Before drawing some conclusions about January and the two months of winter, let’s highlight another piece of the puzzle revealing the real cost of the war for Russia and the disposition before spring.
At the same time, it will become clearer why there is interest in digging into the Russian budget (where there are still many interesting plots), counting ships, mines, etc.
1. When discussing the cost of the war for Russia, the focus is usually on immediate losses. This approach was adequate for short-term wars and was relevant in the early months of the full-scale invasion. Losses/profits were calculated, fixed, and then moved on.
As the war drags on, the balance shifts towards deferred losses, costs, and lost potential future profits. The multiplier effect intensifies.
The most obvious example is the contamination of territories with explosive objects. Years of war mean decades of demining. This also includes social burdens, demographic impacts, etc. All of which require not only nominal funds but also a resource that is nearly impossible to compress – time.
For about three years now, future problems have been growing like an avalanche for both Ukraine and Russia. But while Ukraine is a victim of aggression fighting for survival, Russia has entangled itself through its own fault, not just burning resources (often accumulated since Soviet times through the super efforts of older generations), but also stealing years from both the living and the unborn.
Those Russians who are now around thirty risk spending their most productive decades (30-50) in destitution due to the military escapade of Putin’s club of angry old men and their sycophants. That’s if it ends relatively well for Russia. Which is not a given.
Russia is home to very different people. Including quite rational, reasonable individuals who realize into what abyss they are moving. There are outright villains and pillars of the regime, not lacking professionalism, who also see where everything is heading. This will inevitably end in a major conflict if the militaristic course is maintained (let alone escalated).
The beauty is that Kremlins’ pet maniac visionary, Sergey Karaganov, helps us illustrate the destructive nature of Putin’s regime actions on Russia, radiating respectability and holding a significant place among intellectual services. Those interested can find his official titles themselves.
He is not an ideologically obsessed madman like comrade Dugin, nor a minor provincial deviant of which there are many. He is a person with claims, broadcasting in decent English.
So.
2. Comrade Karaganov has been developing the discourse of the “Siberianization” of Russia for some time. The general idea is to shift the activity of the Russian state from the European part to Siberia, Russian Asia. Where colossal natural wealth is already concentrated, and as the climate softens, their volume will become unimaginable.
Accordingly, Russia must deploy infrastructure for the deep development of currently sparsely populated territories, moving away from a stagnating Europe. The European impulse is allegedly exhausted and becoming toxic.
As a proponent of such ideas, Karaganov is not alone. For example, another figure, Comrade Shoigu, has been promoting them in his own way for a long time. At one point, he even appeared as the second head of the Russian coat of arms, turned eastward. The only difference being that Karaganov philosophizes cunningly, providing a conceptual foundation, while Shoigu, with his innately constructive approach, embraces the spatial-temporal continuum through mega-projects. In particular, he toyed with the idea of building several cities from scratch in Siberia, even up to cities of millions. However, he did not explain whom he would populate them with. Currently, he oversees the development of a new hydropower complex on Siberian rivers.
3. On January 27, Karaganov published an opus in the “Rossiyskaya Gazeta” entitled “Siberian Roads and Routes of Russia” with the message: the transport network should lead people to develop new territories.
If abstracted from reality, it appears grandiose and victorious. Russia’s development is anchored to a parallel-meridian grid of logistical projects.
Simply put, currently, the main and southernmost “horizontal” logistical bond of Russia is the Trans-Siberian Railway, built during the Tsarist era. During the Soviet era, the BAM (Baikal-Amur Mainline) was “added” 600-700 km north of the Trans-Siberian. The Northern Sea Route is intended to be the northernmost artery. The space between them needs to be gradually filled with new latitudinal projects, even up to a railway to the tunnel across the Bering Strait to Alaska.
Simultaneously, “vertical” meridian routes need to be engaged, with the great Siberian rivers playing a crucial role in the northern direction. The “North-South” corridor should be connected to China’s “Belt and Road” initiative, providing access to the Indian Ocean…
In terms of a theoretical concept – why not.
But then come the details.
If one takes Karaganov’s logic and lists the consequences of Russian authorities’ actions in terms of specific projects, the scale of the Kremlin’s misdeeds against Russia becomes evident.
4. It’s not that everything is hopeless in Russia. Rather, not for everyone.
For instance, between 2022-2025, a project was implemented to build 531 km of the private “Pacific Railway” from the colossal Elga coal deposit in Yakutia to the newly constructed port “Elga” near Cape Manorsky (Udskaya Bay, Khabarovsk Krai).
This is the creation of the company “Elga Coal,” whose main owner is billionaire Albert Avdolyan. He is associated with the influential head of “Rostec” Sergey Chemezov and is even sometimes referred to as Chemezov’s nominee, fully or partially.
They have already launched one track with sidings, and are building the second. The goal is to export 50 million tons of coking coal per year through the new port. They have also developed a branch line Elga – Ulak to connect with the BAM network. All of this is already changing the coal mining/export statistics from Yakutia, now ranking 2nd in Russia by volume (50+ million tons). Overall, according to official statistics, coal exports through the Far East ports increased in 2025 by 16% to a historic high of 127.1 million tons.
However, coal is a delicate substance, dependent on prices and the overall market environment.
Last year, the Kemerovo region, previously mining around 200 million tons of coal (No. 1 in Russia, about 55-57% of Russian production), continued to decline. The figures dropped to 190 million tons, and although Kuzbass exports through eastern ports formally increased by 0.4% (to 53.8 million tons), prices were disappointing. And this is even without the competition from the rising “Elga.”
The Kemerovo region ended the year with a budget deficit of 21.8% (-55.7 billion rubles), the region’s debts reached 60% of revenues, and the share of expensive commercial debts increased. Mines are shutting down.
The Russian Minister of Energy (and former governor of the Kemerovo region) Sergey Tsivilev, who is also the husband of Putin’s cousin’s daughter Anna Tsivileva (Deputy Minister of Defense), is lobbying for Putin to mandate Russian Railways to transport 60 million tons of Kemerovo coal to the Pacific Ocean (even though the region does not use the existing 54 million ton quota).
Tsivilev knows well that extraction is half the battle, as his wife was suddenly “sold” the coal company “Kolmar” (Neryungri area, Yakutia) at a bargain price, extracting about 10 million tons of coal a year. Something suggests that Putin’s niece has fewer logistics problems than the Kemerovo region. Therefore, it’s necessary to show concern for the miners.
In other words, the Putin manager Chemezov’s contacts and Putin’s relatives with subsoil resources and infrastructure are all in order, the future is secured. They have Siberianized in a private manner. And the war does not interfere.
In contrast, there is another relatively new project: the development of the Amur-Yakutsk railway towards Yakutsk itself.
5. Formally, in 2011, Russian Railways extended the line to the Nizhny Bestyakh station, allowing Russian authorities to claim: “Yakutsk is connected by rail with the entire country via BAM and Trans-Siberian!” With a small caveat – you need to somehow cross the Lena. Just some 10 km of water barrier. But otherwise – yes.
A railway station was built in Nizhny Bestyakh on the right bank of the Lena opposite Yakutsk. The future plan was to construct a bridge. In 2013, design began for a specific section.
But in 2014, Putin annexed Crimea. And, as officially stated, instead of a bridge over the Lena, a bridge over the Kerch Strait was built. It was postponed. This was the first alarm.
In 2014, freight services were officially opened on the line to Nizhny Bestyakh, and in 2019, passenger services. That same year, preparatory work began for the construction of the “postponed” bridge.
In June 2019, at the St. Petersburg International Forum, the head of Yakutia, Aisen Nikolayev, stated that the bridge over the Lena would be ready by 2024. He then made a bet: if the bridge wasn’t ready by the end of 2025, he would eat his tie. But even in 2026, locals cross over ice. In 2023, due to “unforeseen circumstances,” the bet was postponed: Nikolayev promised the bridge would be built by 2027.
The bridge construction is ongoing year-round. By the end of 2025, they reported the erection of the first support. The new operational date is 2028.
About 17 billion rubles have already been allocated from the federal budget for the Lena Bridge, with another 42.8 billion planned over three years, totaling around 60 billion. Which is clearly insufficient, as the total project cost is estimated at 135 billion+. Yakutia and private investors should co-finance, but the Republic of Sakha authorities mostly declare their readiness to intensify the fight for federal funds.
For understanding: in the federal budget of the Russian Federation for 2026, one (!) of the articles allocates 63.7 billion rubles in compensation for injured military personnel and families of the deceased. This means that in the budget for the current year, under just one war-related expense, the entire (!!!) amount of federal participation in the construction of the bridge over the Lena is allocated. Expenses that simply could have been avoided.
I already mentioned that this budget also includes more than 9 billion rubles for funding the PLANNED funerals of 160,000 military personnel. This means that the amount of compensation for the injured and the families of the deceased will grow. As will the cost of the bridge due to rising prices.
In total. This is not a figure of speech: Putin stole at least 10 years from the residents of Yakutia, during which they could have been traveling across the bridge. Instead, he gifted them the right to die for the “Russian world.” Meanwhile, the final completion dates are highly uncertain. The Ministry of Finance is aggressively cutting federal spending. Maintaining and especially increasing funding will be challenging.
Moving on.
6. The Russian government has been toying with the idea of developing the Northern Sea Route (NSR) for several decades, which they began to replace with the name Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor (TATC), emphasizing multimodality: connecting different types of transport (railways, rivers, aviation, roads) into a single network.
Initially, it was planned that by 2030 everything would be operational. It hasn’t materialized, although since 2016, cargo traffic has increased due to the launch of oil and gas projects.
In the May 2018 decree, Putin ordered that by 2024, cargo traffic through the NSR should reach 80 million tons per year. In fact, by 2026, the transport reached about 40 million tons per year. And while previously the goal for 2030 was set at 150-200 million tons, now even Putin himself speaks of 109 million tons, which still raises skepticism among experts.
On August 1, 2022, the Russian Government approved (directive No. 2115-r) the Development Plan for the Northern Sea Route until 2035 (approximately 155 measures). There is quite a bit of specificity, including the construction of a port at Cape Nagleyynyn by 2026 to serve the Baimsky copper mine, which I wrote about. But realistic timelines there are beyond 2030.
Overall, the plan’s execution is officially estimated at 25% of what is required by the current timeline. The lag is obvious to everyone. At this point, only the creation of the Arctic satellite constellation, which has a dual purpose, is more or less on schedule.
In March 2025, at the Arctic Forum in Murmansk, Putin unexpectedly launched a critique that there is much talk about the NSR but little in terms of practical calculations and implementation. After that, they began to emphasize the verbal construct TATC and position the NSR as the route from St. Petersburg to Kaliningrad to Murmansk to Arkhangelsk to Vladivostok. Discussions about “complexity” allow for time delays.
At the mentioned forum, Putin instructed Mishustin – “with the participation of ‘Rosatom’, ‘VEB’, the relevant State Council commission – to approve the financial-economic and organizational model for the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor development by August 1, 2025.” In other words, having failed with the local task, they took on the cyclopean one, shifting the planning horizon to 2040.
In September 2025, Putin “opened” year-round navigation on the NSR.
On December 24, 2025, Comrade Patrushev Sr. suddenly announced: “The Marine Board of the Russian Federation, together with interested ministries and departments, as well as the expert and scientific community, has begun (!) work on forming a comprehensive project for the development of the Arctic and the Transarctic corridor.” And he delegated this to Dmitriev. Therefore, the process is in its initial stages, and the final outcome is unclear.
7. The burning issue of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) is not just burning but burned out – the absence of the necessary Arctic-class fleet. This affects everything – from tugs and icebreakers to dry cargo ships and gas carriers.
The flagship icebreaker “Russia” (project “Leader”) was supposed to be completed by 2027 according to the 2022 plan. Now the target is 2030-31.
The story with gas carriers is telling. In 2019, they planned to order 21 ice-class Arc7 gas carriers for the Arctic LNG-2 project by the company Novatek. They settled on 15. They were to be built at the shipyards of Samsung Heavy Industries (SHI) and Hanwha Ocean in South Korea, with completion at the Zvezda Shipbuilding Complex (SSC) in Bolshoy Kamen, Primorsky Krai.
Metal cutting for the first ship began at the end of 2020, three ships were laid in 2021, and another five in 2022. In April 2022, the first hull was launched and transferred to Zvezda for equipment installation, set to be handed over to the customer in 2023.
After the imposition of sanctions, SHI handed over 5 unfinished tankers to Russia, refusing to build the rest, while Hanwha Ocean completed 3 tankers independently but did not release them.
In December 2025, the first Arc7 ice-class gas carrier tanker “Alexey Kosygin,” completed at the Zvezda SSC, was handed over to the customers from PAO Sovcomflot (taking three years instead of 10-12 months). It is currently traveling through the Arctic Ocean and will enter the route in February 2026.
Only for one of the remaining hulls did they manage to obtain membrane-type LNG storage systems Mark III from the French company Gaztransport & Technigaz (GTT) before it left Russia. For the other three, they plan to install a Russian-developed system, which is undergoing certification. Thus, by 2024, Novatek was supposed to have a fleet of 8 Arc7 gas carrier tankers. In reality: one by 2026, with prospects uncertain without the lifting of sanctions.
In November 2022, the Russian government approved a list of maritime activities that were to be carried out only on Russian ships starting March 1, 2026. These include maritime transportation of oil, gas (including LNG), gas condensate, and coal extracted in Russia, including on the continental shelf, to the first point of unloading or transshipment, cabotage transportation via the NSR, and several others.
However, at the end of 2025, at the initiative of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the introduction of restrictions was postponed to March 2028, evidently not for the last time. This is a formal acknowledgment that the fleet is not keeping up.
A whole range of TATC facilities – ports, safety centers, etc. – are absent and won’t even theoretically appear until 2030.
8. The next “horizontal” project in the Karaganov scheme is the Northern Latitudinal Passage (NLP). I have already written about it. The essence is to connect the railway line (707 km) across the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug by linking two branches of Russian Railways – the Northern Railway and the Sverdlovsk Railway – from Obskaya station to Korotchaev station. Plus, deploy the accompanying infrastructure.
One of the elements of this project was supposed to be a bridge across the Ob River in Salekhard. Because currently, this city is practically on an island, with no stable year-round connection.
What’s with it? It’s painfully obvious: at the end of December 2025, the Russian government officially (!) suspended the concession agreement for the construction of the SSH for 3 years (until the end of 2028) to eliminate grounds for formal claims.
This means that if there are no works for another three years, in the most optimistic scenario, it will take about 7-8 years to complete the process (by 2032-33). According to the 2022 Plan, the SSH was supposed to be launched in 2027, and before that, the target was 2023.
9. Another horizontally-vertically deceased project— the colossal Northern Siberian Railway (Sevsib). It was supposed to consist of two “beams.” The first beam was to connect Nizhnevartovsk (Yugra) with Ust-Ilimsk (Irkutsk region). The second was to extend through the Altai Mountains to Urumqi, China.
In August 2023, Putin instructed the government, along with the authorities of Kuzbass, the RAS, and JSC “Russian Railways,” to present a report on Sevsib. The assessment of the project’s feasibility was included in the implementation plan of the Strategy for the socio-economic development of the Siberian Federal District until 2035, with the completion scheduled for 2025.
It was done. They assessed and suggested abandoning the project, as was announced in early December 2025. No money.
10. Karaganov formulates a pompous maxim: “Russia is not a maritime, but a riverine country!” Meanwhile, the “vertical” cargo transportation projects on Siberian rivers, clearly off schedule, hit the same snag—lack of a fleet.
Using the example of a typical RSD59 dry cargo ship, I recently showed that during 2022-2025, Russia already fell short by 50 (!!!) ships. The government lease support program for them was halved. And this is only one, the simplest class. At least there are shipyards for them. With a large-tonnage fleet, it’s a dead end altogether.
The general conclusion: even if suddenly millions of tons of cargo start falling from the sky, Russia neither has nor will have a fleet to transport them in the foreseeable future (up to 10 years).
11. The reality is that the cargo will not land on time. Whether it will land at all is an open question.
I examined the situation at the Baimskaya mining and processing plant. Accelerating lag of 5+ years against the backdrop of being cut off from advanced technologies.
I reviewed Gazprom’s investment program in the Arctic zone. Exploration and production are sharply “shifted to the right” in terms of timing. The revision (reduction) of investment programs is a common practice for almost all Russian state corporations and large businesses.
In total.
There are no cargoes and there won’t be. If they suddenly appear, they cannot be delivered. Because there is no fleet, no railways, and will not be.
To get things moving, colossal amounts of money are needed. Which is not available and won’t be if sanctions persist and the course on war continues. Not to mention the workforce.
Not everyone considers that the civil projects outlined by the Russian authorities need to be financed and supported SIMULTANEOUSLY—ships, planes, ports, railways, agriculture, housing, and everything else.
But war also needs to be financed SIMULTANEOUSLY. Militarization kills “Siberization.” At best, it has already pushed back some components by 7-10 years, assuming there are no further deteriorations and “all this” ends right now.
But it’s not happening.
12. Therefore, the Kremlin is in an interesting position, obvious to everyone who can look up from the routine and glance a little ahead.
To have any chance of catching up, Russia needs to exit the war as quickly as possible, lift sanctions, attract technology and colossal funds. In other words, lean on that very West from which Karaganov and others urge to flee.
This track is discussed by Vitkoff and Dmitrieff. But how to stop the accelerating military machine is unclear.
The lifting of US sanctions does not automatically mean the lifting of EU, Canadian, and British sanctions. Why should they give such a pass to Russia and Washington, which seek to undermine Europe for their own reasons? There is no reason.
Agreements on the architecture of coexistence are needed. This is not easy without a change in the political regime in Russia. And the regime is not going anywhere.
China will also not be pleased if Washington concludes binding agreements with Moscow. The situation with “Lukoil” perfectly illustrates how Americans know how to squeeze arrogant bandits.
Comrade Karaganov provides a methodological framework for the conclusion: Putin and his clique are the gravediggers of Russia. Only through the prism of logistics.
And this does not touch on the deep social and mental deformations of Russian society, which will have an impact, even if the rails and sleepers are laid in place.
So you don’t even need to read the slanderous Western media or aggressive Ukrainian propaganda. It is enough to take Russian approaches, Russian official documents, and Russian facts (which are also embellished). A picture with oils: 7-10 years have already been stolen (more in some areas), and the counter does not stop.
The Kremlin needs to decide which direction to run. Down the “normalization” path, negotiating preferences in exchange for abandoning aggression. Or down the “escalation” path, attempting to sweep away all restrictions from frightened Europe at once. Which, nevertheless, is gradually recovering.
Neither can be achieved while continuing the war against Ukraine.
And with Ukraine, it will not be possible to sort things out quickly, especially under the conditions set by Moscow.
And Trump needs it quickly, as Epstein with Beijing are pressing issues.
In February-March, the Russian military-political leadership will decide whether to enter another six-month cycle of war or slow down. If they proceed, the entire US electoral race will occur against the backdrop of active hostilities and negotiations with China.
China has not yet clarified its position, with its own distractions involving the latest arrests of generals. And from the end of 2026, Comrade Xi will need to show something, for in October 2027, he has another CPC Congress to approach from a strong position.
Such is the tangle, where our immediate practical task is not to fall apart before April.
P.S. The petty swindling of Russian contenders for nobility nullifies all their pretentiousness. Two examples.
Karaganov describes the significance of the “Trans-Siberian Railway” for Russia, noting that without this road, it would probably have been impossible to win the “Great Patriotic War.” He mentions Siberian divisions, sheepskin coats, and meat but “forgets” that the USSR received about 50% of all support through Lend-Lease via the “Trans-Siberian.” After all, he would have to acknowledge the role of the hated Anglo-Saxons. Not mentioning it is petty, out of insecurity.
And secondly, the quote I mentioned earlier. Karaganov surely understands that Moscow made a mistake and got bogged down. But, in order to preemptively explain the impending disgrace, he clarifies that Russia will not fully restore the occupied territories, where it supposedly “liberates” people. Supposedly, this is not to the detriment of the eastern regions.
In reality, Russia brings only destruction and death. It’s like a plague of locusts. It recreates a Wild Field where the “liberated” and newcomers are doomed to a miserable existence, turning their lives into a “sanitary zone.”
All these musings about “Siberization” are just a fig leaf to cover the shame of failure. The Kremlin was flicked on the nose in front of the whole world. If Russia had taken control of Kyiv and/or Odesa, Karaganov would have been a prophet of “Europeanization.”
As it stands, it is grandiose cheating born out of desperation.
