Information on current Russian losses due to sanctions as of 07/29/2026.
1. Ukraine attacked the Wildberries logistics center and the Ryazan Oil Refinery.
– On the night of July 29, Ukrainian drones attacked the Wildberries logistics complex in the city of Rybnoye, Ryazan Oblast. Videos released by witnesses show a large fire on the warehouse site.
– Simultaneously, explosions were reported in the area of the Ryazan oil refinery. The Ryazan refinery is one of the largest in Russia and has repeatedly been hit by Ukrainian drones.
– Previous attacks have led to temporary halts in processing at the plant.
– Wildberries, Russia’s largest marketplace, has become one of the main targets of Ukrainian long-range strikes in recent weeks.
2. Ukraine attacked one of Russia’s largest oil refineries in Perm.
– Ukrainian drones struck the “Lukoil-Permnefteorgsintez” oil refinery in Perm on July 29 — one of the ten largest oil refineries in Russia and the second most powerful plant of “Lukoil”.
– Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky confirmed the strike, calling it part of a “long-range sanctions” strategy aimed at raising the economic cost of the war for Russia.
– In 2024, “Lukoil-Permnefteorgsintez” processed 12.6 million tons of oil, producing about 2 million tons of gasoline and 5.3 million tons of diesel fuel.
– This is the second attack on the plant in less than three months: the previous strike on the plant was carried out on May 7.
3. Ukrainian strikes crippled more than 15% of Wildberries’ warehouse space.
– Within a week and a half, Ukrainian drones disabled eight Wildberries logistics centers with a total area of about 860,000 square meters, or 15.4% of the marketplace’s total warehouse space in Russia, estimated at 5.6 million square meters.
– The company suffered the greatest losses after the July 18 attack on a warehouse in Elektrostal, Moscow Oblast, where 250,000 square meters of premises were destroyed. Another 170,000 square meters of warehouse space were engulfed in flames following a strike on the Ryazan logistics center on July 29.
– Warehouses of Wildberries in Kotovsk (Tambov Oblast), Krasnodar, Nevinnomyssk (Stavropol Krai), the Shushary area in St. Petersburg, Utkina Zavod (Leningrad Oblast), and occupied Simferopol were also completely or partially burned due to the attacks. Four more logistics centers — in Koledino (Moscow Oblast), Yekaterinburg, Voronezh, and Zelenodolsk (Tatarstan) — were attacked without large-scale fires.
4. Russia’s three largest terminals on the Black Sea have restricted cargo acceptance due to Ukrainian drone attacks.
– The three largest Russian grain terminals on the Black Sea — KSK and Novorossiysk Grain Terminal (NGT) in Novorossiysk, as well as ZTKT in Taman — have restricted the intake of grain delivered by road transport.
– Problems arose after a series of Ukrainian strikes on shipping and logistics infrastructure in the Azov and Black Seas. Earlier, Russia restricted the movement of vessels through the Kerch Strait following drone attacks on grain carriers, effectively paralyzing the operation of Azov ports. As a result, grain flows from the southern regions began to reorient towards Black Sea terminals.
– However, increased risks to shipping and more frequent attacks near Black Sea ports have led to new restrictions. The ZTKT terminal in Taman, with a capacity of 5.5 million tons per year, has almost completely halted operations, as it accepts grain exclusively by road transport. KSK and NGT continue to operate with rail deliveries, but about a third of their volumes also previously arrived by trucks.
– The combined capacity of the three terminals exceeds 20 million tons of grain per year, accounting for about 40% of all Russian grain exports by sea.
– An additional blow to export logistics was the ban on night navigation in the Novorossiysk area, introduced on July 22 due to the threat of drone attacks. According to market participants, the number of shipowners willing to enter Russian Black Sea ports has noticeably decreased due to heightened risks.
– The consequences are already reflected in export statistics. It is estimated that in July, Russian wheat exports fell to 1.5 million tons — the lowest level for this month since 2017. This is about a third less than last year and almost half the average for July over the past five years.
– Russia is attempting to redirect export flows to Baltic ports, which are considered a safer route. The Caspian direction is also being considered, but its capabilities are limited, and risks are also increasing lately.
5. Russia considers installing weapons on grain carriers due to attacks by Ukrainian drones.
– The Russian authorities are discussing the possibility of equipping grain carriers with machine guns and missile systems to protect against Ukrainian drones. The Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Defense, and the Federal Agency for Maritime and River Transport are holding consultations with grain traders and shipowners to strengthen the protection of vessels in the Azov Sea.
– The need for such measures arose after Ukrainian drone attacks effectively paralyzed shipping in the Azov Sea. Under normal conditions, about 25% of Russian grain exports pass through this route, but transportation has been significantly restricted for the past two weeks due to strikes on ports, vessels, and maritime infrastructure.
– If restrictions persist, Russia could lose from 0.5 million to 1.5 million tons of grain exports per month. This means a reduction in export revenue, additional losses for the agricultural sector, and complications in logistics during the peak of the harvesting campaign.
6. Tax pressure on Russia’s non-commodity economy has increased to the highest level in 15 years due to war financing.
– The tax burden on non-commodity sectors of Russia’s economy in the first quarter of 2026 reached the highest level in at least the last 15 years.
– According to calculations based on data from the Ministry of Finance and Rosstat, non-oil and gas revenues of the consolidated budget reached 31.6% of GDP. In monetary terms, the state extracted 15.8 trillion rubles from the economy, or almost every third ruble of the quarterly GDP, which amounted to 49.9 trillion rubles.
– The main sources of the increased tax burden were the increase in the profit tax from 20% to 25% in 2025 and the increase in the VAT rate to 22% — the highest level since the early 2000s.
– VAT revenues rose to 8.1% of GDP compared to 6.7% in 2024, and profit tax revenues to 4.8% of GDP compared to 4% the previous year.
– The Kremlin is rapidly depleting all available financial reserves to fund the war. Military spending, which has approximately quadrupled compared to 2021, already absorbs every third ruble of the federal budget.
– After a massive seizure of business assets, the Russian authorities are increasingly shifting the financial burden to the population through increases in indirect taxes and the introduction of a progressive income tax scale.
7. Russia increases oil exports through the Arctic to speed up deliveries to Asia.
– Russia has intensified the use of the Northern Sea Route for oil exports, attempting to bypass shipping risks in the Red Sea, where Houthi attacks continue.
– This year, Arctic navigation started earlier than last year: in July, six tankers were already heading along the route, whereas in the same period last year there was only one.
– Despite maintaining sea exports at a level of more than 4 million barrels per day for five consecutive weeks, the use of the Arctic route does not increase supply volumes. Its main advantage for Russian exporters is reducing delivery time to Asian markets and faster return of tankers for new loads, partially offsetting logistical problems.
– To navigate the Northern Sea Route, tankers require the escort of nuclear icebreakers. Notably, the tanker “Breeze” has already passed more than half the route through the Laptev Sea, while at the port of Dixon, another five vessels await a path through the ice.
– Rerouting flows through the Arctic indicates that war and increased risks for international shipping are forcing Russia to overhaul its oil export logistics, using more expensive and complex routes.
– This increases dependence on the specialized icebreaker fleet and raises transportation costs.
8. Russia’s industry has almost stopped growing: production of cement, steel, machinery, and building materials continues to decline.
– Industrial production in Russia increased by only 0.4% year-on-year for the first half of 2026, according to Rosstat data. The extractive industry decreased by 0.5%, while manufacturing showed a symbolic growth of 0.7%, indicating actual stagnation in the industrial sector.
– The most significant deterioration is observed in sectors related to civil construction, engineering, and investment activity: cement production decreased by 13.2%; construction bricks — by 23.2%; pig iron — by 5.8%; non-alloyed steel — by 4.6%; alloyed steel — by 19.2%; finished steel products — by 6.6%; pipes and profiles — by 22%.
– A sharp decline is also recorded in the production of machinery and equipment: tractors — -35.3%; bearings — -29.5%; internal combustion engines — -21%; trucks — -12.1%.
– The situation in transport engineering is also deteriorating. The production of freight wagons decreased by 34.3%, electric locomotives — by 10.5%, passenger cars — by 10.6%.
– Fertilizer production has also started to decline. In physical terms, it decreased by 2.4%, which also corresponds with the decline in rail transportation of these products.
– Coal mining decreased by 1.9% to 212 million tons. The most significant decrease was in thermal coal production (-5%), while coking coal showed an increase of 3.5%.
– The structure of industrial production increasingly shows a reorientation of the economy towards meeting military needs. Meanwhile, the sharp reduction in the production of building materials, metal products, machinery, and equipment indicates a weakening of the civilian economy, a contraction of investments, and a decline in business activity.
9. The EU is preparing the largest sanctions package against companies linked to Russia.
– The European Union is preparing a new sanctions package that could include over 1,600 companies that, according to Brussels, facilitate Russia’s war against Ukraine. This will be the largest single expansion of the sanctions list of legal entities.
– The combined annual turnover of these companies exceeds $20 billion, and the total number of employees is 265,000.
– If approved, the total number of organizations under EU sanctions due to Russia’s war against Ukraine will increase by approximately 50%.
– The new package focuses on individual companies rather than entire sectors or types of products.
– It was developed over several months, aiming to cover enterprises that have so far remained outside the sanctions but support the Russian military-industrial complex.
– The document is planned to be presented to member countries in the coming weeks, allowing sufficient time for agreement. The final approval of the sanctions is expected at the meeting of EU foreign ministers in October.
– Separately, the EU is also preparing additional sanctions in response to the forced deportation of Ukrainian children, which may be adopted in the fall.
