
Today – Oleksandrivskyi and Hulyaipilskyi directions.
1. In the Oleksandrivskyi direction the enemy (Russian forces) continues trying to restore the positions of their forward units that existed before the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ counterattacks in mid-spring this year.
By engaging additional forces and resources in the area of the 36th Combined Arms Army (CAA) and on the adjacent left flank of the 29th CAA, such as parts and units of the 120th Marine Division, the Russian command is evidently trying to reach the Vovcha River in their 36th CAA’s area and eliminate the threat to their important lateral communication — the Hulyaipole-Velyka Novosilka road in the Uspenivka-Temyrivka section.
In this direction, beyond the 36th and 29th CAA’s own parts and formations, parts and units of the 35th CAA, 68th Army Corps, and 120th Marine Division are observed. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to consolidate their positions and lines, repelling attempts by the enemy’s forward units, mainly acting with small infantry (assault) groups, to advance northward and northwestward.
As of 17.05.2026 the following areas and directions are noted where the enemy attempts to attack/assault the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces:
– In the direction of Myrne — Oleksandrohrad, it is likely that enemy assault groups again reached the eastern outskirts of the latter. In the south, in the direction of Voskresenka — Sichneve and Maliivka — Sichneve, Russian units are trying to bypass Sichneve from the north (acting from Voskresenka) and south (attempting to advance from Maliivka). So far, aside from “penetrating” a few hundred meters, they haven’t achieved anything significant.
– Ukrainian forces continue to hold Ternove and the area south of Vorone, approaching Komyshuvakha within 3 km.
– Rather intense battles are unfolding in the area of the Russian 36th CAA along the Ternove — Novohryhorivka line, where, evidently, the enemy, using the Berezove area and the area north of Novohryhorivka to advance in converging directions (specifically towards Berezove — Stepove and Novohryhorivka — Verbove), is attempting to force the retreat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ forward units that previously reached Novomykolaivka and Kalynivske.
So far, the enemy has not managed to achieve this goal. Their small infantry (assault) groups advanced towards Berezove-Stepepove by 1.8 km south of the latter (in two weeks of intense fighting). However, they have not even managed to secure a foothold in Stepove itself.
Meanwhile, in the Novogrygorivka — Verbove direction, the enemy apparently managed to connect with their “residual” infantry groups that had previously infiltrated the area south of Verbove, reaching the local pond south of the village, advancing 3.2-3.5 km overall in the same period.
However, all this did not lead to the withdrawal of Ukrainian Armed Forces units from the Novomykolaivka and Kalynivske area. Naturally, their position cannot be considered particularly “convenient” (since the enemy has managed to advance on their flanks, even if minimally in a tactical sense).
It’s likely that the command of the Russian 36th CAA will soon try to intensify their efforts in these areas by deploying additional forces and means from their army reserve (most likely 1-2 battalions).
− The enemy continues to operate on the western bank of the Yanchur River (adjacent flanks of the 5th and 36th CAA), moving in the directions of Zlahoda — Pryvillya and Solodke — Nova Zaporizhzhia. It is apparent that the Russian command pursues two tactical goals simultaneously — to push the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ forward units as far north as possible from Uspenivka and reach the main communication lines of the Ukrainian units defending in the Dobropillia area (in the Nova Zaporizhzhia region).
If in the Zlahoda area the Russian troops, acting as separate small infantry (assault) groups, managed to advance towards Pryvillya by 1.5 km, then towards Nova Zaporizhzhia, they apparently achieved more — approaching Nova Zaporizhzhia itself from the east within a distance of 1.8-2 km, achieving a tactical incursion of at least 3-3.2 km over a week and a half of fighting.
Thus, it can be stated that in the Oleksandrivka direction, Russian forces have failed to complete the main operational-tactical tasks assigned to the forces (units) of the 36th and 29th CAA, as well as the additional forces and means provided for their enhancement. This has resulted in scattered skirmishes between small infantry groups of both sides across several sectors and various directions in the tactical zone.
Although two of them are probably the most promising in this regard for the Russian command — the section from Novogrygorivka to Berezove and the territory west of the Yanchur River (from Zlahoda to Rivnopillia). It is likely that they will aim to intensify their efforts there soon by deploying additional forces and means.
2. In the Huliaipilske direction (within the area of the Russian 5th CAA) numerous and fierce battles also continue in the tactical zone between small infantry groups and units of both sides, which are heavily “infiltrated” into each other’s combat formations. In reality, neither side has made significant advances with the main forces of their forward units and divisions. Despite numerous battles in the tactical zone, the operational situation appears quite stable.
In the area from Dobropillia to Luhovskoho, numerous “infiltrations” of enemy small infantry (assault) groups into the combat formations of the forward units and divisions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces occur, as well as Ukrainian forces maintaining individual positions and strongholds in the tactical rear of the forward units and divisions of Russian troops.
The westernmost Russian “penetration” of small infantry groups was recorded in the area of Vozdvyzhivka and south of Novoselivka. Conversely, the easternmost positions still held by the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) are a small section on the western outskirts of Huliaipole (in the area of Verbova Street), near the village of Zelene, and slightly west of Olenokostiantynivka.
Currently, the combat actions are essentially significantly “fragmented,” reduced to a state of permanent battles and skirmishes of small infantry groups over individual strongholds, shelters, buildings, and wooded strips without the involvement of more substantial tactical units at the platoon-company-battalion level. In reality, specific combat actions by the enemy are conducted by “optimized” (assault) infantry squads, and even then, this is more the exception than the rule. Primarily, groups of 2-3-4 personnel operate, rarely 5-6, and even less frequently 8-10.
The main intent of Russian groups is to advance unnoticed by the enemy (AFU) as deeply as possible into their combat formations, find shelter there, and hold it until reinforcements arrive. In turn, AFU infantry groups remaining deep within the Russian military formations, aside from the basic desire to survive, strive to block the enemy infantry’s advance in their sector while simultaneously trying to divert some of the enemy’s forces and resources, thereby restraining the advance of the main forces of their forward units.
Overall, from an operational-tactical perspective, the offensive of the Russian 5th Army has significantly “slowed down,” to say the least. While certain assault groups from its forward elements continue to advance (or rather, “infiltrate into the interposition space”), it is at a pace that is difficult to consider a fully operational-tactical offensive—3-4 km over 2-3 weeks.
For example, it took Russian assault groups 1.5 months to advance a distance of 7.5 km (from Myrne in the direction of Novoselivka), or to “infiltrate” the road to Orikhiv (on the stretch from Huliaipole to Huliaipilske), which is about 12 km, took the Russian assault infantry almost 2 months. Moreover, this concerns not the main forces of the forward elements and units of the enemy, but only some of its small infantry (assault) groups.
Yet, in a number of cases, these “infiltrators,” even those who managed to “entrench” somewhere directly behind the advanced Ukrainian units, are successfully “cleared out” by the latter. For example, several such Russian groups were reportedly eliminated over the past week in the area of Verkhna Tersa, Krynychne, and Sviatopetrivka.
In the next review, we will examine the situation in the Orikhiv-Zaporizhia direction. So, stay tuned…
