Information on current Russian losses due to sanctions as of 05/23/2026.
1. Ukraine has opened the way for its long-range drones to strike deep into Russia, significantly weakening the frontline air defense system of the occupiers.
– Massive attacks on Russian refineries, ports, and military enterprises, including the largest attack on the Moscow region since the beginning of the war on May 17, have become possible thanks to the new tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
– This involves the systematic use of mid-range drones targeting objects at a distance of 30–200 km from the frontline. Ukrainian forces are destroying Russian air defense complexes, logistical hubs, and rear infrastructure, opening corridors for further strikes on strategic Russian energy and defense industry targets.
– The Commander of Ukraine’s Drone Systems Forces, Robert Brovdi, stated that since the beginning of the year, Ukrainian drones have destroyed at least 129 Russian air defense systems in occupied territories. According to him, the Russian army is already forced to use outdated Soviet complexes and radars from the 1960s due to the shortage of modern systems.
– Against this backdrop, Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refining are becoming increasingly painful for the Russian economy.
2. In Novorossiysk, after a night drone attack, the “Grushova Balka” oil depot and the “Sheskharis” transshipment complex caught fire — key Transneft facilities in southern Russia.
– A significant portion of Russian oil’s sea export passes through these terminals. The “Sheskharis” complex is the endpoint of major oil pipelines and one of the main loading hubs for raw materials via the Black Sea.
– Damage to the infrastructure creates risks of reducing Russian oil exports, which are already under pressure from sanctions, logistical problems, and regular strikes on energy facilities.
– In recent months, drone attacks have increasingly incapacitated Russian refineries, oil depots, and port infrastructure, already leading to a drop in petroleum product exports and disruptions in the operation of several terminals.
3. Russia is halting the “Ladoga” civil aircraft project, which the Kremlin presented as one of the key replacements for the outdated Soviet An-24 and An-26 as part of the “revival” program of the aircraft industry after sanctions.
– The civilian version of the TVRS-44 “Ladoga” aircraft has been put on hold, and the project is being redirected to meet the needs of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Now the aircraft is planned to be converted into either a military transport or cargo variant.
– Three years ago, Russian authorities promised mass production of new regional aircraft to replace Soviet technology, which is rapidly aging due to a shortage of spare parts and sanctions. According to government plans, airlines were to receive the first 25 “Ladogas” last year, and by 2030 — 140 such machines and over 900 civilian aircraft of various types.
– In reality, the project has become yet another victim of the crisis in the Russian aviation industry. Due to sanctions, technological dependence on imported components, and a lack of funding, Moscow is unable to quickly create a full line of modern civilian aircraft.
4. Russia has turned to China for funding a large-scale transport corridor to Iran and Afghanistan, once again demonstrating Moscow’s growing dependence on Beijing in the face of sanctions and the degradation of its own investment capabilities.
– The Kremlin is discussing with Chinese partners not only participation in building a new highway along the Caspian but also the direct involvement of Chinese funds to implement the project.
– This concerns the eastern branch of the international transport corridor “North-South,” which Moscow has been promoting for over 20 years but has failed to realize due to chronic funding shortages and weak infrastructure. The total cost of the project was estimated at approximately $40 billion. Russia is counting not only on Chinese technologies but also on financing from Chinese state banks and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
– This indicates how critically Russia depends on China after losing access to Western capital and technologies. Following the failure of negotiations regarding the “Power of Siberia-2” gas pipeline, the Kremlin is increasingly trying to engage Beijing in financing its transport and energy projects, effectively turning into a junior partner of the Chinese economy.
– Meanwhile, China itself is in no hurry to take on the full financial burden of Russia’s geopolitical ambitions. Beijing traditionally tries to secure the most favorable terms, taking advantage of Moscow’s weakened positions due to the war against Ukraine, sanctions, and Russia’s growing isolation from global financial markets.
5. Kyrgyzstan has begun to phase out sanction bypass schemes for Russia after itself coming under EU restrictions.
– The country’s authorities have suspended the activities of 50 companies related to wholesale trade, transportation, and logistics, suspected of assisting Moscow in supplying sanctioned goods.
– The information about risky companies in Bishkek was provided by the USA and the United Kingdom. After inspections, the registration of several firms was halted. The authorities have not disclosed the names of the companies.
– The decision was a consequence of the European Union applying, for the first time, a punishment mechanism against Kyrgyzstan for bypassing sanctions against Russia. Within the 20th package of EU sanctions, the supply of CNC machines, telecommunications equipment, and networking technology to the country was restricted.
– After the start of the full-scale war, Kyrgyzstan became one of the key channels for parallel imports for Russia. European goods and technologies, officially under sanctions, were massively entering Russia through the country. According to estimates, exports from some European countries to Kyrgyzstan increased by tens of times — from Estonia, in particular, by more than 10,000%.
– Now even Moscow’s allies in the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization are forced to respond to Western sanction pressure. This creates new problems for the Kremlin with the supply of critically important technologies and equipment needed for both the civilian economy and the military-industrial complex.
6. Switzerland has partially joined the 20th package of EU sanctions against Russia and Belarus but decided not to replicate all of Brussels’ restrictions in full.
– Bern agreed to implement the main sanction measures but refused to include seven companies on the lists, stating that existing mechanisms are sufficient to prevent sanctions bypass.
– Meanwhile, the Swiss authorities decided to address broader restrictions in the financial, energy, and trade sectors separately. This means that some Russian entities may still maintain access to the Swiss financial system and certain channels of international operations.
– Nonetheless, even Switzerland’s partial joining of the new sanction package intensifies pressure on the Russian economy.
– Any restrictions related to finances and international settlements remain particularly sensitive for the Kremlin, as after the start of the full-scale war, Moscow actively used neutral jurisdictions to bypass Western sanctions and maintain access to the global financial system.
7. In April, Japan sharply increased its purchases of Russian LNG, despite official statements about reducing dependence on Russian energy resources.
– Imports of liquefied gas from Russia increased by 29.5% year-on-year, although total LNG imports to Japan fell by 20.6% over the same period.
– The share of Russian gas in Japanese imports rose to 10.7%. The reason was the energy crisis in the Middle East: supply disruptions due to the war around Iran triggered a sharp price spike in the Asian LNG market — approximately 85% in just a month.
– In addition to gas, Japan significantly increased purchases of Russian coal by 2.3 times, and imports of Russian steel rose by almost 49%.
– Meanwhile, purchases of Russian oil formally decreased by 63.7%, yet Tokyo continues to maintain participation in the “Sakhalin-2” project, which remains an important source of energy resources for the country. Notably, oil imports from the Middle East to Japan fell by 67.2%, reaching their lowest level since 1979.
– This situation prompted Japanese companies to return more actively to Russian supplies, despite political declarations about reducing dependency on Moscow.
