Information on current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 05.05.2026.
1. In the Leningrad region on the night of May 5, a new attack on oil infrastructure was recorded.
– In the city of Kirishi, a fire broke out in the industrial zone following drone strikes. This area houses one of Russia’s largest oil refineries — Kirishinefteorgsintez, which has repeatedly been a target of attacks.
– Its capacity is about 20 million tons of oil per year, with actual processing around 18 million tons, corresponding to approximately 7% of the national volume.
– The enterprise is a key fuel producer: it annually produces about 2 million tons of gasoline, 7 million tons of diesel fuel, and significant quantities of fuel oil and bitumen.
2. Prices for Russian oil in April reached their highest levels in over a decade.
– The average price of Urals crude for tax calculations rose to $94.87 per barrel — the highest level since 2014. Compared to March ($77), the increase was $17.87 (+23%), and relative to January ($40.95) — more than 2.3 times.
– As a result, the actual price exceeded the budgeted level by approximately $36 per barrel. This directly impacted budget revenues. With current prices and the ruble exchange rate at 78–80 per dollar, monthly revenues from oil and gas taxes are estimated at about 1 trillion rubles — twice as much as at the beginning of the year.
– It is estimated that in April the budget received about 850 billion rubles from oil and gas.
– However, this effect is situational. The increase in revenues is driven by external factors — primarily pricing, rather than the recovery of volumes or efficiency.
3. An increase in demand for cash is being recorded in Russia.
– In April, the volume of cash in circulation increased by 607.3 billion rubles — the largest growth except for the seasonal December peak since September 2022.
– The trend has continued for the second month: in March, the cash outflow exceeded 300 billion rubles — the maximum in 2.5 years. The total volume of cash at the beginning of April reached 19.48 trillion rubles and may exceed 20 trillion, which is already a historical maximum.
– Officially, this is explained by technical factors, including disruptions in internet service and payment terminals. At the same time, increasing tax pressure encourages businesses to switch to cash transactions, and the population to keep money outside the banking system. As a result, the trend towards the “cashization” of the economy is strengthening.
– This reduces the transparency of financial flows, complicates tax administration, and might indicate growing distrust in banks and non-cash instruments.
4. The Russian elevator industry continues to decline in 2025: production has decreased by more than 6% and amounts to about 25,000 units.
– Reasons include a sharp slowdown in housing construction, issues with financing elevator modernization programs, and expensive loans that limit investment.
– Additional pressure is created by disruptions in access to some imported components and technologies.
– As a result, Russian enterprises are underloaded, losing orders, and some manufacturers are reducing production by a third or more. It is expected that weak demand and unstable financing may keep the industry in decline until the end of the year.
5. The volume of microcredit in the Russian Federation in 2025 has reached a historic high, indicating a deterioration in the financial condition of the population and limited access to banking resources.
– Citizens have borrowed 2.1 trillion rubles from microfinance organizations, 35% more than the previous year. On average, quarterly disbursements exceeded 500 billion rubles.
– The growing demand for expensive loans is linked to tighter bank policies, which have raised borrower requirements and reduced lending to clients with high debt loads. As a result, a significant part of the population is forced to turn to MFOs as an alternative source of financing.
– At the same time, the cost of such loans remains extremely high. According to the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, about half of microloans in 2025 were issued at rates exceeding 250% per annum.
– The most common short-term loans up to 30,000 rubles were issued at an average of 290.3% per annum, while loans for 2–6 months cost borrowers 284–286% per annum.
– The sharp growth of the microfinance segment amid the inaccessibility of bank loans reflects structural problems in the Russian economy and the decline of real incomes, which increasingly cover current expenses through expensive debt instruments.
6. Russia records a record demand for luxury cars for the entire period of the full-scale war.
– In the first quarter of 2026, 42 new Rolls-Royce Motor Cars were registered — 5% more than the previous year. The highest demand was for Rolls-Royce Cullinan SUVs and Rolls-Royce Spectre electric coupes.
– The cost of such cars starts at 30 million rubles and can exceed 100 million in maximum configurations.
– After the sanctions slump in 2022–2023, the luxury car market began to recover quickly: sales rose to 152 vehicles in 2024, and to 225 in 2025. This is the highest figure since the beginning of the war. This trend shows that the sanctions pressure hardly affects the wealthiest strata of Russian society.
– In parallel with the reduction of small business lending, the decline in consumer demand, and the increase in demand for cash, the elites continue demonstrative consumption through parallel import channels.
7. The UK has hit Russia’s schemes for recruiting migrants for war with sanctions.
– The United Kingdom has announced the imposition of sanctions against 35 individuals and organizations involved in recruiting vulnerable migrants to participate in Russia’s war in Ukraine and the production of drones for use in the war. This is stated in the official announcement.
– The British government stated that while Russia attempts to exploit migrants to fuel its war machine, the announced sanctions are directly aimed at those involved in trafficking migrants to the front lines, as well as companies supplying products to Russian drone manufacturing plants.
– The latest measures target 35 individuals and organizations, including those responsible for human trafficking networks. It is noted that the networks sanctioned by Britain deceitfully recruited foreign migrants.
– The sanctions list also includes individuals and legal entities from third countries, including Thailand and China, responsible for supplying components to Russia for drones and other critically important military goods.
8. Kazakhstan is considering the possibility of completely refusing electricity imports from Russia by 2027 amid the expansion of its own generating capacities. This was stated by the Deputy Minister of Energy of the country.
– According to him, in 2026 there is an energy deficit in the country at the level of 1–1.2 billion kWh, but over the next two years, this gap is planned to be completely eliminated through the introduction of new capacities.
– This involves a strategic review of energy dependence, which may deprive Russia of another market. The loss of the Kazakhstani direction would mean additional pressure on the export revenues of Russia’s energy sector, which is already facing restrictions in key external markets.
– The gradual displacement of Russian electricity by local generation reflects a broader trend — countries in the region are attempting to minimize dependency on supplies from Russia, strengthening energy autonomy and diversifying sources.
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