Information on current Russian losses due to sanctions as of 10/28/2026.
1. Ukrainian forces attacked the “Azot” chemical plant in the Tula region of Russia, causing a fire at the facility.
– In Novomoskovsk, Tula region of Russia, Ukrainian forces attacked the “Azot” chemical plant. A fire broke out at the facility following the attack.
– “Azot” is part of the “EuroChem” group and is one of the largest producers of nitrogen fertilizers in Russia. The plant produces ammonia, ammonium nitrate, urea, nitric acid, and methanol.
– The facility also holds significance for Russia’s military-industrial complex. According to the Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service, the plant supplied nitric acid to the Sverdlov plant in Dzerzhinsk, Nizhny Novgorod region, which manufactures explosives. Nitric acid is used in the production of explosives and ammunition.
2. Ukrainian forces attacked the Novolipetsk Steel Plant — one of the largest in Russia.
– On the night of October 27, a missile threat was declared in the Lipetsk region of Russia due to a threat to industrial infrastructure. Later, a fire was reported on the premises of the Novolipetsk Steel Plant (NLMK).
– NLMK is the largest steel plant in Russia, ranking among the top twenty worldwide. Its production capacities allow up to 17 million tons of liquid steel to be produced annually.
– A previous attack on the facility occurred in July 2026.
3. Russian maritime oil exports through western ports in November may decrease by 100,000–200,000 barrels per day.
– Russian maritime oil exports through Baltic and Black Sea ports in November may decrease by 100-200 thousand barrels per day compared to October, according to preliminary shipment plans. One reason is the resumption of refinery operations after repairs.
– Increased processing allows Russia to boost diesel fuel production, particularly to fulfill the agreements between Moscow and Washington from October 9 regarding stabilization of the global diesel market.
– In the second half of the month, processing and diesel production increased following the introduction of export quotas and US reports on easing sanctions on Russian fuel exports.
– Meanwhile, export prospects remain uncertain. Ukrainian attacks on Russian energy facilities and production cuts limit the possibility of rapidly increasing processing.
– Additional difficulties are posed by risks in the Black Sea: oil shipments in Novorossiysk are delayed by almost three weeks.
– Another factor will be the end of navigation through the Northern Sea Route, which is expected to reduce the supply of Russian Urals oil to Asia. This may also decrease overall export volumes through Russia’s western ports.
4. Russian satellites may have been assisting Iran’s allies in preparing attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil and military infrastructure.
– Russian reconnaissance satellites regularly flew over strategic Saudi Arabian facilities shortly before attacks by Iran-supported groups. This correlation was identified by the Swiss company AURORAH Geosignal Intelligence, which analyzed 40 missile and drone attacks conducted from July 1 to October 19.
– On September 10, drones launched from Iraq hit three pumping stations on the East-West pipeline, halting oil transportation. The 1200 km pipeline is an important alternative route for Saudi oil exports amid threats to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
– Approximately a week later, the Houthis attacked the King Fahd Air Base in Taif, damaging an Italian Eurofighter Typhoon jet.
– According to AURORAH, the number of Russian satellites over target areas increased by approximately 50% during the 72 hours before and after the attacks. The company tracked 11 “Cosmos-2600” series satellites and identified a total of 72 Russian reconnaissance satellites.
– However, researchers did not intercept the transmission of intelligence data to Iran or its allies: conclusions are based on correlations of satellite activity with the location and timing of attacks. Iran and its supported groups may have used Russian intelligence data for target selection.
– Saudi intelligence also links Russian satellites to March attacks by Iran on the “Prince Sultan” airbase, where a US reconnaissance aircraft was seriously damaged, and on a CIA facility in Riyadh.
– According to a Saudi official, components of Russian and Chinese manufacture were found in the rockets and drones used by the Houthis.
5. India increased ammunition exports to European countries by 17.7 times after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
– This enhances the ability of European states to replenish their arsenals and support Kyiv while creating a new market for Indian arms manufacturers and increasing competition with Russian defense exports.
– Since 2022, Indian manufacturers have supplied Europe with ammunition and related materials worth at least $872 million. In the four years before Russia’s full-scale invasion, the value of such supplies was only $49.2 million. The growth exceeded 1600%.
– About 75% of these supplies were to 13 countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In this region, India rose from 28th to second place among munitions suppliers, second only to South Korea. In the financial year 2026, which ended in March, India also became the largest supplier of explosives to these countries: exports reached $45 million compared to $35 million from the US. By the financial year 2023, Indian companies did not supply such products there at all.
– The growth in demand is linked to European countries urgently replenishing their stocks and seeking ammunition to support Ukraine after Russia’s invasion. Indian products are attractive due to their cost: according to Reuters, a 155-mm artillery shell made in India costs approximately $300–$400, while the European equivalent costs over $3000.
– For Russia, this has a double negative effect. India, which for decades was one of the main buyers of Russian arms, is expanding its production and strengthening its position in a market where Moscow traditionally competed.
– Meanwhile, European countries are increasing their capability to procure ammunition and aid Ukraine, reducing dependence on external suppliers. Indian ammunition is not necessarily transferred directly to Ukraine: European buyers can use it for their own needs, supplying Kyiv with weapons from their stocks.
6. The US is considering lifting sanctions from the Russian Direct Investment Fund.
– This concerns the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), headed by Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s special envoy involved in negotiations with Washington. Russian officials are insisting on the lifting of sanctions on the fund as part of agreements to supply diesel fuel to the U.S.
– The Biden administration imposed sanctions on the RDIF shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in 2022. At the time, U.S. authorities described the fund as one of the Kremlin’s tools for international influence, linking its activities to financing projects close to Putin.
– Dmitriev helped organize the shipment of three tankers with Russian diesel fuel to the U.S. The fuel was sent without prior payment by American buyers.
– Meanwhile, the U.S. Treasury believes that for diesel transactions, the fund already has the necessary permits following the suspension of sanctions on the fuel itself on October 9.
– The RDIF’s request for the lifting of restrictions is being reviewed in the usual manner. To achieve their removal, the fund must prove that the reasons for the imposition of sanctions are no longer relevant. Therefore, there is no final decision on the lifting of restrictions yet.
– Potential lifting of sanctions on the fund would represent a noticeable easing of U.S. economic pressure on Russia. Former Biden administration official Eric Green warned that such a move would signal a change in Washington’s approach, which previously linked the easing of sanctions to reaching agreements on Ukraine.
7. The U.S. discusses the return of American oil companies to Russia as part of peace negotiations.
– Washington and Moscow are discussing the possible return of American companies to the Russian energy market as part of negotiations to end the war against Ukraine. Options include resuming joint oil production on the Sakhalin shelf and restoring the supply of Russian oil to Europe via the Druzhba pipeline.
– Donald Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, raised economic deal issues during meetings with Putin. The White House views them as part of a post-war economic framework that should be included in a comprehensive peace agreement.
– In contrast, the Kremlin seeks to restore business ties with the US even before the end of hostilities. This discrepancy remains one of the main obstacles to agreements.
– The list of possible deals is much broader than the oil sector. Discussions include the resumption of Russian titanium supplies for the American aviation industry, including Boeing, allowing American airlines to fly through Russian airspace, selling Lukoil’s foreign assets to investors, and cooperation in the gas sector.
– Other ideas include partial restoration of supplies through Nord Stream and easing sanctions on Russian potash fertilizers.
– However, the return of American business is not guaranteed. ExxonMobil, which exited the Sakhalin-1 project after the full-scale invasion began, does not plan to return. European countries oppose easing sanctions until the end of the war.
– Western diplomats also doubt that economic benefits will persuade Putin to give up his military goals. For Russia, such agreements could mean access to American capital, technologies, and markets lost due to the war and sanctions.
– At the same time, the very fact of negotiations does not imply the lifting of restrictions or the readiness of American companies to return. Washington links large-scale economic deals with the cessation of the war, while Moscow seeks to achieve normalization of relations earlier.
8. An American company will pay a $1.53 million fine for supplying equipment to a Russian missile manufacturer for the S-300 and S-400.
– The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) fined the American company Extreme Networks $1,529,685 for supplying network equipment to the Moscow-based machine-building plant Avangard, which manufactures missiles for Russia’s S-300 and S-400 anti-aircraft systems. The enterprise is part of the Almaz-Antey concern, which is under American sanctions.
– According to OFAC, from September 2018 to March 2022, Extreme Networks exported equipment to the Russian plant nine times. Although Avangard was only added to the U.S. sanctions list on June 28, 2022, American companies were prohibited from cooperating with it previously due to its affiliation with sanctioned Almaz-Antey.
– The American agency found that the cooperation involved numerous meetings between representatives of Extreme Networks and the plant’s employees, at least two of which took place directly at the enterprise in Russia. Moreover, as early as 2020, the company had access to a contractor verification system, which likely could have identified Avangard’s connection with Almaz-Antey.
– The agreement with OFAC includes a fine for violating American sanctions. This case demonstrates that supplying technological equipment to the Russian military-industrial complex may have financial consequences for foreign suppliers even when a specific enterprise is not yet individually listed in the sanctions.
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