Today, there will only be brief reports from several directions.
1. Northern Slobozhansky (Sumy) direction
It is evident that the command of the enemy’s “Sever” military group (Russian forces) continues to implement the plan to create a so-called “security zone” in the border area of the Sumy region of Ukraine, attempting to expand their incursions and various types of “penetrations” to the east and southeast of the city of Sumy.
In particular, to the east and southeast of the regional center, Russian units have been reported to penetrate Ukrainian territory in the border zone in the strip from Myropil’ske to Hrabovs’ke.
Russian forces are operating with several tactical groups, which are likely tasked initially with creating numerous tactical incursions into Ukrainian territory, then trying to connect and expand them into one larger “buffer” zone, specifically:
— The Northern group operates in the general direction of Demydivka (RF) — Prokhody, as well as north of Myropil’ske towards Popovka (RF) — Myropil’ske.
— The Central group attempts to occupy the village of Pokrovka, moving in the direction of Kolotylovka (Russia) — Pokrovka. Counter-battles are ongoing in Pokrovka itself. Additionally, the enemy actively attempts to attack towards Vysoke — Novodmytrivka, using a large forested area east of the village and south towards Taratutine, though not very successfully so far.
— The Southern group, operating in the general direction of Hrabovs’ke — Riasne, tries to push Ukrainian troops from Riasne, circumventing it both from the south along the Korova River and from the north, moving towards Hrabovs’ke.
Currently, the Russian Central and Southern groups have likely managed to connect their incursions, but the Northern group has not yet joined them, continuing to fight persistently against Ukrainian units protecting the state border along the Prokhody – Maryine line and in the Myropil’ske area. Clearly, the enemy does not yet confidently control either Prokhody or Myropil’ske, operating only with small assault groups there.
Currently, in these directions, Russian forces have managed to occupy only one relatively large village — Hrabovs’ke, penetrating Ukrainian territory in these directions by an average of 5-6 km.
2. Southern Slobozhansky (Vovchansky, Kharkiv) direction
It is apparent that Ukrainian forces have managed to completely halt the advance of forward Russian units from the “Belgorod/Kharkiv” tactical group, which mostly belongs to the 6th General Army and the 44th Army Corps, in the Vovchansk area, both towards Staryi Saltiv and towards Bilyi Kolodiaz. Specifically:
– In the Prylypky area, Ukrainian units likely operating along the Siverskyi Donets managed to push the enemy away from the road to Synelnykove northwards into the forest.
– In the Vilcha area, the Ukrainian Armed Forces likely “cleared” the central and southern parts of the village. Separate Russian infantry groups are still holding out in the areas of Koltseva and Vovchanska streets. However, it is apparent they will have to retreat northwards to the railway.
– Furthermore, in Vovchansk itself, the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue fighting in the areas of Panina and Chkalova streets in the southeastern part of the city. As a result, Russian forces have yet to begin a more or less significant offensive towards Vovchansk — Bilyi Kolodiaz.
It is important to highlight that the Russian command in the Vovchansk direction has not even managed to solve its intermediate (preliminary) goal — to fully and confidently take control of the Synelnykove — Tsehlyane — Vilcha — Lyman area. Without this, advancing on Bilyi Kolodiaz will be very difficult. Primarily due to the need to fend off very likely flank counterattacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces from this area during such an advance.
In this context, individual small Russian infantry groups entrenched in the vicinity of Hrafskyi and north of Semenivka do not change the tactical situation. Their supply and reinforcement with manpower are extremely difficult due to the intense fire impact on their flank and rear from Ukrainian Armed Forces positions near Lyman and Prylypky. Accordingly, they are unlikely to move from their positions anytime soon. They can only survive by receiving supplies via air drops from drones and attempting to hold these positions. How long they will remain there is a rhetorical question.
3. Kupiansk Direction
The struggle for the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ foothold on the Oskil, east of Kupiansk, continues.
The practical implementation of the command plan of the “Zapad” group and its 1st Tank Army (TA), which evidently includes “compressing” from the flanks (from the north and the south), over the last two weeks has likely encountered an “unforeseen” pause.
In the northern part of the bridgehead, where Russian forces are persistently trying to break through to the “Zaoskillia” (eastern part of Kupiansk), and finally managed to push a few of their infantry groups into Petropavlivka a week ago, the situation has once again “stalled” for them. Their attacks on Kucheriivka proved ineffective, as did several attempts by the 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (SMRB) to break through along the Oskil from north to south.
Meanwhile, in the south, persistent attempts by the forward units of the Russian 47th Tank Division (TD) of the 1st TA to “develop and deepen” their relatively successful results of certain assault groups in the eastern part of Kurylivka and northeast of Kivsharivka faced several very focused counterattacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces both in the Pishchane area and in Kurylivka itself. Consequently, the enemy was forced to pause their previously quite active “moves” towards Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi, which General Gerasimov is so eager to secure.
4. Lyman Direction
It is evident that both Russian armies (the 20th and the 25th Developer Army Command), designated by the “Zapad” group command to eliminate the Lyman bridgehead of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, will likely soon be forced to postpone the assault on Lyman itself.
At least the Russian 20th CAA is tightly stuck in battles for the area of Oleksandrivka — Novoselivka — Drobysheve — Sosnove, unable to fully take control of it. Without this, it is virtually impossible to block the Liman area from the northwest, without which a “star” assault on Liman itself (meaning an assault from several directions) is also impossible. Separate small infantry groups from the 144th Motor Rifle Division (MRD) of this army, which penetrated into the Yarova and Oleksandrivka area (likely from a bridgehead on the Netrusy River), were evidently “cleared” in the previous weeks.
There is also information about the destruction of several infantry groups from the forward units of the enemy’s 25th CAA, which penetrated the southeastern outskirts of Liman (the area of Partizanska and Vishneva streets). Although this still requires additional verification.
On the left flank of the same Russian 25th CAA in the “triangle” of Dibrova — Yampil — Ozernoe, stubborn close battles continue. Apparently, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) are quite actively counterattacking there, managing to push the enemy out of parts of Yampil and Ozernoe and continuing to push them out of the forest west of Yampil. If the Ukrainian troops, as a result of these counterattacks, manage to significantly push the forward parts and units of the 25th CAA from the Liman-Zakytne road (including the entire forest area between Liman and Yampil), then the issue of eliminating the Liman bridgehead of the AFU (not to mention the assault on the city itself) will be postponed “indefinitely.”
5. Sloviansk Direction
The forward parts and units of the Russian 3rd CAA, operating along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River and achieving quite obvious tactical successes over the previous month, were likely also forced to “stop” this week at the Zakytne – Riznykivka line.
In this context, the AFU counterattacks in the Zakytne area and south of Kryva Luka became very indicative. The enemy can supply and support its forward assault groups that broke through to Kalenyky and Riznykivka exclusively from the Siversk direction, using the Siversk-Zakytne road through Platonivka and the road from Sviato-Pokrovske to Riznykivka.
However, the AFU continue to hold positions west of Riznykivka and therefore have the opportunity to cut off the enemy’s forward infantry groups near Kalenyky from any supply by means of flank counterattacks both from the north of Kryva Luka and from the south from the area west of Riznykivka.
So far, in this context, the fact that several Russian assault groups were also able to wedge into the AFU defenses south of Riznykivka plays into the enemy’s hands, as it forces the Ukrainian command to think more about defending Rai-Oleksandrivka than about any of its own flank counterattacks.
However, in my opinion, the situation can completely change, and quite quickly. As soon as the AFU can eliminate the immediate threat to Rai-Oleksandrivka from the southeast (that is, stop the enemy’s advance in the direction of Nykyforivka — Lypivka; by the way, there is information that the AFU were indeed able to push the enemy out of Lypivka and approach Nykyforivka, although this still needs to be verified), the issue of small and “ultra-small” Russian infantry groups that broke into the Kalenyky area will become quite relevant.
In turn, the forward units of the Russian 3rd CAA, operating on both sides of the Sloviansk-Bakhmut road, also “sharply slowed down” compared to the previous month.
Currently, they have two main tactical tasks:
– The main forces are to “turn” towards Kramatorsk. That is, first reach the Nikanorivka-Tykhonivka line, and then break through to the Vasylivska Pustosh-Vasyutynske line.
– And the second task is to reach the Rai-Oleksandrivka area from the southeast with part of the forces, specifically through Nykyporivka and Fedorivka Druha.
It is worth noting that they also encountered problems with both of these tasks, especially in the last two weeks. Initially, after the first successful tactical penetrations at the end of March and the beginning of April, their advance “slightly slowed down,” but then it completely “came to a halt.”
I still do not know if the latest information about successful counterattacks by the Armed Forces of Ukraine towards Nykyporivka is true, but it can be confidently said that after the capture of Pryvilne and Minkivka by advanced Russian units, and their advancement north of Novomarkove, they have been unable to “move forward” towards Kramatorsk for over a week.
Photo: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
