Information on current Russian losses due to sanctions as of 17.02.2026.
1. On the night of February 17, Ukrainian drones attacked several regions of Russia, striking one of the largest oil refineries in the south of the country and causing disruptions in infrastructure operations.
– In the Krasnodar region, the Ilsky oil refinery was attacked. A petroleum tank was damaged, causing a fire covering about 700 square meters. 72 people and 21 units of equipment were involved in extinguishing the fire.
– The Ilsky oil refinery belongs to the “Kuban Oil and Gas Company” and has a capacity of 6.6 million tons per year. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine previously noted that the facility is involved in supplying Russian troops. Despite previous attacks, this is the first strike on the plant this year.
– Simultaneously, explosions occurred in Tatarstan — in Kazan and Nizhnekamsk.
– Explosions were also heard over Izhevsk. In addition, drones attacked occupied Sevastopol.
– A series of strikes indicate increased vulnerability of Russian infrastructure — from strategic oil refining facilities to regional centers and transport hubs.
2. The Russian economy has entered a “death zone” — a state where it still functions but systemically depletes its own resources.
– The fifth year of the war against Ukraine has radically deformed the structure of Russia’s economy. Growth in 2025 was only 1%, and the forecast for 2026 is even weaker.
– The economy is stuck in a “negative equilibrium”: it formally stays afloat but destroys its own future potential. In the last four years, the system has effectively split into two sectors.
– The military-industrial complex, which already consumes about 8% of GDP, is showing growth and has priority access to resources. Meanwhile, civilian industries are stagnating or shrinking.
– Of the total industrial production growth of 18.3% over three years, the entire increase was ensured by the defense sector — the civilian sector actually decreased during this period.
– The model relies on so-called “military rent” — budget transfers that create artificial employment and demand. Unlike the oil revenues of the 2000s, this is not an external influx of funds but an internal redistribution that does not generate long-term development.
– Financial stability is weakening. In 2025, the budget deficit grew to 5.6 trillion rubles (2.6% of GDP) — the maximum since the pandemic. Interest payments on government debt exceed the combined spending on education and healthcare. Oil and gas revenues in January halved year-on-year — to less than 400 billion rubles amid a 25–30% Urals discount to Brent.
– Even stopping the war does not guarantee a quick recovery: crisis-free demobilization requires the simultaneous fulfillment of a number of conditions — from lifting some sanctions to creating a viable small and medium business sector. The likelihood of such a scenario is close to zero.
– Russia is capable of continuing the war in the foreseeable future, but each additional year in the “death zone” increases the risk of financial destabilization and institutional degradation. The economy shows no signs of collapse but increasingly loses its ability to recover.
3. Russian oil continues to cheapen relative to global benchmarks, deepening export revenue losses.
– In February, the discount on Urals crude exceeded $27 per barrel, according to Argus data.
– At the port of Primorsk, the discount to the North Sea Dated (NSD) benchmark rose to $27.3 from $26.7 in January. This occurred even though NSD itself increased by more than $4 over the month — to $70.8 per barrel. In fact, Russian oil did not benefit from the rise in global prices.
– In Novorossiysk, the situation is similar: for Urals cargoes on Suezmax ships, the discount increased to $27.53 (from $27.05), for Aframax — to $29.33 (from $29.17).
– On final markets, the discount widened even further. For deliveries to India (DAP West Coast India), it increased to $11.6 from $9.34 in January, for China (DAP Shandong) — to $11 from $9.4 the previous month.
– This indicates the continued weak negotiating position of Russian exporters even on Asian routes.
– Only for the ESPO blend was there a partial reduction in the discount: at Kozmino port, the discount to the Dubai indicator decreased by almost $1 — to $13 per barrel from $13.81.
– However, this does not change the overall picture: the main export grade Urals is being sold at deep discounts, which systematically reduces foreign currency earnings and increases pressure on the Russian budget.
4. Gasoline in Russia continues to become more expensive.
– Despite the strengthening of the ruble and a decrease in global oil prices during the seasonal demand downturn, when the market typically stabilizes, retail prices are showing a steady upward trend.
– According to Rosstat, the price increase is gradual but continuous, indicating deeper structural issues in the industry.
– In fact, the connection between cheaper oil and gas station prices in Russia no longer holds. Fuel costs are increasingly determined by tax burdens and fiscal policy.
– Additional pressure is created by the export model: when foreign sales are more profitable, the domestic market faces shortages.
– The situation worsened with new strikes on oil refining infrastructure. In the week from February 9 to 13, wholesale prices sharply increased: Ai-92 gasoline rose by 6.9% to 62,431 rubles per ton, and Ai-95 by 5.8% to 63,545 rubles. At the St. Petersburg Exchange, Ai-95 reached 63,787 rubles per ton — a two-month high.
– After drone attacks, the Volgograd oil refinery with a capacity of 13 million tons per year stopped gasoline production, and a fire was reported at the Ukhta refinery.
– Fears of supply reductions have already triggered a frenzy on the exchange.
– Russia’s fuel market is becoming increasingly vulnerable: even with a favorable external situation, domestic prices rise, and new infrastructure strikes only heighten the risks of further price increases.
5. Business activity in Russia slowed in February — Central Bank data.
– Growth in business activity in Russia sharply slowed in February, reported the Bank of Russia.
– The Central Bank’s business climate indicator fell to 0.2 points from 1.5 points in January.
– Companies became more cautious in assessing the current production and demand situation. At the same time, their expectations for the next three months slightly improved.
– Business price expectations noticeably decreased after rising for the past four months, dropping below the average level of the fourth quarter of 2025.
6. Russian government urgently raises tariffs to save RZhD.
– The Russian government is launching an unscheduled increase in railway tariffs, attempting to support “Russian Railways,” which lost 14% in freight transportation since the war began, accumulated about 4 trillion rubles in debt, and for the first time since the pandemic, incurred a net loss.
– From March 1, 2026, freight transportation on the RZhD network will become 1% more expensive. The introduced “raising coefficient” is explained by the need to finance “transport security” expenses.
– At the end of last year, the company sought help from the government and requested 200 billion rubles from the National Wealth Fund to close the financial gap and settle with banks. The Ministry of Finance approved only 65 billion.
– According to estimates, the new tariff increase could bring the company about 22.3 billion rubles — an amount that seems insignificant against the multi-trillion debt.
– In essence, the government is shifting the financial problems of the state monopoly onto businesses, further increasing economic costs in conditions of wartime burden and reduced transportation.
7. A wave of bankruptcies has begun among Russian oil companies.
– Against the backdrop of Russian oil prices falling to $40 per barrel and below, and the tightening of US sanctions, small extraction companies have begun to lose solvency en masse.
– VTB initiates bankruptcy proceedings for the First Oil group in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area. Debt — about 6 billion rubles, annual production — 500 thousand tons. The company operated with significant discounts to the market price.
– Bankruptcy proceedings have also been initiated for NK “Yangpur” (YANAO). Previously, the Astrakhan Oil Company and NK “Gorny” went bankrupt. The Moscow Credit Bank filed claims against one of the debtors for 7 billion rubles.
– According to Rosstat, about half of Russian oil and gas companies are loss-making: their cumulative loss for January–November is 575 billion rubles.
– The profit of profitable companies has more than halved — to 3 trillion rubles. Sanctions pressure and price reduction are gradually pushing weaker players out of the market, deepening the crisis trends in the industry.
8. China sets a new record for importing Russian oil.
– In February, China may increase its sea import of Russian oil to 2.07–2.08 million barrels per day — this will be an absolute record. In January, the figure was about 1.7 million barrels per day.
– However, even record purchase volumes from China do not cover the losses from the reduction of imports by India.
– While in the summer India bought up to 2 million barrels per day, in January volumes fell to 1.1–1.2 million barrels, and are expected to remain at about the same level in February.
– Previously, Russia supplied large volumes simultaneously to China and India. Now India is reducing purchases, and China is only partially increasing them.
– As a result, some oil accumulates at sea and in storage, and Russian production gradually decreases due to limited sales opportunities.
9. The EU called for a complete halt to trade with Russia.
– Latvia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Baiba Braže, during a meeting with the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, stated that sanctions pressure on Russia must be intensified, including by combating its “shadow fleet,” and completely halting all types of trade with the aggressor state.
– Factual data indicates that economic ties are already rapidly shrinking. According to the Customs Administration and the Bank of Latvia, between 2022–2024, the volume of trade in goods and services between Latvia and Russia fell by 78.1%.
– In the 11 months of 2025, imports of Russian goods decreased by another 73.5% year-on-year, exports to Russia — by 8.7%. Since 2021, the number of Latvian companies exporting to Russia has decreased by almost 80%.
– The trend indicates further isolation of the Russian economy in the European direction and the gradual loss of even those trade channels that remained after the start of the full-scale war.
