About the current moment.
10 days until summer. President Trump synchronized his watch with Emperor Xi, baskak Pu was brought up to date with his current status. This marks a new horizon – September 2026. Let’s fix the starting position.
1. To begin with, I note that Ukrainians in general still cannot cure their unhealthy tendency to recklessly love with their ears and exaggerate the importance of symbolic tinsel. Hence the endless chewing over whether baskak Pu is pitifully scurrying after Emperor Xi. How will pillow games on chairs in Beijing affect the global development of AI? And so on.
When airtime and heads are filled with this nonsense, important things are lost.
Let me remind you that not so long ago, British King Charles III uncompromisingly called for support of the brave Ukrainian people. This was enthusiastically interpreted as a directive from Freemasons and reptilians to rally around the “Kyiv regime.”
However, the British government (following the Americans) suddenly (not) softened sanctions on Russian oil. What do you think the EU will do in this situation after some time?
Now the London decision will allow Russians to kill thousands more Ukrainians and further destroy our cities. Even earlier, the former queen of the seas began to show inexplicable (not) loyalty to Russian tankers. Even the Swedes look more aggressive and consistent.
Does this mean the king was deceitful? Not necessarily. The fact is that Britain has entered a period of the most severe political turbulence. The ruling party is surrendering one frontier after another. Therefore, practical measures are needed to please voters, including acceptable fuel prices. And the government will proceed from the real situation.
Considering this, we must learn to evaluate what symbolic moves are converted into? What actions? If they hang in the air or mask something directly opposite, well, then it’s not worth deceiving ourselves. Comrade Trump is endlessly useful in this regard as a powerful hygienic tool that cures illusions.
Our friends in interpreting international and internal politics are the caliper, protractor, and the most terrifying device in war – the calculator. Let’s start with it.
2. Let’s take the dynamics of spring and extrapolate to the next three months.
For example, record in a column, how many gas stations, electric trains, trucks, and other transport were destroyed by the Russians in the Kharkiv region to a depth of up to 100 km from the DBR. How many houses they destroyed along the state border perimeter at 20+ km. This morning, the enemy twice attacked cars in Zolochiv. On the Kharkiv ring road, FPV hit a truck and police. And another house in Kharkiv’s private sector was burned down by “lightning”…
The trend is stable and evident. The number of those same gas stations in the city and region is a finite quantity. What will happen if the dynamics continue is clear.
The next step is also evident: the Russians will begin to purposefully destroy agricultural machinery and burn crops.
The next level of escalation: attacks on energy facilities and (directly or indirectly) on water supply. Not necessarily, but probable.
In summary: the price for the next three months in a single region is more or less measurable. Residents of Odesa can perform the same analysis in their area, as well as those in Chernihiv, Sumy, Dnipro, Kherson, Nikopol…
Citizens’ moods are easy to imagine. They will be even more uneven across the country. Advance (!) efforts should be invested here.
3. The situation coverage on the LBS needs to be brought to sense. The fact is the enemy lacks noticeable dynamics. However, it is often ignored that the evaluation criteria have somewhat changed.
Formal territory control often does not reveal the essence. Drones penetrate 20-30 km deep (increasingly up to 50 km) from the formal LBS. This means that our troops may hold certain points or the first line, but behind them, there is a 20 km total death zone where the enemy not only kills everything living but also intercepts supply drones.
Considering this, it is highly likely that significant territory chunks will unexpectedly be re-colored on the map at some point. This will provoke an emotional storm about a “front breakthrough.” Even though this has long been a formed picture.
I fully assume that the Russian command in its reports to Kremlin elders about summer plans is based on the hypothetical dynamics of the influence of Russian drones on the battlefield.
They expect the collapse of our defense over significant areas (from Kup’iansk down the Oskol, beyond Slov’iansk, beyond Kramatorsk) due to logistics cutting and de-facto blockade by drones. And at some points, they might succeed.
HOWEVER.
Flip this picture towards the enemy.
We are already actively moderating logistics with drones not only around Donetsk but also in Mariupol. The “land corridor to Crimea” is rapidly turning into a pumpkin. On the Mariupol – Berdiansk – Melitopol section, the Russians do not manage to clear burning tankers and supply trucks from the road. Similar trends are marked between Melitopol and Dzhankoi. Russian truckers share experienced tips on how to sneak (!) from Russia to occupied Crimea.
In several sections, our troops operate on the ground in the Russians’ formal rear. So just as the Russians can repaint something on the map in their favor, so can the Ukrainian army. But not yet timely.
Additionally, locomotives of freight trains and tanks are being locally disabled (particularly in the Luhansk region).
Importantly: SBS, SBU, SSO, and other Defense Forces of Ukraine structures prioritize targeting Russian UAV operators and devastate the occupants’ personnel bases up to 100 km from the LBS. The recent performance in Snezhnoye is very illustrative.
Also impressive is the plot with the FSB bodies on the Arabat Spit. Here the same calculator for 3 months.
4. Where else numbers are needed – in assessing the impact on Russia’s oil sector, chemical industry, and military-industrial complex.
The list of successful hits is known. Today it was replenished with another visit to the Syzran Oil Refinery. The media are brimming with headlines about the number of stopped oil refineries and hypothetically clogged wells. But here it is important not to lose the thread and fix this.
We do not know the total damage to the Russian oil industry, because somewhere it is short-term, somewhere long-term, with many manipulations. The Russians are quietly fixing some things.
Let’s take a conservative figure cited by Mikhail Khodorkovsky: Ukraine has momentarily reduced the capabilities of the Russian oil sector by approximately 10%. Let’s assume this is the case.
The dynamics show an increase in the number of successful strikes and rising damage. Let’s assume that in 3 months, the Russians will repair at least half of what is currently outside the brackets. But simultaneously, another 10-15-20% will be knocked out. So by autumn, it is quite likely that the Russian oil industry will sag by 15-20% overall. This is not fatal, but substantial.
Plus, there are two more processes.
One was mentioned by the same Khodorkovsky: every industry has a certain investment cycle. The pause without systematic investments in Russia has already dragged on for 4+ years, which in a few years will begin to provoke breaks in thin places and cascade collapses.
The second point is emphasized by technical experts.
One of the extremely important consequences of visits by good drones is not only the immediate damage but also depriving the system of reserve capacities.
Imagine that any of your household appliances is always working at maximum capacity. The kettle is always boiling, all screens have brightness and sound set to maximum, the car is at maximum RPM, etc. Such a mode wears out faster. Either you need to forcibly reduce power, or the risks of incidents increase.
An increase in the number of breakdowns, downtime due to prolonged routine work, etc., can be expected.
The Russians calculate all this perfectly.
5. There are already many cries from the Z-community online: “either mobilization in the fall or a ceasefire.” Pragmatists will speak from their side: by the end of the summer, the oil sector will hurt, and by the end of the year, there is a risk of turning an unacceptably large part of the sector into tatters. How painful is it?
According to open data, Russians on average commission about 20 large (10-50K cubic meters) oil storage tanks per year, ensuring an increase in storage capacity by about 4 million barrels (about 500 thousand tons). There are a number of nuances, as this is partly the repair of existing tanks, partly the introduction of new ones means decommissioning outdated ones. For example, after 2014, they actively built new ones; since 2022, they have mainly been repairing. Therefore, the numbers are approximate.
So, in three months, Ukraine nullified the results of innovations for at least 2 years (40+ tanks burned or damaged). At this pace, by the end of the summer, Russians will lose the results of efforts for 5 years. And this is despite the fact that they are accumulating a gap due to the lack of systematic investments.
Russians know better than we do how this will affect the bottleneck – oil production, from which federal budget revenues are derived.
To restore all this, colossal investment programs will be needed. Without access to external resources, this cannot be resolved. This implies the lifting of a significant part of the sanctions. Which implies AT LEAST a ceasefire. And here we can return to visits to China.
6. It’s customary in the network to assess Trump’s voyage as unsuccessful.
If you list the main results, they look not like a breakthrough, but like the creation of infrastructure for controlled rivalry with de-escalation mechanisms (2 new commissions created, working groups agreed, etc.). Which is not so bad in the current hysterical environment.
The next round will take place in September, Emperor Xi will visit the USA with a state visit during the “leaders’ week” at the UN. Given that China (and Russia along with it) appeals to the UN model as one that excludes malicious dominance by a single hegemon, Xi’s appearance at the UN General Assembly is also likely. France will chair the UN Security Council in September.
The main result of the visit by basketman Pu: Russia, it seems, did not receive support for significant escalation. Everything will remain the same as it was.
It looks something like this: Xi made it clear that Pu has until September to show some result with existing forces and means (in Ukraine, against the Baltics, wherever). Because after that, if China and the US enter a de-escalation process for harmonious division of the world, this line will be set as a directive for the Kremlin. Or some new framework will be marked.
Conversely, this increases the risks of military escalation in the Persian Gulf, to somehow settle everything by autumn. Cuba will likely be played based on perceptions of influencing election outcomes (either by July 4th or already in the fall).
To escalate for the Kremlin by July 4th (ideally – by July 19th, when the World Cup ends) means greatly offending Trump. Which is very incautious without urgent need.
Conclusion: straightforward calculations and linear logic show that the end of July – August is a period of potential escalation in the “small victorious war/operation” format. For Russia, this is a chance to regain some subjectivity, solve part of the internal issues (ahead of elections), and expand the number of continuation scenarios (up to mobilization).
7. Agitation around all three Baltic countries is not necessarily a guarantee of escalation, but it is a necessary technical condition. Because it’s hard without buildup.
This also includes nuclear games.
The speech of the first lady of RF Alexander Lukashenko with peacekeeping messages looks like a very crude formation of an alibi. I remind you that in January-February 2022, Lukashenko and his minions swore there were no threats to Ukraine from Belarusian territory. And it’s good that their words were taken with skepticism. Now they can simply be ignored.
Moreover, now Ukraine can single-handedly nullify the Mozyr and Novopolotsk refineries, as well as several chemical enterprises (Soligorsk, Lyuban, Petrikov, Grodno). Lukashenko would like to avoid this because he will lose the last resources for maneuvering.
The Russians may try with relatively small forces to open a new front line, either to bargain for its closure or to develop it into a full-fledged argument.
This is a very risky venture, but Putin has no other options. The continuation of the war, the maintenance of sanctions (financial) guarantees stress and decline.
Our task is to do everything to push Russia to exit the war. Rear support for the front is very important in this regard.
Anticipatory adequacy from the authorities will also be needed.
The destruction of gas stations and the fuel crisis in Kharkiv is no reason to leave Sloviansk. It is a reason to prepare, since such risks have already arisen. Otherwise, the crisis will be turned into a pressure tool.
Meanwhile, the Russians attacked Dnipro, injuring 19, including three children. The response, including for this, is already on the way.
