Relentless delirium

Relentless delirium
Oleksiy Kopytko

A bit of delirium for the night.

1. A cluster of alcohol molecules, taking the form of Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, stated that in the first half of 2026, “contracts” with the Russian army were signed by “about 200,000 people.” This construction is traditionally used to mean “less than 200,000 people.”

According to the estimate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in the first half of 2026, Russian forces lost over 241,000 people in the so-called “SVO.” The proportion is currently about 60/40 killed to wounded. That is, about 140,000 killed, with some wounded being maimed and unfit for service, maybe 50,000 will return to duty. If you add deserters and non-combat losses, out of the indicated 240,000+, about 20-40,000 will return to duty.

In summary. According to official Russian data, which may be inflated, and official Ukrainian data, which also requires an accuracy adjustment, it’s roughly evident that the Russian army only replenished its losses without gaining anything.

To prepare for potential mobilization amidst a shortage of contract soldiers, Russian authorities are already conducting forced mobilization in peripheral regions as a test.

2. Medvedev noted that Russian drone forces were supplemented by 40,000 people. At the beginning of the year, our commander-in-chief, Alexander Syrsky, estimated their number at 80,000 people, by April 1st – at 101,000. Considering Medvedev’s statistics, it turns out that quarterly, Russians recruit 20,000 people into their SBS (about 6-7,000 per month).

Formally, this is quite a lot. The nuance is that even quite loyal Russian observers note: for SBS, quality is needed, not quantity. The contingent that is voluntarily or semi-voluntarily recruited under contract is not suitable for SBS. And students (whom the Russian Ministry of Defense intended to attract) are not particularly eager to join the army, even for big money.

3. Today Medvedev vehemently denied Kremlin’s intention to conduct a new wave of mobilization in the fall. He used various words to criticize rumor spreaders “before the elections.” But we remember that 8 days before the 2022 mobilization, Peskov himself denied it would happen.

It is quite likely that this time they will not make any public announcements to avoid provoking a population exodus and will quietly start gathering people with certain MOSs.

But the above numbers of contract soldiers suggest: attacking Sloviansk and Kramatorsk with such numbers is a highly questionable venture.

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