Kostiantynivka and Kramatorsk directions.
The enemy (Russian forces) continues offensive actions within the framework of the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk operational-strategic offensive operation in the operational zone of its troop grouping “South,” aiming to establish complete and stable control over the city of Kostiantynivka, as well as reach the outskirts of the cities of Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk from the south, southeast, and east.
During the reporting period, the enemy achieved some tactical results in a number of areas, but failed to accomplish its main task of fully capturing the entire city of Kostiantynivka with the main forces of its forward units and subdivisions. The battles in the city itself continue, although there are quite a few enemy assault and small infantry groups present.
Currently, the main forces of the Russian forward units are still on the outskirts of Kostiantynivka β in the area of the city cemetery, on the northern outskirts of the village of Ivanopillia, between the village of Illinivka and the western (central) part of the city. However, the mass infiltration of small (and not only small) Russian infantry groups into the city itself continues. They have been recorded in varying numbers in almost all areas of Kostiantynivka, as well as on its outskirts.
1. The enemy operates in these directions with the following forces and means (likely):
3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA), operating with part of its forces:
– 84th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) β I wrote about its composition in one of the previous reviews; it operates in these areas almost in full composition.
– 85th and 88th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigades (SMRBr), operating with part of their forces.
– Possible presence of separate units of the 123rd SMRBr.
– Part of the forces of the 2nd Artillery Brigade (ABr).
8th OA:
– part of the forces of the 20th MRD (likely, units of the 10th Tank Regiment\TR and one of its motorized rifle regiments\MRR β 242nd or 255th MRR, 944th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment\SAP).
– part of the forces of the 150th MRD (103rd MRR and possibly 68th TR, 381st SAP).
– 238th ABr.
3rd Army Corps (AC):
– 6th MRD (1008th, 1307th and 1442nd MRR “Territorial Troops”/TT, as well as 54th MRR and 89th TR).
– 72nd SMRBr.
– 17th ABr.
Reinforcement forces and means:
– from the 51st Combined Arms Army (CAA) β the 1219th and 1436th Motor Rifle Regiments (MRR).
– from the 18th CAA β the 70th Motor Rifle Division (24th, 26th, and 28th MRR, 17th Tank Regiment, 81st Artillery Regiment).
– from the 49th CAA β the 77th MRR β is essentially a consolidated regimental tactical group, formed in occupied Abkhazia from the 7th Russian military base.
– from the “VMS RF” β the 20th and 155th MRRs, essentially consolidated rifle regiments formed from navy personnel of several Russian fleets.
As we can see, the Russian command has concentrated and deployed a significant grouping of troops in these directions, attempting to achieve a decisive advantage over the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) in terms of forces and means, which is quite logical and adequate. These directions are among the most important in the current Sloviansk-Kramatorsk offensive operation of the Russian forces.
2. The current situation in these areas is characterized by quite intense engagements in the Kostyantynivka defense area of the AFU, as well as in the direction of Chasiv Yar β Druzhkivka and southwest of Kostyantynivka, where the enemy is conducting very active attacking/storming actions, trying to quickly eliminate the Kostyantynivka defense area of the AFU and reach the close approaches to the cities of Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk with their main forces. Moreover, they clearly aim to do this SIMULTANEOUSLY. Specifically:
– In the direction of Pryvillia β Malynivka, Russian forces with their main advance units have reached the Siversky Donets β Donbas canal and were able to “infiltrate” several assault groups in the Malynivka area. Further advancement towards Pershomarivka, Vasilivska Pustosh, and Nikanorivka was stopped β their infantry groups essentially got “bogged down” in battles for Malynivka and Yurkivka (lasting for at least about a month).
– In the direction of Minkivka β Tykhonivka, the situation is similar. In the Tykhonivka area, there are apparently small Russian infantry groups. However, their further advance towards Vasyutinske was evidently blocked by a series of counterattacks by advanced Ukrainian units. The AFU likely “cleared out” those who managed to approach Vasyutinske directly from the side of Tykhonivka, and pushed the rest back towards the canal.
– In the direction of Markove β Fedorivka, the enemy’s main advance units have reached the eastern outskirts of the latter and are now engaged in fierce battles to establish stable control over it. Their attempts to move further towards the Belokuzminivka chalk cliffs and the town of Belokuzminivka itself have not yet been successful.
– The enemy has managed to heavily “infiltrate” their assault infantry into the area of Stinka β Podilske β Novodmytrivka β Molocharka and continues to do so further northwest towards Izhivka, Bezymyane, and Popasna, attempting to cross the north of the railway that runs from Chasiv Yar to Kramatorsk.
– In Kostyantynivka itself, fierce and intense battles are ongoing. The enemy, having effectively reached the outskirts of the city with the main forces of its advanced units and divisions, persistently attempts to increase the presence of its assault infantry within the city, advancing from Novodmytrivka and Predtechyne, Illinivka, and Berestok. Currently, the Ukrainian Armed Forces still maintain control over several neighborhoods in the northern and central parts of Kostyantynivka (mainly along a rather narrow “corridor” near Oleksa Tykhoho Street and the T-0504 road). However, Russian assault groups are already quite “densely” present in the western, southern, and northeastern parts of the city, and their numbers are gradually increasing.
– Russian forces continue quite active operations to the west and southwest of Kostyantynivka, attempting to advance northwest from there along the western bank of the Kryvyi Torets River. In this regard, certain Russian assault groups have managed to reach Osikove and secure the area between Panfilova Street and the Kryvyi Torets River in the northwestern part of Kostyantynivka.
It is evident that the enemy is attempting to physically “cut off” the road connecting Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka in the area north of the former. Considering that its “infiltration” groups are also constantly trying to advance from Molocharka and Novodmytrivka to the area of the sludge collector lakes north of Kostyantynivka and in the direction of Oleksiyevo-Druzhkivka, such developments are entirely possible.
– Battles also continue in the area of the villages Rozkishne, Dovha Balka, and Stepanivka. The enemy, advancing from Illinivka and Yablunivka, is trying to gain complete control over this area. However, the Ukrainian Armed Forces still hold several positions in Rozkishne and Stepanivka, but in Dovha Balka and even west of it, the enemy has already managed to secure several infantry groups. It is evident that soon, as a result, Ukrainian units will still be forced to retreat from here south of the road near Mykolaypil. Moreover, Russian assault groups are already recorded several kilometers east of it.
3. Regarding the overall (operational) situation in the aforementioned directions, it is quite possible to state that the Russian offensive is continuing. Yes, quite slowly β in 2 months of stubborn and very “costly” battles for them, they managed to advance a maximum of 7.5β8 km into the depth of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ defense. However, it should be understood that this occurred in one of the key directions for the entire Sloviansk-Kramatorsk offensive operation of the enemy β Kostyantynivka.
Furthermore, the trend of further deterioration of the position of the advanced Ukrainian units engaged in combat in the Kostyantynivka defense area has become quite apparent. The enemy managed to envelop it quite deeply in a tactical sense from the northeast and southwest (reaching the Illinivka area and advancing in the Novodmytrivka β Molocharka direction), which, in turn, together with the forward Russian units and divisions reaching the outskirts of the city from the south and east, allowed them to start and then “accelerate” the assault on Kostyantynivka itself. Effectively, at present, operationally, the enemy has focused precisely on the final elimination of the Kostyantynivka defense area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and is quite close to achieving this goal.
In turn, on the Kramatorsk direction, where with the advance of Russian forces and units on a fairly wide front section to the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal, it has also received quite good tactical opportunities for a breakthrough towards Kramatorsk, it is not yet so successful. The Ukrainian Armed Forces here are effectively preventing the enemy from advancing on Kramatorsk, engaging them in intensive counter-battles directly on the western bank of the canal. The most dangerous direction for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in this sense is the Markove β Fedorivka β Bilokuzmynivka line, where the enemy has made the deepest advance beyond the canal towards Kramatorsk β up to 4.5 km. However, the local penetration of the Russian forces has not expanded so far. In fact, the enemy, in 1.5 months of its active “infiltration” in this direction, has managed to “creep” 1-1.5 km along a small chalk ridge stretching from Markove to Fedorivka.
The main determinant for the further development of the situation both on the Kostyantynivka and Kramatorsk directions, in my opinion, will likely be the duration of the battles around Kostyantynivka. It is evident that the Russian troop grouping concentrated on the left flank of the operational zone of the Russian Southern Command will not be able to advance broadly from the south and southeast to Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk without “capturing” Kostyantynivka definitively. Even despite the fact that it is being actively assisted by forces and means from the right flank of the Central Command, trying to break through towards Druzhkivka along the Kazennyi Torets River.
It is already noticeable that the battles for Kostyantynivka are consuming the lion’s share of these forces and means (it is sufficient to compare the intensity of the enemy’s actions both on the Kostyantynivka and directly on the Kramatorsk directions). Moreover, it is clear that the duration of these battles has already exceeded all the “established” and “planned” terms by the Russian command. Thus, the longer Kostyantynivka holds, the more likely it becomes that the Russian command will eventually be forced to significantly revise its plans for a SIMULTANEOUS breakthrough to Druzhkivka and Kramatorsk from the east and southwest.
As expected, it realized this and is already trying to avoid such a scenario by sharply activating the right flank of its Central Command towards Druzhkivka. Which, presumably according to its plan, should force the Ukrainian Armed Forces not only to retreat from the Kostyantynivka area to Druzhkivka but also to leave a rather large area north of Rusin Yar.
In the subsequent reviews, we will return to the Dobropillia and Lyman directions and try to determine if the events happening there can most decisively and significantly impact the entire Slovyansk-Kramatorsk offensive operation of the Russian forces. Especially considering its possible and most likely outcomes.
