Information regarding the current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 24.02.2026.
1. Four years after the start of the full-scale war, Russia’s energy revenues continue to decline, although the physical volumes of oil exports remain high.
– In the 12 months leading up to February 24, 2026, Russia earned 193 billion euros from the export of oil, gas, coal, and petroleum products. This is 27% less than in the corresponding period before the invasion.
– CREA analysts note that sanctions have not yet reduced the volumes of crude oil exports, but have forced Moscow to sell it at significant discounts.
– Revenues from crude oil exports fell by 18% over the year, while physical deliveries even exceeded the pre-war level by 6%, amounting to 215 million tons.
– After 2022, Russia redirected sea deliveries to China, India, and Turkey, actively using the “shadow fleet” of old and often uninsured tankers to bypass restrictions. However, the decline in revenues indicates worsening price conditions and increased discounting on Russian oil.
– Further pressure may intensify. The EU is discussing a complete ban on any business supporting the export of Russian sea oil, which would effectively block the use of Western shipping and insurance services.
– Simultaneously, Washington is linking trade agreements with India to diversifying its purchases and reducing dependence on Russian raw materials.
– Despite maintaining export volumes, the financial base of Russia’s energy sector is gradually narrowing: Moscow sells more but earns less, increasing structural pressure on the budget and limiting long-term war financing options.
2. Russia is forced to restructure oil export logistics due to growing dependence on China and the loss of part of the Indian market.
– Instead of relatively short routes, Moscow is increasingly using complex ship-to-ship transfer schemes and employing large tankers, indicating not strength but forced adaptation to sanction pressure.
– According to tracking platforms Vortexa and Kpler, since December, 6.3–6.9 million barrels of Urals oil have been transported by smaller tankers through European waters and the Suez Canal to the Red Sea, where the cargo was transferred to four VLCCs — very large tankers capable of carrying up to 2 million barrels. From there, the raw material headed to Asia.
– The Red Sea was not previously a typical hub for such operations, highlighting the forced nature of the new scheme. Russian oil deliveries to Chinese ports increased to 2.09 million barrels per day in the first 18 days of February, compared to 1.72 million in January and 1.39 million in December.
– Moscow increasingly relies on Beijing as the main sales market. Meanwhile, logistics are becoming longer and more expensive. Now, oil journeys from Novorossiysk to the end buyer in China take about three months instead of the usual five to six weeks.
– Part of the transfer involves ships under U.S. sanctions, including the supertanker Sahara, and information about its management is virtually absent in maritime registers — another sign of the shadowing of Russian exports.
– The emergence of new routes is also linked to increased control at traditional transfer points, particularly north of the Suez Canal and near the coasts of Greece and Malta. In the Middle East region, the presence of the U.S. Navy further complicates maneuvering.
– Instead of stable, diversified trade, Russia is increasingly dependent on one large buyer — China — and is forced to use complex, costly, and risky logistical schemes.
– This underscores that sanction pressure continues to narrow the Kremlin’s options and increases its economic dependence on Beijing.
3. The EU reduces Russia’s diplomatic mission in Brussels and prepares a ban on entry for participants in the war against Ukraine.
– The European Union will limit the Russian diplomatic mission in Brussels to 40 people and is also working on a mechanism that could close entry to the Schengen area for hundreds of thousands of former Russian military personnel. This was stated by the head of European diplomacy, Kaja Kallas.
– “We will not tolerate abuses of diplomatic status. Together with the European Commission, we are working to potentially deny hundreds of thousands of former Russian soldiers entry to the Schengen area. We do not want war criminals and saboteurs walking our streets,” she emphasized.
– The reduction of the diplomatic mission is not just a symbolic step. For Russia, this means a reduction in influence and lobbying opportunities in EU structures; limitations on intelligence and political activities under diplomatic cover; further isolation on the European front.
– The EU’s move appears to be a systematic continuation of a policy of curbing Russia and a demonstration that even amid internal discussions, Brussels maintains a hard line towards the aggressor state.
– Russia faces not only economic sanctions but also a consistent reduction of diplomatic and political space in Europe — a process that increasingly complicates the Kremlin’s return to the pre-war status quo.
4. During the preparation of the 20th EU sanctions package against Russia, there was renewed discussion in Brussels about possibly extending restrictions to the largest Russian corporations.
– Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys stated that the European Union should already start working on the 21st package since there are still large Russian companies not under EU sanctions, even though they are listed by the U.S.
– This includes, in particular, the oil company “Lukoil” and the state corporation “Rosatom”. According to Budrys, delaying decisions or blocking them within the EU undermines the effectiveness of the sanctions policy.
– “We cannot find ourselves in a situation where decisions are constantly postponed or blocked. Ukraine will not fight with political statements — it needs real measures and pressure on Russia,” emphasized the head of Lithuanian diplomacy.
– The potential inclusion of “Lukoil” and “Rosatom” in the EU sanctions list would be a significant step, as these are strategic structures for the Russian economy — energy exports and nuclear projects remain key sources of foreign exchange earnings for the Kremlin.
– At the same time, sanctions against “Rosatom” traditionally raise discussions due to some EU countries’ dependence on Russian nuclear fuel and technologies.
– It is expected that the 20th sanctions package will be announced in the coming days. Lithuania’s calls to prepare the next package indicate growing dissatisfaction among some EU countries with the pace of increasing pressure on Moscow and a desire to close loopholes that allow large Russian companies to avoid comprehensive restrictions in Europe.
5. The EU will propose a permanent ban on Russian oil after the elections in Hungary.
– The European Commission plans to present a bill on April 15 to implement a permanent ban on the import of Russian oil. The document will be published immediately after the parliamentary elections in Hungary, indicating Brussels’ intention to minimize political manipulation around the issue.
– Despite resistance from Budapest and Slovakia, which still maintain reliance on pipeline supplies from Russia, Brussels hopes to approve the decision through a qualified majority mechanism. This effectively prevents individual countries from blocking the bloc’s strategic energy decisions.
– The initiative means the institutionalization of the oil embargo and the final displacement of Russian raw materials from the European market.
6. Europe’s largest fuel hub received its first shipment of Indian diesel fuel following the implementation of new EU sanctions aimed at blocking the entry of products made from Russian oil into the European market.
– The tanker Proteus Bohemia, carrying about 100,000 tons of diesel, arrived at the port of Rotterdam. The vessel had been loaded in mid-January at the Indian port of Sikka, where products from the Jamnagar refining complex by Reliance Industries Ltd are exported, and reached Northwestern Europe by rounding the Cape of Good Hope.
– Reliance stated that the fuel destined for Europe is produced on a line that has not used Russian crude oil since November 20, 2025, and that the company provides all necessary documents for customs clearance.
– At the same time, the very fact of increased attention to the origin of raw materials indicates growing difficulties for Russian oil exports: the EU is trying to close the possibility of Russian hydrocarbons entering the bloc through processing in third countries.
– India remains one of the key buyers of Russian oil; however, new European restrictions create additional barriers for further resale of products from Russian raw materials.
– For Moscow, this means narrowing channels of indirect access to the European market and increasing risks for an export model that increasingly relies on complex logistics schemes and the political climate in intermediary countries.
– Although the global market is trying to adapt, the sanctions regime gradually complicates Russia’s ability to discreetly integrate its oil into international supply chains.
– Each new shipment from India is now accompanied by checks and reputational risks—raising transaction costs and reducing maneuverability for Russian exporters.
7. The UK announced the largest package of sanctions against Russia since the first months of the full-scale invasion in 2022.
– The decision is timed to the fourth anniversary of the war and aims to further reduce the Kremlin’s key revenues from energy and limit the ability to finance aggression. The new package covers almost 300 items.
– Among those sanctioned is Transneft, the operator through which over 80% of Russian oil exports are transported. London also targeted 175 companies in the “2Rivers” oil network, considered one of the largest operators of the “shadow fleet,” and 48 tankers used to circumvent restrictions.
– Separate sanctions were introduced against LNG-related structures, including the “Portova” and “Vysotsk” terminals, nine banks facilitating cross-border settlements, as well as companies and intermediaries involved in the supply of components for Russian drones and weapons.
– According to British estimates, international sanctions have already deprived Moscow of over $450 billion in potential revenues.
– Russia’s oil revenues have fallen to their lowest levels since 2020, and the economy shows signs of stagnation. The list also includes companies from China, India, the UAE, and Thailand, which, according to British estimates, contributed to servicing Russian operations or helped maintain export flows.
– Expanding the list further complicates Moscow’s access to insurance, logistics, financing, and technology. The blow to pipeline operators, LNG infrastructure, and the nuclear sector indicates London’s intention to systematically narrow Russia’s export opportunities and increase transaction risks for any partners cooperating with it.
8. On February 24, Australia announced a new package of sanctions against Russia, significantly expanding the list of restrictions in the financial, defense, and energy sectors.
– The sanctions affected 180 individuals and entities, as well as ships of the so-called “shadow fleet” used to bypass oil restrictions. This is one of Canberra’s largest actions during the entire period of the full-scale war.
– The restrictions target the banking sector, defense industry, aviation, oil and gas industry, transportation, as well as science and technology sectors.
– For the first time, Australia imposed sanctions against cryptocurrency structures used to bypass financial restrictions. The expansion of sanctions pressure indicates Australia’s continued hardline stance on isolating the Russian economy.
– Particularly notable is the focus on the “shadow fleet” and cryptocurrency tools — channels through which Moscow attempts to maintain oil exports and circumvent financial barriers.
