Due to the significant resonance in the information sphere caused by events in the Southern operational zone, today we return to the Hulyaipole and Zaporizhzhia directions.
1. I will briefly remind our readers of the composition of enemy forces and means operating within the groups of forces (GF) “Vostok” (Hulyaipole direction) and the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) GF “Dnepr” (Zaporizhzhia direction).
GF “Vostok”:
– 29th CAA (right flank of this group, operating on both sides of the Zaporizhzhia – Donetsk road), includes the 36th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (SMRB), the 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR), and several other units and divisions (possibly from the 90th Tank Division (TD) and the 41st CAA from GF “Center”).
– 36th CAA (ensures the right/northern flank of the 5th CAA, operating south of the Vovcha River, in the general direction of Velyka Novosilka β Pokrovske), includes the 37th SMRB, the 5th Separate Tank Brigade (STB), up to 2-3 formations at the motorized rifle/rifle regiment (MRR/RR) level of the “mobilization reserve” (MR) category.
– 5th CAA (the most powerful army of this group, operating along a rather wide front line roughly from Rivnopillya to Hulyaipole), includes a complete 127th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) β 114th, 143rd, and 394th Motorized Rifle Regiments, 218th Tank Regiment (TR), as well as the 57th and 60th SMRB. Evidently, like the 36th CAA, it was reinforced with several formations of the MR category (up to 4).
– 35th CAA (partially reinforcing the 5th CAA, the remaining forces evidently form the operational reserve of GF “Vostok”). It includes three brigades β the 38th and 64th SMRB, as well as the 69th Separate Protection Brigade (SPB)
GF “Dnepr” (58th CAA and reinforcements).
58th CAA (operating in the Zaporizhzhia direction, along the Dnieper and on the Orikhiv directions), operates forces of the 19th MRD (392nd, 503rd, and 429th Motorized Rifle Regiments), as well as part of the forces of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (at least the 70th and 291st MRR). In addition, it is evident that forces and means of two airborne assault divisions (AAD) from the Airborne Forces of the RF Armed Forces operate in the zone of the 58th CAA, namely:
– The 7th Air Assault Division (operating with at least two of its air assault regiments β the 108th and 247th), in the general direction of Kamianske β Stepnohirsk and from the line of Stepove β Mali Shcherbaky in the northern direction.
– The 76th Air Assault Division (which previously took over part of the 35th Combined Arms Army’s zone of the Eastern Military District, operating in the area of Orikhiv, to its east and north of Polohy), is likely operating with its main forces.
Additionally, in the Zaporizhzhia direction, separate units from the 100th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade and the 45th Separate Special Purpose Brigade of the Russian Airborne Forces, as well as the 4th Military Base from South Ossetia, have been recorded.
2. Regarding the current situation.
The enemy (Russian forces), by advancing with the above-mentioned forces and means (troops), previously achieved the following results:
– In the operational zone of the Eastern Military District:
In the area of the 5th Combined Arms Army, they took the city of Huliaipole and advanced westward to the area of the village of Zaliznychne, north reaching the line of Tsvitkove β Pryluky, and also penetrated the defensive system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the tactical level in the direction of Dobropillia β Ternuvate, occupying part of the latter.
In the area of the 36th Combined Arms Army, they started battles for the village of Danylivka and reached the line of Novooleksandrivka β Orestopil.
– In the operational zone of the Dnipro Military District:
Russian forces advanced in the direction of Novopokrovka β Mala Tokmachka, starting battles for the latter, and managed to capture part (southern) of the hard-fought Novodanylivka south of Orikhiv.
In the area of the 58th Combined Arms Army, the enemy managed to advance in the direction of Kamianske β Lukianivske, bypassing Stepnohirsk from the southeast, and in the direction of Plavni β Prymorske, occupying part of the latter. The enemy also advanced north of Stepnohirsk along the E-105 road and in the direction of Stepove β Pavlivka.
However, about a week ago, the pace of advancement of the forward parts and units of the Russian forces in these directions first significantly slowed, and then almost completely “zeroed.” Moreover, in the areas of the 5th, 36th, and 58th Combined Arms Armies, Ukrainian forces began a series of counterattacks in some areas, which succeeded not only in sharply slowing down the general advance of the enemy (and in some places completely stopping it) but also forced the Russian command to pull back its forward units, specifically:
In the operational zone of the Eastern Military District:
– In the directions of Velykomykhailivka β Ternove and Kolomiitsi β Verbove, forward units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine managed to expel the enemy from Oleksiivka and Orestopillia, reaching Berezove, Ternove, and starting battles for them.
– In the direction of Danylivka β Pavlivka, the Armed Forces of Ukraine consistently pushed the enemy back from Danylivka and, by acting along the Yanchur River, managed to liberate Vyshneve, Yehorivka, Pershotravneve, Zlahoda, and Rybne, beginning battles for Pryvilne.
– In the direction of Ternuvate β Dobropillia, forward Ukrainian units managed to oust Russian infantry groups from Ternuvate, Kosivets, cross the Haichur River, and liberate Dobropillia itself (as of last evening, attacking units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were already recorded east of Dobropillia).
– In the direction of Vozdvyzhivka β Varvarivka, Ukrainian units managed to expel the enemy from Pryluky and Olenokonstantynivka, cross the Haichur River, and began battles for Varvarivka (and, evidently, part of Varvarivka is already under control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine).
– At the Tsvitkove β Zaliznychne line, it is evident that the enemy was halted due to several counterattacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, although south of Zaliznychne they made some progress towards Dorozhnianka β Zaliznychne (up to 1.2 km along the railway from the south). Currently, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are holding the line Tsvitkove β Sviatopetrivka β Staroukrainka β Zaliznychne. All the forward units of the enemy’s 5th CAA managed in this sector was to establish a presence in Zaliznychne itself and reach the eastern outskirts of Tsvitkove, but they have been unable to advance further for over a week.
In turn, in the zone of the Russian 58th CAA (right flank of the operational zone of enemy’s “Dnipro” group):
– In the direction of Malokaterynivka β Prymorske, the Ukrainian Armed Forces likely managed to push out the Russian forward units from the central part of Prymorske to its southern part (however, the enemy managed to hold them with main forces in the area of Stadionna, Pokrovska, Horkoho, and Zaliznychna streets).
– In the direction of Lukianivske β Stepnohirsk, apparently, the forward Russian units were pushed from their positions in the Lukianivske area and retreated southwest of it.
– North of Stepnohirsk, separate small infantry groups of Russian troops are evidently trying to hold on both sides of the E-105 road, where the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in turn, are attacking their left flank from Prymorske along Hnidyi street.
– Additionally, as a result of counterattacks by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the enemy’s advance in the direction of Stepove β Pavlivka is likely also halted.
Thus, it can be asserted that over the past week, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have managed on the Hulyaipole and Zaporizhzhia fronts, if not to completely stop the Russian offensive, then to effectively reduce it to a tactical minimum, and only in relatively narrow sectors. Moreover, as a result of these counterattacks, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have pushed the enemy’s forward units back in some areas, in some cases by 9-9.5 km.
3. Now, regarding future prospects (operational-tactical).
Some domestic and Russian experts have hastily termed these actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces a “counteroffensive.” However, I would refrain from such definitions.
Most likely, we are dealing with “stabilizing” actions by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and only in the tactical zone. They have quite a limited scope and scale. Therefore, it is obvious that we should not assert that someone will “encircle the flanks,” “trap the enemy grouping,” “break through to the rear,” etc.
It is likely that the main significance and intent of these actions by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which I emphasize are purely of a “stabilizing” character, on the Hulyaipole and partially Zaporizhzhia fronts, is the Ukrainian command’s desire to “slow down” the Russian offensive. Therefore, in this case, we should not talk about deep operational-tactical breakthroughs and encirclements.
Of course, if the forward units and subdivisions of the Russian 5th, 36th, and 58th CAA, evidently weakened in the previous two-month offensive battles, significantly and on a large scale “crumble in defense,” then the Ukrainian Armed Forces will try to capitalize on this, developing their successes on certain tactical sectors into a full-fledged operational-tactical offensive. But at the moment, this course of events does not seem apparent to me, for several reasons, including:
– Limited number of forces and resources at the disposal of the Ukrainian command in these directions (in other words, even these relatively small successes, limited in scale exclusively to the tactical level, need to be consolidated and developed, yet the corresponding forces are “stretched thin”).
– The Russian command possesses sufficient operational reserves in these directions, and mostly they have not yet been used. For example, according to my calculations, only in the “Vostok” Operational Group (including the 5th and 36th Combined Arms Armies), there are at least two brigades.
– The Ukrainian Armed Forces lack air and artillery superiority in these directions, which is critically necessary for them in such a situation. The situation with UAVs in the tactical and operational-tactical zones also has, let’s say, a “controversial” nature, not giving a noticeable advantage to either side.
– The Russian military command, to “counter” such efforts by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, can use a whole set of ADDITIONAL forces and resources from relatively “stabilized” areas and directions in adjacent operational zones to the corresponding zones of “Dnepr” and “Vostok”. For example, the 18th Combined Arms Army from the “Dnepr” group or the 41st Combined Arms Army and the 90th Tank Division from the “Center” group. All of them are ALREADY deployed in neighboring operational zones and on adjacent operational directions. Therefore, for the Russian command, their transfer (regrouping) to the Hulaypilska and Zaporizhzhya directions will not be particularly difficult and will not take much time.
In this context, several other factors can also be listed…
In short, for now, we can only talk about some counterattacking actions by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on SPECIFIC tactical areas and directions of the Southern operational zone, whose maximum operational-tactical significance lies exclusively in disrupting the preparation and execution by the Russian command of a hypothetical Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhya operational offensive operation in the near future.
Moreover, my assessment of these actions by the Ukrainian Armed Forces is based solely on one result that they have ALREADY managed to achieve β evidently, the Ukrainian Armed Forces did manage to disrupt the plans and schedules of the deployment of the forward units and subunits of the enemy’s “Dnepr” and “Vostok” groups to the staging areas necessary for such an operation, and to the same boundaries. Instead of this advancement, the enemy is clearly forced to “stall,” as they say, halfway.
For a week now, Russian propaganda platforms have been generating panic, claiming that the Ukrainian Armed Forces have launched a counteroffensive in the Zaporizhzhya region, using a large number of forces and means, including armored vehicles.
Some particularly βextremeβ war reporters are reporting colossal losses for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, thousands killed, and hundreds of pieces of equipment destroyed. Yet dozens and hundreds of videos verifying these losses have never once appeared in the public domain, although how could they not boast live about the destruction of another Ukrainian tank column?
So what is really happening on the Line of Combat Contact?
First and foremost, it is necessary to understand that the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) are not currently conducting any counteroffensive. Instead, Ukraine’s defense forces are conducting tactical-level counterattacks in specific areas of the front to improve positions.
So, there is no talk of any epic “counteroffensive”, but rather about tactical-level counterattack measures.
The transition from a full defense to counterattacks is entirely normal, and throughout 2025 we have observed them multiple times in the AFU, such as in the Dobropilsky direction, Kupyansk clearing operation, etc. However, even to conduct such counterattacks, certain conditions need to be created or arise.
Currently, these conditions include the disconnection of Starlink gray terminals from the occupiers, as well as the slowdown and potential blocking of Telegram. Considering the decline in quality communication in several units along the front line, not taking advantage of this to improve positions would be senseless.
Another critical factor is that the main strike force of the group gathered in the South-Donetsk direction, the 5th Operational Tactical Group, has suffered catastrophic losses since September 2025 β over 20,000 people β and lost its combat capability. Although it is challenging to imagine the loss of combat capability, it happened with the 5th Operational Tactical Group.
The 5th Operational Tactical Group operating in the Huliaipole direction with the forces of the 127th Mechanized Brigade, the 57th and 60th Motorized Rifle Brigades, received support from adjacent armies, including units of the 38th and 64th Motorized Rifle Brigades, as well as the 69th Separate Battalion. Earlier, the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 36th Operational Tactical Group and the 5th Tank Brigade were also forced to reinforce its depleted resources.
Currently, the RUS command is also considering deploying the full reserve forces of the 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 49th Operational Tactical Group in the battle for Huliaipole, which is known to be part of the “Dnieper” group, as well as units from the 90th Tank Division. These forces were initially intended to be used only after reaching the right bank of the Haichul River, but they may be deployed soon to speed up the occupation of Huliaipole.
All these factors allowed the AFU to switch to active counterattack actions in several directions, and their results can already be observed, namely:
– the enemy has been pushed back from Novooleksandrivka, Verbove, and Vyshniove (Dnipropetrovsk region), weakened by the redeployment of forces and assets to strengthen the 5th Operational Tactical Group;
– the enemy was pushed back from Ternuvate and Kosivtseve to the left bank of the Haichul, and even more than that, but about that later;
– in the Stepnohirsk bridgehead, the AFU not only continue to hold the city but also pushed the enemy back from Prymorske, completely clearing the north part of the village up to road 204, as well as Lukianivka in the area of the βStepnohirskβ landscape reserve.
The RUS cannot currently fully counter these counterattacking actions, but to diminish their results and exaggerate their resistance, they label it as some large-scale “counteroffensive”, to report having halted something that, in essence, did not happen, while the lost positions are deemed acceptable.
However, this is a vivid indicator of the RUS vulnerability to unexpected situational phenomena. And what if we talk about phenomena forming within a strategy?
Photo: 147th Separate Artillery Brigade of the Airborne Assault Forces of the AFU
