Part Two
So, in the first part, we answered the questions “why” and “where” the enemy (Russian forces) might attempt to launch a large-scale (at least operational-level) offensive this summer and possibly during the first half of autumn. For those who have forgotten or didn’t read, let me remind you that these are the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk and the so-called “great” Zaporizhzhia operational directions.
However, before considering the arguments “for” and “against” choosing each of them, it’s worth examining (and simultaneously understanding) whether the enemy will advance on one of them (obviously limiting to auxiliary actions on the other), or will still try to “break through” on both simultaneously (likely ensuring a certain time “gap” between these attempts). Additionally, it is necessary to determine whether offensive actions are possible (and on what scale) by the enemy in other operational directions.
This is important for the allocation of our own forces and assets at the strategic level, to repel and neutralize another attempt by the Kremlin to “exit the war on its own terms.”
In this sense, two factors will obviously be key among them, namely:
– The level of “grandiose” goals and objectives that the Kremlin has formulated (or will formulate) for its military for the summer-autumn of this year, which, accordingly, will prompt the latter to real practical actions.
– The availability and condition of the necessary “toolkit” for them (in other words, the presence of an appropriate number of troops, needed “quality”).
Of course, we will not be able to provide definitive and clear answers to both of these questions, especially ones confirmed by specific information. Neither you nor I, unfortunately, have access to the strategic planning documents of the “General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation”. Therefore, we can make some conclusions about the aforementioned factors only exclusively speculatively, so to speak, through indirect signs and our own reflections. In this context, I can only express my own, exclusively and deeply subjective point of view, and you have every right to agree with it or not.
So, based on the principles and provisions of operational art, which are currently professed and very actively used by Russian “planners” (the so-called Soviet/Russian “military school”), if the “political leadership” sets its military goals and objectives of a military-political (strategic) nature and scale, then the military plan their actions precisely at this level and in this vein. In other words, as is commonly written in Soviet “sources,” they must strive for “achieving a decisive and final defeat” of the enemy forces precisely at the strategic level.
As we determined in the previous part of our review, these goals and objectives today simply cannot be anything other than at a strategic level. Further prolonging the “war of attrition” for the Kremlin is fraught with the risk of a whole list of, let’s say, surprises already within their own ranks, in many aspects—from the budgetary sector to the socio-political sentiments of the population.
Therefore, it is likely that the Kremlin will demand from its “Kutuzovs and Zhukovs” the achievement of strategic goals within this year. Accordingly, they will plan some sort of “deep operational offensive operation” (or a series of similar ones) to “decisively and conclusively” achieve a strategic effect (destruction of at least one or two operational-strategic groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, or, so to speak, inflicting such a defeat on them that it becomes “incompatible” with their further full functioning).
Based on the aforementioned, it seems that they will attempt to advance on at least two directions simultaneously (albeit with a possible time delay) and even “dilute” these actions, likely with a series of auxiliary operational-tactical convulsions on several other directions to “distract attention” and “stretch the strategic reserves of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.”
But it is not worth rushing to a final conclusion on this issue. Because here enters the second point—the availability and volume of reserves accessible to the Russian command for this (mainly of a strategic level), without which it becomes almost impossible to achieve the desired result of the defined parameters (that is, at a strategic level).
Because with this, obviously, the Russian “general staff” at the moment is not “in good shape.” I won’t reveal a secret: roughly from the middle of last autumn, watching the progress and content of their “autumn-winter strategic offensive operation,” they quickly realized that it might not conclude as planned. Accordingly, the need arose to “continue the war” through the following 2026 year, which, in turn, meant the necessity to begin forming and deploying strategic reserves as soon as possible.
But, as I wrote back in winter (January 7 and February 5), the Russian command, in this regard, had to revise the “wonderful” and “very significant” plans of forming a fairly long and impressive list of new parts and units (for the period of 2026-2030, it was planned to simultaneously deploy 17 formation levels of “division” and 9 separate brigades). However, for the entire 2025, they managed to form and deploy actually only 4 such new formations—the 68th Motor Rifle Division (MRD) within the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA), the 71st MRD within the 14th Army Corps (AC), and two Marine Divisions (MD)—the 55th and 120th MD. And why? Because the involved “mobilization resource” had to be used mainly not for reserves, but for restoring the combat capability of units and formations that were already deployed and engaged in battle.
Moreover, even those formed and deployed in 2025, and those that completed formation at the beginning of 2026, also had to be “dragged” to the front and “engaged in battle.” For example, both formed Marine Divisions (MD)—the 55th and 120th MD—had to be “thrown” in winter and early spring to Kostyantynivka (unsuccessfully), and now dragged to the Southern Operational Zone. Or the same 71st MRD, practically “shattered” by the command of the “North” Group of Forces on the Sumy and Vovchansk directions.
It is evident that under such conditions, the formation and deployment of new units and formations with the status of strategic reserves, which in reality did not remain long within their composition, was somewhat “nervous, unpredictable” and even, in some cases, quite “chaotic.” Therefore, it can currently be stated that the “General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” at this moment does have a certain amount of reserves, but their volume and state, in the context of the required Russian “deep operational offensive operation,” let’s say, raise more questions than answers.
The situation could be improved by the next stage of the so-called “partial mobilization” (which the Kremlin is not even planning to cancel), but only if it had been announced and carried out in a timely manner. For this year’s summer offensive operation, it is already too late. To significantly replenish the strategic reserve, it should have been announced and conducted at the end of last year.
Thus, the answer to the question of whether Russian troops will advance this summer in one operational direction or two currently looks, in my view, in this proportion — 60% (“the main strike” will be in one direction) and 40% (they will attempt in two directions simultaneously). However, in the latter case, it is most likely that Russian command will not immediately deploy most of its strategic reserves “into battle” and will wait, trying to determine where it “succeeds” and where it does not. To direct them precisely where it “succeeds.” This is how they have behaved before, and repeatedly.
Yes, I am talking about the strategic “swing” of Rzhev-Stalingrad, which the then General Staff of the USSR carried out against the Germans in 1942–1943. It seems that, considering the habits and mindset of the current Russian “planners,” they are clearly planning to do something similar now.
And, like then, they risk making a mistake in choosing the “main strike direction.” Moreover, they clearly do not consider the fact that the volume of strategic reserves Stalin had then (which allowed him, after the bloodiest and very unsuccessful “grind” near Rzhev, to successfully conduct the “Stalingrad Strategic Offensive Operation”) and those that the “commanders” of the bunker rat can mobilize at the moment, are entirely different in order and combat capabilities. Even in purely “formal” mathematical terms.
And this does not account for the level and degree of possible resistance to this hypothetical Russian “deep” offensive from the AFU. And it will clearly not be weak, as, in reality, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (and the AFU in particular) have not yet used most of their strategic reserves.
(To be continued)
Photo on cover: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
