Information on the current losses of Russia due to sanctions as of 06.04.2026.
1. On the night of April 6, Ukrainian drones launched a massive strike on Novorossiysk in the Krasnodar region of Russia, hitting one of the largest oil terminals on the Black Sea.
– According to open sources and videos from the scene, the “Sheskharis” oil terminal was hit — a key oil and oil products transshipment hub in southern Russia, playing an important role in the Novorossiysk sea port and the entire export infrastructure of the region.
– This is the second attack on the terminal since the beginning of spring: the previous strike occurred on March 2 and caused a fire. The site was also attacked in November 2025, damaging tanks and a pier.
– “Sheskharis” is of strategic importance, particularly used to supply fuel to Russian military logistics. Repeated strikes on such sites indicate systemic pressure on Russia’s export and energy infrastructure.
2. Ukrainian drone strikes on port infrastructure in the Baltic region hinder Russia from fully capitalizing on rising global oil prices.
– Despite the Brent price exceeding $100 per barrel, attacks on key export hubs — Primorsk and Ust-Luga — reduce potential Kremlin revenues.
– According to the Kyiv School of Economics, five attacks on these ports over a week cost Russian exporters about $970 million in lost revenue. Primorsk and Ust-Luga account for over 40% of Russia’s marine export capacities.
– Western sources report that approximately $200 million worth of oil was destroyed in Primorsk alone. The greatest effect is seen in the crude oil market for petrochemicals — naphtha.
– Prices in Asia have doubled since the start of the conflict, while Ust-Luga supplies about 8% of the world’s deliveries of this product. After the attacks at the end of March, crude oil exports from the port reduced by approximately 70%.
– Sources also note that Ukraine is boosting long-range drone capabilities faster than Russia can adapt its defense. Despite a multi-layered defense system, including electronic warfare and physical barriers, Russian infrastructure remains vulnerable.
– Besides energy, strikes also target the chemical industry, including fertilizer production plants significant for military logistics. As a result, even in a favorable price environment, Russia faces a situation where physical export constraints prevent converting high prices into maximum profits.
3. Russia’s oil and gas budget revenues could sharply rise in April, approaching $11-13 billion, almost double that of March.
– The calculated oil price for taxation, determined at the beginning of April, is $77 per barrel, significantly higher than the March level. With such parameters, revenues could amount to $11–12 billion, and according to some estimates, up to $13 billion.
– In March, the Russian budget received approximately $6.7 billion from oil and gas compared to $4.7 billion in February and $4.3 billion in January. However, this was significantly lower than the previous year’s figure — around $11.7 billion.
– The tax base in March remained weak: the calculated price of Urals was only $44.6 per barrel, which is below the budgeted target of about $59.
– As a result, the revenue shortfall in March amounted to about $2.5 billion, and for the first quarter — approximately $6 billion. The increase in revenues in April is associated with the rise in global oil prices, but the effect is limited by issues with export infrastructure.
– Due to strikes on oil and gas facilities, about 40% of export capacities were disabled by the end of March, marking the most severe supply disruption in modern Russian history. By the beginning of April, part of the infrastructure was restored, but at least 20% of the capacities remain unavailable.
– Consequently, even at high oil prices, revenue growth is limited by logistical losses: part of the export cannot be realized, reducing the potential financial effect for the budget.
4. Russia has increased gold exports to China, which may indicate the use of the precious metal for import payments.
– By the end of 2025, gold deliveries from Russia to China increased ninefold — from 2.8 tons in 2024 to 25.3 tons. The main volume of exports occurred in the fourth quarter.
– It is likely that gold is used as a payment tool for critical imports from China in the context of sanction restrictions and complicated currency settlements.
– Russia remains one of the largest gold producers in the world with about 330 tons mined annually and ranks among the top 5 countries for official reserves — approximately 2340 tons. For comparison, in 2024, the Russian population purchased 75.6 tons of gold, exceeding the export volume to China.
– However, the key factor seems to be not the scale of supplies, but the very fact of using gold as a payment tool, which may indicate increasing restrictions on financial transactions and dependence on alternative import schemes.
5. Exports of diesel fuel from Russian Baltic ports increased by 22% in March compared to February, but volumes may sharply decrease in April due to strikes on infrastructure.
– About 400 thousand tons of diesel were shipped through Ust-Luga — 80% more than in February and twice as much year-on-year. However, a series of attacks on the ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga at the end of March complicated the export of oil products, adding to the existing ban on gasoline exports.
– If the infrastructure is not quickly restored, diesel exports through the Baltic ports in April could fall by 30–50%. Some volumes could theoretically be redirected through the Greater Port of Saint Petersburg and Vysotsk, but these capabilities are limited.
– Redirecting exports to southern ports, such as Novorossiysk or Taman, requires railway logistics over a distance of more than 2,000 km, significantly increasing costs and facing limited railway throughput. It is estimated that only 15–20% of the dropped volumes can realistically be redistributed.
6. One of Russia’s key oil hubs in the Baltic — Ust-Luga — has resumed crude oil shipments after a five-day halt, which also affected Primorsk, while disruptions have been recorded in the port of Novorossiysk in the southern direction.
– Simultaneous problems in both the Baltic and Black Sea nodes, as well as disruptions in the operation of CPC infrastructure and the Druzhba pipeline, have created unprecedented pressure on the entire export system. Every day of downtime not only delays tankers but also quickly fills up storage tanks within the country, bringing companies to the brink of a forced reduction in production.
– Shifting pressure from oil refining to port infrastructure changes the export economy: if previously losses at refineries could be offset by increasing crude oil exports, port blockages practically close this mechanism during periods of high prices.
– With Urals prices around $105 per barrel, delays mean not only cash flow gaps but also increased freight costs due to elevated risks in the Black and Azov Seas.
– There are no reserve routes for quickly rerouting such volumes, and the strain also affects gas infrastructure, including the Turkish Stream direction. As a result, there is a risk of a real reduction in physical supplies to the global market, which supports rising prices.
– Despite a favorable pricing environment, infrastructural constraints can turn potential extra profits into a logistical crisis, forcing exporters to work with larger discounts and lose some revenue.
7. In Germany, investigators conducted extensive searches in a case related to circumventing sanctions against Russia, checking the activities of three companies in the Frankfurt am Main region.
– According to media reports, the searches took place on March 27 at 14 sites — residential and commercial premises in Frankfurt and surrounding areas. A significant volume of documents and electronic media was seized during the operation, and assets of two companies worth approximately €987,000 and €148,000 were frozen.
– The investigation suspects that at least two companies systematically exported engineering components and chemicals to Russia, violating EU sanctions. They used transport companies and logistics chains through third countries to conceal the end recipient.
– The investigation is led by the Frankfurt Prosecutor’s Office, with the management of three companies under suspicion. The scheme was uncovered after checking the foreign economic activity of one of the firms, which made deliveries to Russian clients.
– Essentially, this is a classic model of circumventing sanctions — through intermediaries and “transit” jurisdictions, allowing Russia to receive critically important components despite the restrictions.
8. In 2026, Russia ranked second to last in the world for internet freedom according to Cloudwards.
– The study analyzed access to torrent sites, adult content, opportunities for political and civic online expression, and VPN usage.
– Russia scored only 4 out of 100, placing it in the same group as China, Iran, and Pakistan. The worst result was recorded in North Korea—0 points, where internet access is practically limited to a select few.
– The highest level of internet freedom—92 points—was achieved by 11 countries, including Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, New Zealand, and Slovakia.
– The group with high scores (84 points) includes Canada, Poland, Switzerland, Lithuania, and Croatia. Next are countries with scores ranging from 80 to 76 (Ireland, Sweden, Portugal, Argentina, and others) and from 72 to 68 (Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, etc.).
– The USA, Germany, France, and Japan each scored 64 points, corresponding to a medium level of freedom. The United Kingdom scored 52 points.
– Ukraine scored 44 points, placing it in the lower part of the ranking along with several countries where access restrictions and content control are recorded.
– Russia remains among the most restricted digital environments in the world, trailing only North Korea and being on par with countries with strict state control of the internet.
