Part Two
So, in the first part, we answered the questions of “why” and “where” the enemy (Russian troops) might attempt a large-scale (at least operational level) offensive this summer and possibly during the first half of autumn. For those who forgot or didn’t read, let me remind you that this is the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk and the so-called “large” Zaporizhzhia operational directions.
However, before considering the arguments “for” and “against” choosing each of them, it is worth considering (and at the same time understanding) whether the enemy will advance on one of them (obviously limiting to auxiliary actions on the other), or still try to “break through” on both simultaneously (likely providing a certain time “gap” between these attempts). Additionally, it is worth determining whether offensive actions (and on what scale) are possible for the enemy in other operational directions.
This is important for the distribution of own forces and means at the strategic level, to counter and neutralize the next attempt by the Kremlin to “end the war on its terms”.
In this sense, two factors will clearly be key among them, namely:
– The level of the “spaciousness” of the goals and objectives that the Kremlin has formulated for its military for the summer-fall of this year, which accordingly will prompt the latter to take real practical actions.
– The availability and condition of the necessary “tools” for this (in other words, the presence of an adequate number of troops, of the required “quality”).
Of course, we cannot give definitive and clear answers to both these questions, especially confirmed by specific information. Neither you nor I, unfortunately, have access to the strategic planning documents of the “gsh rf”. So we can make some conclusions about the aforementioned factors only hypothetically, so to speak, through indirect signs and personal reflections. In this context, I can only express my own, solely and deeply subjective point of view, and you have every right to agree with it or not.
Thus, based on the principles and provisions of operational art currently held and very actively used by Russian “planners” (the so-called Soviet/Russian “military school”), if the “political leadership” sets its military goals and objectives of military-political (strategic) nature and scale, then the military plan their actions precisely at this level and in this key. In other words, as usually written in Soviet “primary sources,” they must strive for “achieving a decisive and final defeat” of the enemy’s troops precisely at the strategic level.
As we determined in the previous part of our review, these goals and objectives today can only be of a strategic level. Further prolongation of the “war of attrition” for the Kremlin is fraught with the risk of a range of, let’s say, surprises and “unexpected events” within the very midst of its own regime, in many aspects — from the budget sector to the socio-political sentiments of the population.
Therefore, it is likely that the Kremlin will demand from its “Kutuzovs and Zhukovs” to achieve strategic goals precisely within this year. Accordingly, they will plan some “deep operational offensive operation” (or series of such operations), to “decisively and finally” achieve a strategic effect (defeating at least one or two operational-strategic groupings of the Armed Forces of Ukraine or, let’s say, dealing them such a defeat that it becomes “difficult to reconcile” with their further full-fledged functioning).
Based on the above, it seems that they will try to advance on at least two of these fronts simultaneously (even with a possible slight time delay) and even “dilute” these actions, probably with a series of operational-tactical “convulsions” of an “auxiliary” nature on a number of other fronts, to “divert attention” and “stretch the strategic reserves of the Armed Forces of Ukraine”.
But it is premature to make a final conclusion on this matter. Here, the second point comes into play — the availability and volume of reserves available to the Russian command for this (mostly strategic level), without which it will be almost impossible to achieve the desired result of the defined parameters (i.e., at the strategic level).
For with this, obviously, not everything is “glory be” for the Russian “General Staff” at the moment. I will not reveal a secret: approximately from the middle of last autumn, watching the course and content of their “autumn-winter strategic offensive operation”, they quickly realized that it might end not as planned. Accordingly, there was a need to “continue the war” during the next 2026 year, which, in turn, meant the necessity to start forming and deploying strategic reserves as soon as possible.
But, as I wrote back in winter (January 7 and February 5), the Russian command, in this sense, had to revise the “splendid” and “very significant” plans for forming a rather long and impressive list of new individual parts and formations (for the period 2026-2030, they planned to simultaneously deploy 17 formations of “division” level and 9 separate brigades). However, throughout 2025, they managed to form and deploy only 4 such new formations — the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) as part of the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA), the 71st MRD as part of the 14th Army Corps (AC), and two Marine Divisions (MD) — the 55th and 120th MD. And why? Because the “mobilization resource” had to be used mainly not for reserves, but for restoring the combat capability of parts and formations that had already been deployed and engaged in battle.
Moreover, even those that were formed and deployed in 2025, and those that completed formation at the beginning of 2026, also had to be “drawn” to the front and “brought into battle”. For example, both formed Marine Divisions (MD) — the 55th and 120th MD — had to be “thrown” in winter and early spring to Kostyantynivka (unsuccessfully), and now they are being pulled to the Southern operational zone. Or the same 71st MRD, which was essentially “torn apart” by the command of the troops grouping (TG) “North” in the Sumy and Vovchansk directions.
It is evident that in such conditions, the formation and deployment of new units and formations with the status of strategic reserves, which in reality did not remain part of them for long, was somewhat “nervous, unpredictable,” and even, in some cases, quite “chaotic.” Therefore, it can be currently asserted that the “gsh vs rf” indeed has a certain number of reserves at the moment, but their volume and state, in the context of the Russians’ required “deep operational offensive operation,” let’s say, raise more questions than answers.
The situation could be improved by the next phase of the so-called “partial mobilization” (which the Kremlin does not even intend to cancel), but only if it had been announced and conducted in a timely manner. For a summer offensive operation this year, it is already too late. To significantly replenish the strategic reserve, it should have been announced and conducted at the end of last year.
Therefore, the answer to the question of whether the Russian troops will advance this summer in one operational direction or two, in my opinion, currently looks like this — 60% (“main strike” will be delivered in one direction) and 40% (they will try simultaneously in two directions). However, in the second case, the Russian command is most likely not to immediately deploy most of their strategic reserves “into battle” and will wait, trying to determine where they are “succeeding” and where they are not. To direct them precisely where they are succeeding. This is how they have acted before, repeatedly.
Yes, I am talking about the strategic “pendulum” Rzhev-Stalingrad, which the then gsh vs srsr used against the Germans in 1942–1943. It seems, considering the habits and mindset of the current Russian “planners,” they are clearly planning to do something similar now.
And, just like then, they risk making a mistake in choosing the “main strike direction.” Moreover, they clearly do not take into account the fact that the volume of strategic reserves that Stalin had then (and which allowed him, after the bloodiest and very unsuccessful “meat grinder” under Rzhev, to successfully conduct the “Stalingrad strategic offensive operation”), and those that the “commanders” of the bunker rat can currently engage, are of completely different orders of magnitude and combat capabilities. Even in a purely “formal” mathematical sense.
And this does not take into account the level and degree of possible resistance to this hypothetical Russian “deep” offensive from the AFU. And it will clearly not be weak, as in reality, the AFU (and the Armed Forces of Ukraine in particular) have not yet used most of their own strategic reserves.
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Part Three of the review on the hypothetical plans of the Russian command for the summer of 2026 is presented as today’s stream with Yana Kholodnaya on the 5th channel’s YouTube:
Cover photo: General Staff of the AFU
