Information on the current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 05.06.2026.
1. The Kirishi Oil Refinery in the Leningrad region of the Russian Federation has completely halted oil processing after a drone strike.
– The fire damaged all three primary processing units (AVT-6, AVT-2, and AT-1), as well as part of the secondary capacities.
– The enterprise is among the top three in Russia with a capacity of about 20 million tons per year and plays a critical role in fuel production. Last year, the plant produced about 2 million tons of gasoline and 7 million tons of diesel fuel.
– This is the second attack on the facility since the beginning of spring: after the March strike, the plant only partially resumed operations at the end of April. The current damage has again stopped it completely, and the timeline for recovery remains unknown.
– “Kirishi Oil Refinery” has become the sixth refinery to halt production in the last month.
2. Oil and gas revenues for the Russian Federation’s budget remain below last year’s despite short-term growth in April.
– Revenues of the Russian Federation’s federal budget from oil and gas in April 2026 increased by 38.7% compared to March and amounted to 855.6 billion rubles. However, on an annual basis, they remain significantly lower — minus 21.2% compared to April 2025.
– Despite the monthly growth driven by a spike in global oil prices amid the war in the Middle East, the overall picture for Russian finances remains negative.
– In the first four months of the year, oil and gas revenues amounted to only 2.3 trillion rubles — this is 38.3% less than in the same period last year. Thus, the budget received only about a quarter of the planned 8.92 trillion rubles for the year.
– Even before the escalation in the Middle East, Russian energy revenues were falling due to low oil prices, significant discounts on Russian grades, and a strengthening ruble. In 2025, revenues had already decreased by 24% — to 8.48 trillion rubles, the lowest since 2020.
– In the first quarter of 2026, the decline accelerated to 45% on an annual basis. Although the sharp rise in oil prices due to the conflict around Iran temporarily supported Russian revenues, this trend is unstable.
– The budget is increasingly dependent on external factors, while structural problems — sanctions, export discounts, and limited market access — continue to pressure the Kremlin’s key revenue source.
3. The Russian coal industry is entering a phase of steady decline.
– The first quarter of 2026 became another testament to the systemic decline of Russia’s coal industry — by all key indicators. Production decreased by 6.1% year-on-year to 105 million tons. This is no longer just a cyclical drop but a signal of a loss of stable demand and logistical capabilities.
– The financial situation is even more telling: a loss of 51.6 billion rubles over two months and 59% unprofitable companies — the trend remains negative. The industry, which was once a key exporter, is losing its position: replacing the European market with the Asian one is hampered by infrastructure limitations.
– Due to the capacity deficit of the BAM and Trans-Siberian Railway, coal shipments lose competition to more profitable flows — oil, petroleum products, and containers.
4. Russia resumes currency purchases amid unstable oil revenues due to the Middle East conflict.
– For the first time since the pre-war period, Russia plans to resume purchasing foreign currency on the market. This was reported by the Ministry of Finance. From May 8 to June 4, the agency plans to purchase currency worth 110.3 billion rubles (about $1.46 billion), mainly in Chinese yuan, for the National Welfare Fund. The Central Bank will carry out the operations.
– In net terms, daily purchases will amount to about 1.18 billion rubles, while currently, sales are ongoing at 4.6 billion rubles a day.
– Formally, these actions comply with the budget rule: the state buys currency when oil prices exceed the set threshold ($59 per barrel) and sells it when they fall below.
– However, these operations were halted back in February due to weak oil revenues caused by sanctions-related discounts on Russian oil.
– The rise in prices following the effective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz at the end of February temporarily improved the situation, but even now, financial indicators remain weak. According to the Ministry of Finance, in April, Russia’s oil and gas revenues amounted to 855.6 billion rubles — this is 21.2% less than a year ago, despite growth compared to March.
– The decision to resume currency purchases appears forced and situational: it aims to curb the strengthening of the ruble but simultaneously highlights the budget’s dependence on external shocks. Deferred operations from previous months partially compensate for purchase volumes, indicating an attempt to smooth the market impact.
– Ultimately, even amid short-term oil price increases, Russia’s budget remains vulnerable: revenues are unstable, and financial policy is increasingly dependent on geopolitical factors beyond Moscow’s control.
5. Russian tanker with diesel fuel for Cuba blocked at sea due to increased American pressure.
– The sanctioned vessel Universal has been adrift since mid-April about 1,000 miles from the island, without guarantees of safe port entry. Onboard are about 270,000 barrels of diesel, but the delivery itself is in question.
– Due to the risk of seizure by the US Navy, most vessels avoid trips to Cuba. In 2026, only one Russian tanker managed to make a delivery — and that under exceptional conditions of temporary political easing.
– The situation underscores Russia’s limited capabilities as an energy donor even for allies. Sanction pressures and control of maritime routes disrupt logistics, turning even isolated deliveries into complex and risky operations.
6. Russia’s oil exports have risen to wartime highs.
– The average volume of sea shipments in the four weeks leading up to May 3 increased to 3.66 million barrels per day. Revenue reached approximately $2.42 billion per week, and about $2.57 billion in the last week, the highest level since the start of the war.
– Supply disruptions through the Persian Gulf, including actual restrictions on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz area, pushed prices up and forced some countries to more actively purchase Russian oil.
– Amid this, sanction pressure partially weakened. At the same time, growth occurred after the resumption of shipments from key ports — Primorsk, Ust-Luga, and Novorossiysk. However, new strikes on infrastructure, particularly on Primorsk, create risks for the stability of these flows.
– The main driver of demand remains Asia: India imports about 1.5 million barrels per day, with total flows to the region reaching approximately 3.4 million barrels. Meanwhile, the emergence of supplies to countries such as Japan and the Philippines indicates attempts to expand the sales geography.
– Despite rising revenues, the situation remains unstable. A significant portion of the oil — about 115 million barrels — is at sea, indicating logistical delays and limited system flexibility.
– Russia temporarily benefits from the external conjuncture but remains dependent on geopolitical crises and vulnerable to further infrastructure strikes.
7. Russia increased diesel fuel exports in April.
– The shipment volumes increased by 8% m/m to 3.25 million tons, almost reaching the level of April 2025. However, this growth is situational: it is driven by a sharp spike in global prices and demand amid the conflict in the Middle East, rather than the recovery of internal industry stability.
– In fact, Russia is trying to maximize monetization of the short-term market conditions to compensate for previous losses.
– Meanwhile, drone strikes on key infrastructure continue to undermine export capabilities. The Baltic port of Primorsk lost about 17% of Euro-5 standard diesel shipments compared to March.
– In the Black Sea direction, the situation is even worse: attacks on the port of Tuapse and the local refinery led to fires and the actual halt of processing since mid-April due to the inability to ship products. This demonstrates the high vulnerability of Russia’s export model to logistical disruptions.
– The export structure also indicates a deterioration in market quality. The main volumes are going to Turkey and Brazil, with supplies to Turkey increasing by more than a third.
– At the same time, large importers include Morocco, Ghana, and Syria, reflecting a shift towards less solvent or politically dependent markets.
– Notably, there is an increase in “gray” logistic practices. About 340 thousand tons of petroleum products are at sea without defined destinations, another 200 thousand tons are effectively drifting, awaiting buyers or instructions. Additionally, about 0.5 million tons are directed to anchorages near Port Said and Limassol, where “ship-to-ship” transfers traditionally take place.
– The growth of such operations directly indicates increased sanction pressure and attempts to circumvent it. Even amid temporary volume growth, Russian diesel exports show signs of fragmentation: dependence on market conditions is increasing, market geography is deteriorating, and logistics are increasingly shifting into a semi-shadow mode.
– This increases operational costs, risks, and in the long-term undermines the stability of export revenues.
8. A group of U.S. Democratic senators urged the Trump administration to immediately reinstate sanctions against Russian oil, warning of an increase in Russia’s revenues from energy exports amid geopolitical tensions.
– The initiator of the appeal was Senator from Colorado, Michael Bennet, joined by 13 other members of the Senate. In their letter to Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, the legislators emphasize that lifting the restrictions allowed Russia to acquire additional financial resources to continue its war against Ukraine.
– According to their estimates, amid rising global energy prices, Russia’s revenue from oil has significantly increased and could have doubled in April. The senators highlight that the administration’s decision to ease the sanctions regime did not yield the expected effect on the US domestic market. Instead, it removed the price discount on Russian oil, allowing it to be sold at higher prices and regain positions in foreign markets.
– The authors of the appeal pay special attention to the impact of the conflict with Iran, which, in their view, caused a sharp increase in energy prices and intensified global energy instability.
– This, in turn, created additional opportunities for Russia to increase oil revenues and partially offset budgetary pressure.
– The senators called for the use of all available tools to limit Russia’s so-called “super-profits” from the war, emphasizing that the lack of strict sanctions pressure only strengthens the Kremlin’s position and creates additional risks for the security of US allies.
