
Information on current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 11/22/2026.
1. The Russian combine “Ural Steel” is on the verge of bankruptcy amid the deepening crisis of Russian metallurgy.
– The Russian metallurgical combine “Ural Steel” has faced a sharp deterioration in its financial situation. The company completed the first half of 2026 with a loss of 7.3 billion rubles, and its operational indicators show serious problems with profitability and liquidity.
– The situation is complicated by numerous legal claims from suppliers and contractors.
– The problems of the combine are developing against the backdrop of a general decline in the Russian metallurgy industry. According to the management of “Severstal,” domestic steel consumption in Russia has decreased by 18–20% compared to the levels of 2023–2024.
– The biggest decline in demand has come from the energy sector — by 45%, and machine building — by 32%. High interest rates, weak investment activity, and reduced construction are holding back market recovery.
– According to industry estimates, from January to October, steel production in Russia decreased by 3% year-on-year, to 54.4 million tons, and the output of finished rolled products fell by 3.6%, to 47.4 million tons.
2. Problems with aircraft engine production threaten Russia’s plans to produce import-substituted aircraft: the “ODK-Saturn” plant is downsizing 680 employees.
– The Russian aviation industry faces difficulties in establishing mass production of domestic aircraft engines, jeopardizing plans to produce import-substituted aircraft. One of the key engine manufacturers — the “ODK-Saturn” plant in Rybinsk, Yaroslavl region — plans to lay off 680 employees.
– The situation at the plant is indicative of the problems facing the entire industry. “ODK-Saturn,” part of the “Rostec” structure, is supposed to ensure the mass production of PD-8 engines for import-substituted Superjet 100 aircraft. The company also manufactures engines for Ilyushin Il-76 transport, combat aviation, and other aviation products.
– The reduction in staff at a production facility that is supposed to increase the output of new engines indicates difficulties in implementing these plans.
3. Russia has imported almost 4.8 million cars during the war: the auto industry depends on Chinese cars and parallel imports.
– From the beginning of 2022 to October 2026, Russia imported 4.79 million cars, about half of which came from China. Of the total volume, 2.83 million cars, or 59%, were new, and another 1.96 million were used.
– China became the main supplier of new cars, providing 77.5% of their imports. Kyrgyzstan accounted for 8.7%, Kazakhstan 4.1%, Belarus 3%, and South Korea 1.7%.
– In the used car segment, Japan became the largest supplier with a share of 54.4%. Cars also came from South Korea (12.2%), China (10.3%), Belarus (8.1%), and Armenia (3.8%).
– The scale of imports shows how dependent the Russian car market is on foreign supplies after the departure of most Western automakers in 2022.
– Instead of restoring its own production, Russia is forced to compensate for the car deficit with imports, primarily from China, as well as by purchasing used cars from Asian countries.
4. EU sanctions against Russia fall short of American ones, and hopes on the US Congress are overrated.
– This year, the European Union imposed more new sanctions than the US for the first time, but its sanction mechanism remains slow and insufficiently effective.
– According to LexisNexis Risk Solutions, since the beginning of 2026, the EU has added 2,794 entries to its sanctions lists, about 95% of which are related to Russia. At the same time, the US has removed more Russian organizations from its sanction lists than it has added.
– European sanctions lag behind American ones in speed, scale, and territorial coverage. Approving restrictions in the EU requires unanimous support from all 27 member states, which delays decisions.
– Additionally, sanction databases contain outdated data, and the lack of precise personal information complicates the identification of sanctioned individuals.
– The prospect of strengthening American sanctions through Congress remains uncertain. Even if Democrats gain control of Congress in January, overcoming a potential presidential veto by Donald Trump would require a two-thirds majority in both houses.
– A change in Washington’s policy towards Russia is not guaranteed, and Europe will likely have to rely on its own sanction system for a long time.
5. Finland is trying to claim over €25 billion from Russia and Gazprom based on international arbitration rulings.
– Finland is trying to enforce three international arbitration awards for damages totaling over €25 billion.
– The largest claim is €16.4 billion against Gazprom Export for halting gas supplies to the German company Uniper and other European consumers in 2022.
– Nearly €10 billion more is sought directly from the Russian state. Specifically, Luxembourg’s Yukos Capital demands €4.3 billion for the unlawful confiscation of investments in the Yukos case, and Ukraine’s Naftogaz seeks €4.9 billion in compensation for Russian-seized assets in Crimea.
– In Finland, Russian property worth tens of millions of euros has already been seized, including real estate, shares in residential companies, and funds. These seizures have been pursued by Naftogaz and its subsidiaries.
– In early November, the Helsinki Court of Appeal halted further asset seizures following a Hague arbitration court’s decision on lack of jurisdiction over most of the claims. Previously imposed seizures remain in effect.
– Fully collecting the awarded sums will be difficult: Russia and Gazprom have insufficient assets in Finland that can be confiscated and sold. The Russian side is contesting the compensation awards and their enforcement in Finnish courts and other jurisdictions.
