Today — Kostiantynivka direction.
1. The enemy (Russian forces) continues active offensive actions in this direction with part of the forces of their troop groupings (TG) “South” and “Center”, as well as several formations of TG “Dnepr”, aiming to eliminate the Kostiantynivka defense district of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, capture the city of Druzhkivka, and reach close approaches to the city of Kramatorsk from the south and southeast.
For this purpose, the Russian command has formed 2 tactical groups (TG) within the mentioned troop groupings — “Bakhmut” and “Dzerzhinsk”, uniting appropriate forces and resources, including:
TG “Dzerzhinsk”:
– 4th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (SMRB) from the 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA);
– 103rd Motor Rifle Regiment (MRR) of the 150th Motor Rifle Division (MRD) from the 8th CAA;
– 10th Tank Regiment (TR) of the 20th MRD of the same 8th CAA;
– 78th MRR of the 42nd MRD of the 58th CAA (TG “Dnepr”);
– 54th MRR of the 6th MRD of the 3rd Army Corps (AC);
– 1194th MRR of the 3rd CAA;
– 1219th, 1436th, and 1465th MRR of the 51st CAA (TG “Center”);
– 20th and 155th “combined” MRR of the Russian Navy;
– 77th Separate Motor Rifle Regiment (SMRR), formed on the basis of the 7th Military Base (VB) units of the 49th CAA of Russian forces (Gudauta, Abkhazia).
TG “Bakhmut” (operating in the Kostiantynivka direction with part of the forces):
– 72nd SMRB of the 3rd AC;
– 1008th, 1307th, and 1442nd MRR of the 6th MRD of this same 3rd AC;
– 89th TR of the 6th MRD, also of the 3rd Army Corps.
In the context of the composition of Russian forces operating both in the Kostiantynivka and directly in the Kramatorsk directions, it is also worth mentioning:
– 70th MRD of the 18th CAA (TG “Dnepr”), operating in the directions Chasiv Yar — Novodmytrivka and Chasiv Yar — Virolyubivka (likely with main forces);
– 20th and 150th MRD of the 8th CAA (part of the forces), reinforced by units of the 120th Naval Infantry Division (NID) (formerly the 40th and 155th Separate Brigades of Naval Infantry), advancing on both banks of the Kazennyi Torets River towards Druzhkivka, in the directions Sofiivka — Pavlivka and Rusyn Yar — Novopavlivka.
In the past two weeks, the combat and numerical composition (CNC) of the Russian forces operating in the Kostiantynivka and Kramatorsk directions likely has not undergone significant and substantial changes.
2. Obviously, the enemy command (referring to TG “South”, whose operational zone includes these directions) currently seeks to implement a plan of double operational encirclement of the entire Druzhkivka-Kostiantynivka agglomeration with the above-mentioned forces and resources, aiming to subsequently reach close approaches to the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the south and southeast.
For this purpose, the Russian command obviously concentrates its main efforts in the strip of the 8th Guards Army (in the center and on its right flank) and also on the left flank of the adjacent 3rd Army Corps accordingly to the south, southeast, and east of Kostyantynivka.
In particular, in the 8th Guards Army strip (TGr “Dzerzhinsk”), the enemy conducts rather persistent and regular attacking/assault actions in the following directions:
– Oleksandro-Kalynove – Berestok;
– Yablunivka – Illinivka;
– Yablunivka – Stepanivka;
– Pleshchiyivka – Berestok.
In this context, it is obvious that the enemy’s TGr “Dzerzhinsk” has a clear task — to break through Illinivka and Berestok to the western (central) part of Kostyantynivka, located on the west bank of the Kryvyi Torets river, and occupy it.
In turn, TGr “Bakhmut”, operating in the strip of the 3rd AC, has the immediate task of securing the southeastern part of the city, and in the future, trying to break through in the northwestern direction (that is, to occupy the eastern part of Kostyantynivka). Accordingly, its forward units attack/assault in the following directions:
– Oleksandro-Shultyne – Kostyantynivka (via the “Dachi” area, along Ostrovskogo Street);
– Predtechyne — Kostyantynivka and Stupochky — Kostyantynivka, trying to penetrate the city north of the Shanghai pond.
As of the evening of 24.02.2026:
– The enemy managed to break through to Berestok from the direction of Yablunivka (probably with assault groups from the 4th MRB and the 10th TP), acting along the T-0504 road, and also advanced through the forest north of the road towards Illinivka, where its separate small assault groups managed to “cling” to Illinivka itself (the area of Naberezhna and Molodizhna streets). However, their position is clearly not entirely stable. The Ukrainian Armed Forces periodically counterattack them and actively work against them with tactical UAVs, which is why the enemy constantly tries to increase the number of those who broke through the aforementioned forest south of Illinivka.
– Meanwhile, attacks by Russian units on Stepanivka (the 77th MSP) were apparently not as successful for them. They failed to significantly advance towards Stepanivka — Dovga Balka. Therefore, the main forces of the forward units of the enemy’s TGr “Dzerzhinsk” are apparently currently occupied mainly with securing along the T-0504 road in the section from Berestok to the area west of the ring road junction, preparing to continue attacks to the north.
– Likely, the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the Klebanbytske reservoir (the area of Pleshchiyivka and Ivanopillia) are also not yet captured by the enemy, and therefore, the command of its TGr “Dzerzhinsk”, which is probably preparing a quick breakthrough from Berestok to Kostyantynivka itself with assault groups on armored vehicles along the T-0504 road, must initially dislodge the Ukrainian units from the area between the reservoir and Kostyantynivka and only then make such an attempt.
– In the 3rd AC sector, it appears that the enemy (most likely units of the 6th MSD) has not yet been able to infiltrate or openly advance despite persistent attacks toward the Kostyantynivska railway station. Although Russian forces consistently attempt to “draw in” their UAV crews to the southeastern outskirts of Kostyantynivka (obviously to significantly reduce flight time to the target), fierce battles continue in the Kyiv and Odesa street areas. Therefore, in their effort to move further along road T-0504 (leading to Bakhmut), i.e., into the eastern part of the city along Bakhmutska and Oleksa Tykhoho streets, the enemy has not yet succeeded.
– Similarly, as with the forward units of their 72nd SMB, operating from the direction of Predtechyne and Stupochki toward the city. However, it seems that the command of the enemy’s 72nd SMB later decided to temporarily postpone ineffective attempts to “draw in” additional assault groups into Kostyantynivka and slightly turned north, assisting units of the 70th MSD, attacking AFU positions in the Chasiv Yar area.
As a result, the enemy likely managed to penetrate several areas of the city of Chasiv Yar – “Zemlyanky” and “Workshop №2” with a few of their small infantry groups. However, the enemy failed to fully “dislodge” the AFU’s defenses in front of their 70th MSD, and Ukrainian units apparently continue to hold positions in the “Shevchenko” and “Southern” areas.
– Meanwhile, on the opposite flank of the 8th CAA, the enemy also attacked, using its advanced units, reinforced by the 120th IAB, in the Sofiivka, Rusyn Yar, and Shakhove areas. These attacks have also proven largely ineffective for them so far.
3. Thus, by the end of February, the Russian command is still occupied with capturing only Kostyantynivka. Furthermore, the implementation of their overall plan of double encirclement of the Druzhkivka-Kostyantynivka agglomeration is clearly still in its “embryonic” stage.
Moreover, the enemy has not yet managed to rapidly and swiftly capture Kostyantynivka itself. Instead, Russian forces, with a noticeable advantage in manpower, are forced to only “push out” the AFU, doing so very slowly. For example, to “entrench” and subsequently hold the southeastern outskirts of the city, Russian forces had to spend about 1.5 months.
In the battles for Kostyantynivka, the only “bright” spot for them so far is the relatively quick advance of their small infantry groups to the Illinivka-Berestok line, providing their command some grounds to expect a quicker capture of the western part of the city in the future.
Yet again, the position of these groups there remains unstable. Several “bodies” that penetrated the gas station area “Leader” at the entrance to Kostyantynivka from Pokrovsk, as well as those still successfully hiding from Ukrainian drones in the ruins on Illinivka outskirts, are obviously not the forces and means to quickly and successfully “storm” the central part of Kostyantynivka tomorrow. They need at least a slight “buildup” there, provided with everything necessary for the assault, etc. How long all this will take the Russian command, it probably does not know itself.
Furthermore, the AFU continues to hold several positions to the south of the city (between it and the Klebanbytske reservoir), which significantly complicates and, most importantly, prolongs the time for the enemy to conduct a “general assault” on Kostyantynivka in converging directions.
It is evident that Ukrainian units will eventually be forced to retreat from this area under the threat of encirclement (likely to the part of the city located north of the T-0504 road). In other words, they will retreat to the central (western) part of the city, and some of them will likely appear directly in front of the Russian 3rd AC’s front. This, in fact, clearly will not speed up the enemy’s assault actions in the city itself.
However, if one looks at this situation in a broader (operational) sense, then the Russian command should recognize that if its hypothetical Sloviansk-Kramatorsk offensive operation, which it likely planned for this year’s summer campaign and which it has evidently long “conceived and nurtured,” is still on the agenda, then it literally has only 2-3 spring months left to capture all of Kostyantynivka and all of Druzhkivka (with adjacent areas).
Moreover, if during this time it fails to reach Dobropillia, and the Dobropillia-Kramatorsk road remains under the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, then despite the obvious successes of Russian troops in the Lyman and Sloviansk directions, it will very likely encounter significant, and most importantly, obvious difficulties at the operational-tactical level in organizing and conducting the aforementioned operation.
