of new markets. In the long run, this could indeed boost economic growth and expand the tax base.

For countries with large debts, such a future is particularly attractive. If

productivity grows faster than the cost of servicing debt, some current budget problems can be overcome without drastically reducing social obligations.

However, the AI revolution is also increasingly financed through loans. Building data centers, purchasing computing equipment, developing energy infrastructure, and creating large models require colossal investments. The OECD points out that large corporate bond issuances by AI-related companies could contribute to higher long-term market rates.

An almost ironic situation arises. Artificial intelligence is supposed to ensure future economic growth that would ease debt servicing for countries. But the financing of AI itself increases demand for capital and could make borrowing more expensive for those same countries. Governments and technology corporations are effectively competing for financial resources, while politicians simultaneously rely on the technological boom as a source of future budget revenue.

This does not mean that investments in AI are doomed to failure.

The problem lies elsewhere: anticipated productivity growth is already being used as an argument in favor of current expenditures, although the scale, timing, and distribution of future economic benefits remain uncertain.

Even if AI substantially increases productivity, it does not necessarily follow that the benefits will automatically reach workers, taxpayers, or society at large. Benefits may concentrate among technology owners, computing capacities, data, and digital platforms. Therefore, technological progress itself does not guarantee solutions to inequality, housing accessibility, or healthcare financing.

In a world where the future is already partially pledged to debt obligations, the promise of a technological miracle becomes particularly enticing. But expected profits are not equivalent to realized income.

Ukraine: Others’ Debts Could Also Become Our Problem

For Ukraine, this discussion is of great importance. A significant part of the financial stability of the Ukrainian state during the war depends on international support. Grants, concessional loans, and other forms of external financing allow for meeting budgetary needs, supporting the economy, and fulfilling critically important social obligations.

However, our partners themselves are entering a period of more expensive borrowing and tighter budget constraints. This does not automatically mean a reduction in aid to Ukraine. Its volumes are also determined by security interests, political decisions, and international agreements. However, the financial capacities of donor countries are not unlimited.

Increased costs of servicing their own debt, rising defense budgets, and pressure from domestic social needs intensify competition for state resources. For Ukraine, this creates risks of delaying certain programs, revising financing conditions, and changing the ratio of grant and loan assistance.

It is particularly important to distinguish between funding that does not create future debt obligations and funds that will have to be repaid later. According to data provided in the Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy for 2026–2028, the average annual payments for the repayment and servicing of Ukraine’s public debt during this period are estimated at approximately 1.19 trillion UAH.

These figures serve as a reminder: even concessional funding has long-term implications for public finances.

The future cannot be endlessly paid with the future. The greatest contradiction of modern economic policy is that decisions to use non-existent revenues are made today, benefits from them are distributed now, and the responsibility for their financing will remain for decades.

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Illustration generated by AI

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