Today will be brief regarding the situation in certain directions.
1. Northern Slobozhansky (Sumy) direction.
Intense fighting continues in the border area of the Sumy region of Ukraine (to the east and southeast of the city of Sumy). The enemy (Russian troops), with the forces of the forward units and formations of the “Sever” grouping (apparently acting with a certain consolidated tactical group (TG), units and subdivisions of the 11th and 14th army corps (AC), possibly with the involvement of forces and resources from the 44th AC) is trying to deepen its incursion into the Ukrainian border zone, conducting intensive offensive/assault actions in the following directions:
– Hrabovske – Riasne,
– Vysoke – Taratutyne,
– and also attacking southwest from the line Myropilske — Prokhody.
Currently, it seems premature to talk about significant results for the enemy (even in a tactical sense). It is likely that their small infantry (assault) groups were only able to secure positions north of Taratutyne, “hook” onto the northeastern outskirts of Riasne (most of the village remains under Ukrainian Armed Forces control), and reach the area south of it. After two weeks of fighting in these directions, the enemy managed to advance to a depth of up to 1.5 km.
Attacks (attempts to advance) by the enemy from the line Myropilske – Prokhody towards the villages of Turja and Petrushivka were apparently unsuccessful.
Meanwhile, Russian units operating along the line Andriyivka-Yunakivka (Russian incursion in the northeastern part of the Sumy region) have also not yet achieved significant results.
2. Southern Slobozhansky (Vovchansk) direction
It seems that the enemy’s consolidated tactical group (TG) “Belgorod-Kharkiv”, consisting mainly of units and subdivisions of the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) and the 44th Army Corps (AC), has recently increased the intensity of attacks/assault actions by its forward units in this direction. At the same time, its command is trying to increase the tactical depth of the advance (progress) of its assault groups by equipping them with additional “light motorization” means (motorcycles, buggies, etc.).
Currently, the command of the Russian TG is trying to simultaneously solve several tactical tasks in the Vovchansk area, including:
– Fully take control of the Synelnykove – Tsegelynne – Vilcha – Lyman area, acting via the railway from Vovchansk towards Vilcha, and also trying to advance the main forces of their forward units from Synelnykove towards Symynivka. It should be understood that by doing so, the enemy command is apparently trying to secure the flank of the main forces’ offensive in the general direction of Vovchansk – Bilyi Kolodyaz, acting along the road of the same name.
Currently, this task has not yet been resolved by the enemy. Their separate small infantry (assault) groups have apparently entrenched north of Symynivka and in the northern part of Graf’ske, where they managed to “infiltrate” a month ago. However, the enemy still cannot build upon this success.
In turn, the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to hold at least half of Vilcha, as well as positions in the Lyman and Prylipivka areas, effectively blocking the further advance of the enemy along the Siverskyi Donets to the south.
– Additionally, it is likely that the command of the Russian task group operating in this direction is trying to stretch along the front, involving the forces and means of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, which are defending in the Vovchansk area.
It is likely that in accordance with this effort, the enemy managed to break into Ukrainian territory east of the city towards Mariino – Zybine by 3.5-3.7 km, operating north of the Vovcha River. However, Russian troops apparently still failed to capture Zybine itself. Moreover, Ukrainian units are likely continuing to hold several positions northwest of the village, north of Vovcha.
– In Vovchansk itself, the Ukrainian Defense Forces apparently continue to fight on the southeastern outskirts of the city, holding several positions along the Vilcha – Vovchanski Khutory line (in the area of the Paris Commune and Stanychna Streets). The enemy actively seeks to completely expel Ukrainian troops from the city, but so far is unsuccessful.
– In turn, west of the Siverskyi Donets, in the zone of the enemy’s 18th Motor Rifle Division, south of the village of Lukiantsi, their advanced assault groups have likely also advanced 2 km along the Lypets River. However, it is worth noting that further advancement is apparently hampered by flanking threats from both Neskuchne and Lypets.
3. Velykyi Burluk direction.
Ukrainian troops continue active counterattacking actions in the area of Russian military penetration in the border zone of the Kharkiv region of Ukraine east of Velykyi Burluk, in the zone of their 6th Separate Guards Tank Army.
After driving the enemy out of advanced positions in the direction of Ambarne – Milove, the Armed Forces of Ukraine apparently also counterattacked in the direction of Hryhorivka – Odradne. As a result, they managed to recapture (liberate) the village of Odradne and advance towards the state border by 3.1-3.2 km over a section about 7 km wide.
Considering that the forward units of the 6th Separate Guards Tank Army control the village of Dvorychanske quite “unstably” (since the village is actually located in the so-called “gray zone”), the Ukrainian Armed Forces, if they continue to counterattack effectively in this direction, may have a chance to completely “defragment” the so-called Russian “security zone” created by Russian 6th Separate Guards Tank Army forces in winter and early spring along the state border from Milove to the Oskil River.
However, in this context, it is worth noting that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have ALREADY managed to achieve certain tactical results with their counterattacks in this direction.
The point is that the command of the Russian 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) likely has a rather obvious plan for its “breakthrough” in the area of Velykyi Burluk, so to speak, “by the shortest route” along directions that coincide both from the Oskil bridgehead and from their “wedging” east of Velykyi Burluk, meaning from the side of Milove and Odradne.
Most likely, one of its main elements was (and likely remains) encircling and subsequently capturing the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ defensive “node” in the area of Kolodiazne, which, in turn, would mean the simultaneous advance of forward units of the 6th CAA to the area of Hryhorivka (northwest of Kolodiazne) and to the area of Novovasylivka (south of Kolodiazne).
This is quite eloquently confirmed by the persistent attempts of the 6th CAA units to reach the line of Novovasylivka – Petro-Ivanivka, located along the Verkhna Dvurechenska River, acting from Krasne Pershe. Additionally, it’s worth noting that these attempts by assault groups from the forward parts and units of the Russian 6th CAA did not cease even during the “epic” related to the “liberation of Kupiansk,” in which the main forces of its 68th Motor Rifle Division participated — 121st and 122nd Motor Rifle Regiments, whose units previously broke through from the bridgehead to the city and were essentially defeated there by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
In other words, the command of the Russian 6th CAA perceived and, likely, still continues to perceive its hypothetical “strike” towards Velykyi Burluk quite seriously.
Therefore, successful counterattacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the direction of Ambarny – Milove and in the area of Odradne have, let’s say, ALREADY introduced “very significant adjustments” to this plan of the enemy’s command. Primarily concerning the degree of realism of its implementation.
If the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue their counterattacks, for instance, in the direction of Milove or towards Dvorychanske – Bologaivka, or in the direction of Stroivka, essentially “fragmenting” this entire “security zone” into separate “segments,” then the enemy’s 6th CAA command will clearly have to shift their main efforts in the form of a possible “dash” towards Velykyi Burluk to their Oskil bridgehead.
This, in turn, will significantly complicate for them the implementation of their operational-tactical plan for a “breakthrough” towards Velykyi Burluk. Since in this case, having a fairly full-flowing Oskil in the immediate tactical rear and at the same time a rather narrow (shallow) bridgehead on it (depth – from 4.5 to 6.6 km in the “widest” places), the enemy will clearly face significant difficulties in concentrating and deploying on the bridgehead the forces and means necessary for a “rapid advance” to Velykyi Burluk. From then on, the Oskil River itself and accordingly, the Russian 6th CAA bridgehead on it, are observable and targeted by a wide range of Ukrainian reconnaissance and strike means.
In such a case, it would be sufficient for the Ukrainian command to wait for the moment when the command of the Russian 6th CAA “brings” to the bridgehead (or more precisely, accumulates there) its assault infantry in “commodity” quantities as for an offensive, and cover this entire “celebration” with several powerful and targeted fire raids, plus drones in the quantity necessary to finish off the survivors. I think it will not be difficult for them to determine this necessary moment.
Furthermore, due to the fact that the bridgehead is quite shallow, its use for further advancement on Velykyi Burluk will require additional efforts from the Russian command. Since its assault infantry accumulating there will need to be concentrated somewhere (and hidden), covered and camouflaged.
In my opinion, the fact that for counterattacks in the sector of the Russian 6th Army, the Ukrainian command chose not its bridgehead on the Oskil, but primarily the area of its incursion into the Kharkiv region of Ukraine from Milove to Oskil (where the 6th Army command clearly does not face the aforementioned “bridgehead” difficulties), indicates a fairly balanced and adequate assessment by the Ukrainian command of the overall operational-tactical situation in the Velykyi Burluk direction.
Photo: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
