Today, the Dobropillia direction (formerly Pokrovsk).
1. The enemy (Russian forces), using the Central Military Group (CMG), continues its offensive in this direction, concentrating its main efforts in the strip of the 2nd Combined Arms Army (CAA) along the main route Pokrovsk — Hryshyne — Novooleksandrivka. Forces and means from the 51st, 2nd, and 41st CAA are participating in the offensive, including:
– 51st CAA (1st, 5th, 9th, 110th, 114th, and 132nd separate motorized rifle brigades (smb)),
– 2nd CAA (27th motorized rifle division (mrds), 15th and 30th smb),
– 41st CAA (operating with part of its forces in this direction, likely 35th and 55th smb, and possibly separate units from the 74th smb).
Additionally, Russian forces operating in this direction are significantly reinforced by formations at the level of motorized rifle/rifle regiments (mr/r), motorized rifle/rifle battalions (mrb/rb) of the “mobilization reserve” (MR) and territorial troops (TT).
These formations either belong to the parts and units of these combined-arms armies or are subordinated to them operationally as a means of reinforcement.
2. Essentially, the enemy is operating toward Dobropillia with two operational-tactical groups of forces (conditionally):
– The first consists of parts and formations of the 51st CAA, attempting to break through from the east, southeast, and south to the near approaches to Dobropillia from its bridgehead on the Kazennyi Torets river, reaching the line Stepy (formerly Kutuzivka) — New Donbas and the area Krasnopodillya — Chernihivka — Svitlye — Vodyanske.
– The second, consisting of parts and formations of the 2nd CAA, reinforced by part of the 41st CAA, apparently has the same task as the 51st CAA, but unlike it, operates mainly from the south (trying to break through to the line Novohryshyne — Matiyasheve). Additionally, it simultaneously tackles another task — covering the western flank of the 51st CAA, advancing along the road to Pavlograd and the Hryshynka river northwest (toward Hryshyne — Novooleksandrivka — Myrne).
In the context of Russian forces’ offensive actions toward Dobropillia, it is worth noting that besides the main general task (reaching the near approaches to Dobropillia), the CMG forces likely aim to solve two other, I would say, “related” tasks:
– To cut the Dobropillia – Kramatorsk road northeast of Dobropillia (likely this will be assigned to the 51st CAA).
– And to reach the line Serhiivka-Shylivka (part of the 2nd CAA forces, possibly reinforced by separate parts and units from the 41st CAA).
As a result, as far as I understand, the Russian command hopes to create conditions around the Dobropillya defense district of the Ukrainian Armed Forces similar to those successfully established around Kostyantynivka (i.e., a deep encirclement from at least three directions).
This is, of course, still quite distant, but judging by the persistence and stubbornness displayed by the Russian Central Operational Group regarding the offensive/assault actions of its advanced units in the relevant areas and directions, despite the losses already incurred, the probability of such a situation is quite high.
3. The current situation in the direction of Dobropillya, as I mentioned above, is characterized by a fairly high level of activity of the enemy’s (Russian forces) advanced units and formations. In particular:
In the sector of the 51st ACF:
– In the direction of Sofiyivka — Novopavlivka, enemy advance units regularly attempt to break through to Novopavlivka and Pavlivka, operating both along the road to Druzhkivka and to the northeast of Sofiyivka. During the reporting period, they made small tactical advances of several hundred meters.
– In the direction of Shakhove — Kucheryav Yar, it is apparent that several Russian assault groups managed to secure positions in the quarry area (located south of the village), with some groups even advancing between them to the north, likely reaching the southern outskirts of the village.
– Enemy advance assault units also regularly attempt to advance in the directions of Novoe Shakhove — Vilne and Dorozhne — Novyy Donbass. So far, these attempts have mostly been repelled by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, but individual Russian “stormtroopers” periodically “jump into” Novyy Donbass and Vilne and even occasionally secure positions there for a time. However, they are regularly dislodged or “cleared on-site.”
– In the area of Biletske and west of Rodynske, stubborn, almost confrontational battles continue. The enemy simultaneously attacks Biletske from the south (operating along the road from Rodynske) and from the east (from Nikanorivka). So far, they have only managed to “cling to” the southern outskirts of the settlement (the stadium area and Shakhtarska Street), but attempts by the Russians to “penetrate” it from the east have so far failed.
In turn, west of Rodynske, enemy assault groups simultaneously try to break through both towards Hryshyne and along the adjacent valley towards Shevchenkove. In this sense, the overall advance of the enemy amounted to up to 1 km.
– It is apparent that the command of the Russian 51st ACF is concentrating its main efforts on the sector from Biletske to Myrnohrads (i.e., on the adjoining flank with the 2nd ACF, which seems quite logical), where assault units operate mainly from those of its brigades that have a more or less suitable level of combat capability for continuing regular attacks/assaults, in particular, the 5th and 9th Motorized Rifle Brigades.
For this purpose, the enemy regularly accumulates assault infantry in the area of the Krasnolymanska Mine, in the northern areas of Myrnohrads and in the area of Rodynske. It is also quite possible that from the line of Rivne — Svitlo and in the direction of Rodynske — Shevchenko, in addition to them, separate units of other brigades of this army, such as the 1st or 110th Motorized Rifle Brigades, operate.
In the sector of the 2nd ACF:
– In the direction of Pokrovsk — Hryshyne, its main “strike” force, the 27th Motorized Rifle Division, despite significant current losses, persistently attempts to fully capture Hryshyne and break through to Novooleksandrivka and Vasylivka. Over the past week, the enemy has made several active attempts to break through in these directions, including using armored vehicles. However, they have not managed to achieve positive results in this endeavor. For now, they are only satisfied with capturing the southern part of Hryshyne.
– Meanwhile, by accumulating significant volumes of assault infantry on the northern outskirts of captured Pokrovsk, the Russian command (2nd Guards Combined Arms Army) has been able to organize persistent and determined attacks in the direction of Pokrovsk — Shevchenko and Pokrovsk — Rodynske, which eventually led to the final end of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ defense in Myrnohrad. Currently, the enemy has managed to advance from Pokrovsk east of Hryshyne towards Shevchenko by 3.8 km.
– Along the line of Molodetske-Kotline, the advanced assault units of the same 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army, strengthened by part of the forces of the 41st Guards Combined Arms Army, have also repeatedly attempted to advance towards Udachne — Serhiivka and from Kotline towards the E-50 road (Pavlohrad — Pokrovsk). Thus, these enemy units have not yet broken through to Serhiivka and the road, but have already approached the former at a distance of 4 km.
4. Regarding the further prospects and peculiarities of the development of the situation in this direction, the following factors should be noted:
– The command of the Russian 51st Guards Combined Arms Army continues to act in its characteristic manner — attempting to advance, albeit “little by little,” on a wide front and almost across its entire line, as they say, everywhere at once.
On one hand, given the structure of this army (it includes 6 motorized rifle brigades, not counting the rest of the army’s complement), this was to be expected. However, on the other hand, at least half of these brigades suffered significant losses during previous battles for the stronghold on the Kazenny Torts and the elimination of the so-called Dobropillia “pocket,” when the Ukrainian Armed Forces attempted to cut it off with flank counterattacks.
In my opinion, this is why even now the attempts of the 51st Guards Combined Arms Army to advance north of Biletske, to encircle Dobropillia from the east, and simultaneously break through to the Dobropillia-Kramatorsk road are becoming increasingly challenging to coordinate. In this sense, obviously, its command still had to shift its main efforts south of Biletske, drawing down everything that remains more or less combat-ready in its composition. I think that the longer the Russians attack precisely in this area, the more the overall pace of the 51st Guards Combined Arms Army’s offensive in other sectors of its stronghold, unlike the Biletske – Myrnohrad area, will decrease until it becomes completely “zero.”
– In turn, evidently, the command of the Russian 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army decided not to “fixate” on its own losses, but at any cost to break through from the south to Dobropillia, attacking massively and “penetrating” in this direction almost daily. But, as always, there is a nuance — if tomorrow a couple of brigades of the 41st Guards Combined Arms Army, which were “embedded” there to enhance the “offensive capabilities” of the 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army, are removed from the left flank of this army, then this hypothetical “breakthrough” of the 2nd Guards Combined Arms Army to Dobropillia from the south may turn into a tactical gamble due to the potential for the Ukrainian Armed Forces to conduct effective flank counterattacks against those breaking through.
And in conclusion, a few words about operational significance. It is already felt that the Russian command in the Dobropillia direction is in a great hurry in this regard. And this, by the way, has a completely reasonable explanation, in particular:
It is obvious that BEFORE the start of the hypothetical summer Slovyansk-Kramatorsk offensive, it would be quite beneficial for the Russian command, so to speak, to capture Dobropillia and especially to cut off the Dobropillia-Kramatorsk road. However, at present, in terms of this offensive, the enemy has not yet managed to complete even the first (initial) stage of their preparatory actions (Kostiantynivka, as well as Druzhkivka, are still not captured).
Therefore, all these efforts by the Russian command aimed at the preliminary “expansion and deepening” of the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration through “deep” offensives on adjacent flanks and directions are still devoid of obvious operational significance. This applies equally to both the Lyman direction and, indeed, the Dobropillia direction.
However, it is quite possible that it will emerge as soon as the enemy troops operating directly in the directions of Slovyansk and Kostiantynivka break through to the immediate approaches to this agglomeration. Then the scale and “depth” of its coverage, which are directly linked to the Russian troop groupings operating in the Lyman and Dobropillia directions, will acquire the most unambiguous and obvious operational significance.
Photo: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
