Information on the current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 25.02.2026.
1. In the Smolensk region of the Russian Federation, on the morning of February 25, drones struck the chemical enterprise “Dorogobuzh.”
– A large-scale fire broke out on the factory premises, visible from several kilometers away. Despite the serious consequences, regional authorities did not officially report the incident, once again demonstrating the closed nature of the Russian information system in crisis situations.
– The enterprise is one of the major producers of nitrogen fertilizers and chemical products. It is part of the Acron structure and produces ammonium nitrate, components of which can be used in both the civilian and military sectors.
– The plant had previously been attacked — in December 2025, a fire also occurred at the site.
2. At the beginning of the fifth year of the full-scale war initiated by the Kremlin, Russia is facing increasingly serious personnel problems at the front.
– For three consecutive months, the losses of the Russian army have exceeded the number of new recruits they manage to enlist.
– Despite significant losses, the Russian command does not change tactics — troops continue to be sent into massive assaults.
– Meanwhile, Ukrainian defense forces are increasingly effectively destroying attacking units. As a result, the rate of depletion of personnel is growing, and the resources for large-scale operations are diminishing.
– Such dynamics significantly undermine Moscow’s ability to launch a major offensive in the coming months. In fact, Russia finds itself in a situation where maintaining the current intensity of hostilities requires more personnel expenditure than the mobilization system can compensate for.
– Previously, intelligence from NATO countries noted that the Kremlin’s tough stance in US-initiated negotiations on ending hostilities was based on the belief that the Russian army supposedly maintains the initiative, while Ukraine’s defense gradually weakens.
– However, current losses and problems with replenishing personnel call this assessment into question.
– Russia is increasingly focusing on attempts to merely hold existing positions, indicating a gradual depletion of its offensive potential.
3. The Russian pipeline monopoly Transneft was forced to reduce oil intake into the system by 250,000 barrels per day after a drone attack on one of the key oil pumping stations in Tatarstan.
– This concerns the NPS “Kaleikino” near the city of Almetyevsk. As a result of the strike from Sunday night to Monday, a fire broke out at the facility. Two tanks, each with a capacity of 50,000 tons, caught fire.
– The station’s throughput capacity reaches 1 million barrels per day, making it one of the critical nodes of Russia’s export infrastructure.
– The largest reduction in crude oil delivery affected the volumes of the company Tatneft.
– The “Kaleikino” station, built in the 1970s, is an important point for mixing oil grades before transportation westward to the ports of Novorossiysk and Primorsk, as well as through the Druzhba pipeline. In addition, it supplies feedstock to several Russian refineries.
– The actual loss of part of the capacities and the forced reduction of pumping demonstrates the vulnerability of Russia’s energy infrastructure even deep in the rear—more than 1,200 kilometers from the border with Ukraine.
– Disruptions at such a node create risks for the stability of exports and currency inflows, on which the Russian budget critically depends.
4. Russia and Iran are lowering prices for China due to oil accumulation at sea.
– The surplus of tankers with sanctioned oil in Asian waters intensifies price pressure on Russia and Iran. Due to limited demand and growing competition, the discount on Russian oil is deepening, and some volumes are effectively “stuck” at sea.
– According to Rystad Energy’s forecast, Russian oil imports to India may fall by 40% and decrease to approximately 600,000 barrels per day by January.
– The released volumes are being reoriented towards China, but Moscow faces tougher competition from Tehran there. The Urals grade is traded at a discount of about $12 to Brent, compared to $10 a month earlier. Iranian Light is offered at a discount of about $11. The price gap is widening, and the battle for China’s independent refineries with limited quotas is intensifying.
– China is unable to fully absorb the redirected flows. Nearly 48 million barrels of Iranian oil are accumulated at sea compared to 33 million at the beginning of February, as well as about 9.5 million barrels of Russian oil.
– Despite the fact that in the first 18 days of February, shipments from Russia to Chinese ports increased to 2.09 million barrels per day (+20% compared to January), Iranian exports to China have decreased to 1.2 million barrels per day (-12% y/y) since the beginning of the year.
– Moscow is already forced to reduce production, while Tehran is trying to increase sales amid geopolitical risks.
– Excessive supply and the increase in the number of tankers at sea intensify dumping, impacting Kremlin’s currency revenues and deepening the dependence of the Russian budget on unstable Asian demand.
5. The tanker “Arctic Vostok” with products from the sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 project arrived at the Beihai import terminal in southern China.
– This is the sixth delivery from “Arctic LNG 2” to Beihai since the beginning of the year. Thus, the Chinese direction effectively remains one of the few stable sales channels for the project, which is under U.S. sanctions and has limited access to traditional markets.
– The vessel loaded from the floating storage “Saam LNG” in the Murmansk region in mid-January. Due to sanction restrictions, exports are carried out via a complex transshipment scheme and using long routes through the Far East.
– Such logistical solutions allow for the maintenance of supplies but significantly increase costs and dependence on specific partners. Moscow is forced to concentrate its liquefied gas exports towards China, which strengthens its energy dependency on Beijing.
– In conditions of a limited circle of buyers and financial sanctions, this reduces the bargaining positions of the Russian side and makes the project increasingly vulnerable to external pressure.
6. Due to a chronic shortage of spare parts, more than a third of long-haul aircraft, which are critically important for flights to the Far East and abroad, have been decommissioned in Russia.
– Of the 93 foreign wide-body airliners remaining in the country, fewer than 60 are operational. The rest are either undergoing prolonged maintenance or are essentially idle.
– The problem is exacerbated by the difficulty in supplying engines and components: such aircraft account for only about 16% of the global aircraft fleet, which increases the cost of parts and complicates their search due to sanction restrictions. Attempts to organize engine repairs outside Russia, including in Iran, have not yielded results.
– As a result, Russian carriers are forced to patch the resource deficit with temporary solutions. The country’s largest airline, Aeroflot, expanded its “wet lease” agreement with iFly, involving an additional Airbus A330 along with a crew to compensate for withdrawn aircraft. Previously, the company had received three such planes, but one of them ceased flights at the end of 2025 due to an engine malfunction.
– In the Aeroflot group, of 59 wide-body aircraft, 17 are undergoing maintenance, with some for over a year. Among them are four Boeing 777s and five 747s. Similar problems are reported with Azur Air, Nordwind, Ikar, Red Wings, and Utair.
– The degradation of the long-haul aircraft fleet indicates the systemic nature of the crisis. Without access to original components and full service support, Russian aviation is gradually losing the ability to ensure stable international and interregional connections, which increases the country’s transport isolation.
7. Canada expands sanctions against Russia: dozens of companies and 100 ships are now under restrictions.
– Canada announced a new expansion of anti-Russian sanctions. The list includes 21 individuals and 53 organizations, as well as restrictions on 100 vessels, according to the official document.
– Ottawa emphasizes that these measures aim to significantly increase economic costs for Russia, particularly by limiting revenue from energy exports.
– The sanctions target structures and logistical links that help Moscow bypass previous restrictions and maintain currency income.
– Special attention is given to vessels that may be involved in the so-called “shadow fleet” — a scheme for transporting oil circumventing price caps and insurance bans.
– The massive inclusion of tankers in the sanctions lists complicates their insurance, maintenance, and entry into international ports. Canada is enhancing coordination with Western partners in an effort to cut off key sources of funding for the Russian economy.
– The new package demonstrates that sanction pressure is not easing and is increasingly focused on Russia’s energy and transportation infrastructure.
8. Democratic senators on the U.S. Senate Banking Committee criticized President Donald Trump for effectively easing sanction pressure on Russia.
– In a report published on the fourth anniversary of the full-scale war, a striking contrast between the approaches of allies is highlighted: in 2025, the European Union designated nearly 900 new legal and physical entities for sanction pressure, while the U.S. only two.
– According to the Democrats, such passivity from Washington undermines the overall regime of restrictions and provides the Kremlin with additional room for maneuver.
– The authors of the analysis stated that the administration could have imposed restrictions on hundreds of potential targets within the first year of work but did not.
– The document mentions more than 130 companies in China and Hong Kong, which, according to senators, openly offer prohibited microchips for sale to the Russian market. It also references structures in various countries worldwide that are already under EU and UK sanctions for supporting Russia’s military-industrial complex, as well as Central Asian banks included in EU sanction lists.
– The report underscores that without active steps from the U.S., companies helping Russia evade restrictions continue to profit without facing real consequences.
– Such a situation, according to the senators’ assessment, effectively undermines part of the international efforts to constrain financing of Russia’s war and weakens the West’s negotiating positions.
