Information on current Russian losses due to sanctions as of 03.07.2026.
1. The fuel crisis in Russia has led to prices for A-92 gasoline exceeding the average price level in the US in 12 regions. This is evidenced by data from Rosstat and the American Automobile Association (AAA).
– The average price of Regular gasoline in the US at the end of June was $1.02 per liter (about 78.3 rubles at the official exchange rate). Meanwhile, in several Russian regions A-92 was already more expensive.
– The highest official prices were recorded in occupied Sevastopol (97.95 rub./l). However, the real cost of gasoline in occupied Crimea significantly exceeds official statistics.
– According to local sources, prices in Sevastopol reach 199 rubles per liter, and in other parts of the peninsula — 185–200 rubles. Across Russia, gasoline prices increased by 1.6% over the last week, and since the beginning of June — by 6.7%, marking the highest monthly increase since 2009.
– The annual price increase approached 20% — the maximum in the last 16 years.
2. Russia’s Sberbank warned of a new wave of troubled loans due to the fuel crisis in Russia.
– The financial condition of Russian businesses continues to deteriorate, and the fuel crisis exacerbates companies’ problems with loan repayments. In recent months, the bank has recorded a worrying deterioration in the quality of its corporate loan portfolio.
– More and more companies are requesting debt restructuring, and the volume of troubled loans is increasing amid high interest rates and fuel shortages.
– According to the Central Bank of Russia, as of April, the volume of problematic corporate loans, considering risky restructurings, reached 11.2 trillion rubles or 11.6% of the corporate loan portfolio.
– The greatest difficulties are observed in the coal industry, black metallurgy, construction, as well as among oil and gas sector companies.
– Sberbank acknowledges that the situation in the fuel market is already negatively affecting the economic situation of many enterprises and increases the risk of further non-payment growth.
3. A record share of Russians in 20 years reported a decline in living standards.
– In 2026, 56% of Russian residents reported a decline in their standard of living — the highest level in two decades of observations. Over the year, the share of such respondents increased by 13 percentage points, and compared to 2022, by 22 points.
– 60% of respondents believe the economic situation in the country is deteriorating. This is also a record level of economic pessimism in the history of the studies. For the first time, more than half of the adult population is pessimistic about the country’s economic prospects.
– The initial surge of optimism after the start of the full-scale war against Ukraine has completely turned into growing pessimism. Among the reasons are the prolonged war, regular drone attacks, high inflation, and worsening economic conditions.
– There is also a sharp drop in trust in state institutions. Trust in the military fell to 66% over the year — the lowest level since 2013, and in the government to 53%, the lowest since 2021. Trust in Russian media fell to a historic low — only 34% of respondents.
4. The fuel crisis in Russia may last for months due to attacks on refineries.
– The fuel crisis affecting almost all regions of Russia may become the largest in the country’s recent history. Official sales restrictions on gasoline are already in place in more than 40 regions.
– In the near future, it is unlikely that the damaged refineries hit by Ukrainian strikes can increase their load. In June, oil processing in Russia fell by 25% year-on-year — to the lowest level in more than 20 years.
– Gasoline production declined by 17%, which no longer meets the needs of the domestic market. Since March, Ukrainian defense forces have attacked Russian oil infrastructure facilities at least 50 times. Some refineries have suffered repeated attacks.
– The most difficult period is yet to come, as the peak demand for fuel traditionally occurs in August–September. Currently, about a third of Russian refining capacities are idle, creating additional risks for the economy, particularly during harvest time.
5. Russia is buying gasoline from an Indian refinery linked to “Rosneft” through traders.
– The gasoline that Russia imports from India to overcome the fuel crisis is produced at the Nayara Energy refinery, 49% of which is owned by “Rosneft.”
– According to Indian Oil Minister Hardeep Singh Puri, Indian companies do not sell fuel to Russia directly. However, he acknowledged that Russia may have purchased Indian gasoline through international traders.
– After the introduction of EU sanctions, Nayara Energy turned to working through intermediaries, as the sanctions complicated settlements with customers and suppliers.
– The company’s refinery in Vadinar, with a capacity of 400,000 barrels per day, processes exclusively Russian oil after the sanctions. At least 60,000 tons of gasoline have already been sent from India to Russia.
– The fuel is transported by two tankers, each carrying 30–40 thousand tons of gasoline. Russia effectively exports cheap oil to India and then is forced to import finished gasoline from there due to the fuel shortage caused by the strikes of Ukrainian Defense Forces on Russian refineries.
6. Russia may have used shadow fleet tankers to launch drones near NATO strategic facilities in Europe.
– Russia may have used tankers from its shadow fleet to launch drones near NATO military facilities in Europe for reconnaissance and testing the effectiveness of air defense systems. This is stated in a report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
– According to researchers, from August 2024 to February 2026, there were 144 instances of drones appearing over the territory of ten NATO countries and Ireland. Almost half of the incidents involved military facilities, and some flights led to the temporary closure of major airports.
– Drones were also detected over sites where American B61-12 nuclear bombs are stored, as well as near the French submarine base with ballistic missiles.
– The authors of the report suggest that this campaign aimed to map military infrastructure and identify weaknesses in European air defense.
– It is possible that the shadow fleet vessels, regularly operating in European waters under the guise of commercial transport, were used to launch the drones.
7. The EU Court allowed criminal prosecution for spreading Russia Today materials.
– The Court of the European Union clarified the application of sanctions against Russian state media and ruled that individuals could be held criminally liable for distributing Russia Today channel materials online.
– The decision was made in response to a request from a German court reviewing the case of three individuals accused of publishing RT Germany video materials. The broadcasting of this channel was banned in the EU in 2022 as part of sanctions imposed following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
– The EU Court emphasized that the sanctions ban applies not only to broadcasters but also to the owners and administrators of websites hosting prohibited content, regardless of whether they profit from it.
– Funding the resource solely through voluntary donations does not exempt from liability.
– The decision confirms that disseminating materials from Russian state propaganda resources could be grounds for criminal prosecution in European Union countries.
8. The US warned Poland of a possible armed provocation by Russia to test NATO’s resolve.
– The USA has repeatedly warned Poland about a possible armed provocation from Russia, aimed at testing NATO’s readiness to fulfill its collective defense obligations. Russia may strike Polish critical infrastructure, such as power plants, using drones or missiles, or organize a limited border incursion using Russian or Belarusian military forces.
– Scenarios also include simulated airstrikes or deliberate border violations under the pretext of a technical malfunction or “rescue operation.”
– The main goal of such a provocation is to force Western allies to start negotiations with Moscow instead of a military response, to undermine confidence in NATO’s collective defense mechanisms, and to achieve a reduction or cessation of military support for Ukraine.
– Polish and Baltic sources indicate that such scenarios are being discussed in Moscow, and after a possible provocation, Russia might attempt to blame Ukraine for the incident.
– At the same time, a decision to implement such a scenario has not been made, and any provocation, if it occurs, is most likely to have a hybrid format rather than an open warfare one.
