Information on current Russian losses due to sanctions as of 05/14/2026.
1. The Russian oil sector continues to lose stability, and positive dynamics are driven by factors that Moscow does not control.
– According to IEA data, in April oil and petroleum product exports from Russia decreased by 1.26% compared to March — to 7.03 million barrels per day. Crude oil production fell by 460,000 barrels year-over-year, reaching about 8.8 million barrels. This confirms the trend of gradual resource depletion and reduced production activity.
– Meanwhile, export revenues formally increased by 0.58% — to $19.18 billion, of which $12.94 billion came from oil and $6.24 billion from petroleum products.
– The export of oil and petroleum products in April decreased to 7.03 million barrels per day, and production fell by 460,000 barrels year-over-year — this is already a systemic trend, not a one-off failure. The increase in revenues to $19.18 billion is explained solely by the price factor: the rise in oil prices offset the drop in physical volumes.
– However, such “arithmetic” works only for a short time. High prices, which lifted Urals to $95–110 per barrel, were shaped by external crises, particularly tensions around the Strait of Hormuz. This is a factor that Russia does not control and which could quickly disappear with any de-escalation.
– Meanwhile, fundamental indicators continue to deteriorate: production and export volumes have been declining for the fourth consecutive year, the circle of buyers is narrowing, dependence on specific markets is growing, costs are increasing due to sanctions and the use of “shadow” logistics, infrastructure regularly suffers hits, undermining supply stability.
– As a result, an unstable model is being formed: fewer barrels are compensated by a higher price, but only as long as the external crisis persists. In the event of market stabilization, the volume decline will inevitably transform into a sharp drop in revenues.
2. The situation on the Russian foreign exchange market looks significantly less stable than the figures show.
– The Central Bank of the Russian Federation reported that major exporters sold $29.8 billion on the exchange, which is twice the usual amount. The reason is simple: expensive oil brought in more foreign currency revenue that companies are forced to sell.
– Against this backdrop, demand looks significantly weaker. Regular businesses bought approximately $15.6 billion in currency — almost half of what was offered. This is why the ruble strengthened to its highest levels in the past year.
– However, the financial sector is actively purchasing currency, much more than the real sector. Banks are not doing this ‘just in case’ — they are profiting from exchange rate changes. If they are buying currency now, when the ruble is strong, it means they expect it to fall.
– In other words, while official statistics show a ‘strong ruble,’ the largest market players are already preparing for the opposite scenario.
– Essentially, the ruble is currently holding not because the economy is strong, but because there is temporarily a lot of currency from exports. But within the system, there is already a bet that this effect will soon disappear — and the exchange rate will go down.
3. The Russian government forecasts a further lag of the Russian economy from the global economy by the end of the decade.
– The Russian economy will continue to lag behind global growth rates at least until 2029. This is stated in the updated macroeconomic forecast of the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation.
– According to the document, Russia’s GDP in the coming years will grow on average only by 1.5% per year: in 2026, growth is expected at 0.4%, in 2027 — 1.4%, in 2028 — 1.9%, and in 2029 — 2.4%.
– Meanwhile, according to the IMF estimates, the global economy will grow by approximately 3.2% annually by the end of the decade. Developing countries will show about 4.1% annual growth, and developed economies about 1.7%, which is also higher than the average forecast for Russia.
– According to the Russian government’s calculations, from 2014 to 2025, the Russian economy grew by only 18.7%, whereas the global economy increased by over 40% during this period.
– The Ministry of Economic Development has effectively acknowledged that achieving the goal of 3% GDP growth annually in the coming years is unlikely. A ministry representative stated that under current conditions, reaching such a pace is ‘hardly possible’.
4. The Russian authorities have faced another financial issue — there were no funds in the budget to complete the construction of the nuclear icebreakers “Leningrad” and “Stalingrad,” as well as a servicing vessel.
– Now the Russian government is forced to seek off-budget funding sources. Back in 2022, the construction cost was estimated at 142.8 billion rubles, but due to rapidly increasing project costs, the price of each icebreaker has approached 85 billion rubles.
– Rosatom suggested compensating for the funding shortfall through additional levies. One option involves introducing a new fee in 2027 for cargoes transported via the Northern Sea Route. Initially, the fee will be $1.5 per ton, rising to $2.75 by 2030.
– Essentially, Moscow is attempting to shift the funding of strategic state projects onto exporters and shipping companies, which could further impact the competitiveness of Russian exports.
– The situation also demonstrates the deepening budgetary problems in the Russian Federation, which increasingly needs to seek new levies to support costly infrastructure projects.
5. Despite Western attempts to weaken Russia’s energy sector with sanctions, Russia continues to earn billions from energy exports, using the Middle East crisis to strengthen its positions in global markets.
– In 2026, Russian exports of LNG, oil, and energy coal sharply increased after supply reductions from the Persian Gulf region due to the war with Iran.
– Russian LNG shipments from January 1 to May 11 reached a record 13.4 million tons, up 12.3% from the previous year. Russia’s share in global LNG exports rose to 8.4% — the highest since 2022. Exports of crude oil and condensate increased to 91.3 million tons, and energy coal shipments reached 34 million tons — the highest figures in recent years.
– One reason for this growth was the effective easing of sanctions by the US after Iran blocked the Strait of Hormuz. Washington aimed to avoid a global oil shortage, allowing Russian companies to increase sales and gain additional profits.
– The West’s sanction policy increasingly shows contradictions: countries that publicly declare Russia’s isolation are effectively forced to tolerate its role in the energy market to avoid a sharp spike in global prices.
– This allows Moscow to maintain foreign currency revenues and finance the war against Ukraine. Moscow continues to use global crises to strengthen its influence and compensate for losses from international sanctions.
6. India may sharply cut purchases of Russian oil.
– Indian refineries are preparing to reduce imports if the US does not extend the sanctions easing, which expires on May 16. This exemption is the reason why supplies from Russia reached a record 2.25 million barrels per day in May.
– However, this surge is temporary. If restrictions return, New Delhi will have to swiftly reorient to alternative raw material sources, even at a higher cost.
– This involves purchasing on the spot market from other regions, including Africa and the US.
– Notably, Indian state companies are already preparing for such a scenario. Indian Oil Corporation and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited signed urgent oil supply agreements from West Africa and the US this week.
– Additionally, BPCL is considering short-term contracts with suppliers from Azerbaijan and other regions. Even the largest buyer of Russian oil shows readiness to promptly abandon it at the first necessity of sanctions.
– This indicates the growing toxicity of Russian raw materials and Russia’s limited ability to maintain stable export flows without external political “concessions”.
7. The EU has increased imports of Russian LNG.
– According to Bruegel, in April, LNG imports from Russia to the European Union increased by 15.5% year-on-year to 2.169 billion cubic meters. From January to April, volumes reached 8.976 billion cubic meters, 18.5% more than the previous year.
– In parallel, in the first quarter of 2026, the EU imported 6.9 billion cubic meters of Russian LNG, 16% more year-on-year. The main recipients remain France, Spain, and Belgium.
– Formally, Brussels continues its policy of phasing out imports: restrictions on short-term contracts have already been implemented, and a full withdrawal from Russian gas is planned by 2027. However, the actual dynamics show the opposite.
– A sharp decrease in alternative supplies became a key factor. LNG imports from the Middle East in April plummeted more than tenfold to 117 million cubic meters.
– The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz disrupted logistics and forced European importers to quickly compensate for the shortfall. As a result, Europe is temporarily returning to Russian resources, despite political statements about energy independence. This confirms that the withdrawal from Russia remains a complex and uneven process.
8. German banks have started a new series of checks and temporary account suspensions for citizens of Russia and Belarus.
– Clients of Sparkasse and other banks are facing demands to re-confirm their right to reside in Germany. If documents are not provided, accounts are temporarily blocked.
– Banks have also increased control over transactions related to Russian citizens, citing financial monitoring rules after Russia was listed as a high-risk country for money laundering and terrorist financing.
