Fierce News – 17.11.2026

Fierce News – 17.11.2026
Ivan Lyuty

(long read)

1. Kyiv between Putin’s Hammer and Trump’s Anvil

There’s an interesting situation: Putin continues to destroy Ukrainian cities, Trump keeps explaining to Ukraine why it’s time to end the war, and Kyiv increasingly finds itself in the position of being offered to voluntarily sign a receipt of its own robbery. And they’re convinced that this is called peace.

And the most dangerous thing here is not even the Russian demands. We know very well what Putin wants. The most dangerous is when the American political agenda starts gradually replacing the Ukrainian survival strategy.

Particularly alarming are the talks about the need to end the war by the end of 2026. The calendar target itself is not the problem. The problem begins when the date turns into a political obligation, and obligation becomes a reason for concessions.

Because the Kremlin has its strategy: to drag out negotiations, increase pressure on the front, continue terrorizing the Ukrainian rear and at the same time convince Washington that it’s Kyiv preventing peace.

In other words, Moscow wants to get at the negotiating table what it couldn’t achieve solely on the battlefield.

And Trump wants results. Preferably quickly, preferably by the end of the year, and preferably something that can be sold to the American voter as his own diplomatic victory.

He needs results. Putin needs territories, a weakened Ukraine, and lifting of sanction pressure. And Ukraine needs security, preservation of statehood, and guarantees that won’t turn into another Budapest piece of paper.

These are three completely different goals.

After the talks in Abu Dhabi on November 10-11, David Arakhamia spoke of good progress towards a solution by the New Year. Zelensky also stated that Ukraine would do everything possible to achieve a result by the end of the year, but separately emphasized: much depends on the readiness of the Americans to pressure Orkostan.

And here I would advise Kyiv to slow down a little with the optimism. Because there’s a huge difference between the phrasings:

– “We are ready to strive for the end of the war.”
– “We expect to end the war by the end of the year.”

The first demonstrates political will. The second creates expectations and potentially ties Ukraine’s hands.

Now let’s imagine a situation.

December comes. No agreement. The unhinged old man continues to insist on his territorial appetites, demands restrictions on the Ukrainian army, and essentially tries to get a veto on Ukraine’s future.

And Trump, in his repertoire, starts looking for the guilty party.

And here Ukraine risks finding itself in a highly unpleasant situation: first, Washington sets a political deadline, then it declares the lack of results as a consequence of Ukraine’s intransigence.

Next, familiar pressure tools may follow:

1. Delays or restrictions on military assistance.
2. Limitation of intelligence information and technological support.
3. Public accusations against Zelensky of unwillingness for peace.
4. Increased pressure demanding territorial concessions.
5. Attempts to portray European support for Ukraine as an obstacle to diplomatic resolution.

Some of these tools are already familiar to Kyiv from previous episodes of relations with the Trump administration.

In such a situation, the sole beneficiary becomes the Kremlin elder. He doesn’t even need to achieve the immediate signing of capitulation conditions. It’s enough to make Washington and Kyiv argue among themselves over who and for what reason limited the work of Starshield.

Orkostan gains the opportunity to continue military actions, negotiate for Ukrainian territories, and watch as Ukraine’s main military partner gradually becomes a source of political pressure on it.

Moreover, Putin is interested in making Ukraine appear as the side rejecting peaceful initiatives. A confirmation of this is the proposal for a humanitarian mission in Konstantinovka. This allows the Kremlin to portray itself as a constructive participant in negotiations, even when its demands remain incompatible with Ukrainian interests or even sovereignty.

And most importantly.

Kyiv must remember one simple thing: Trump’s desire to end the war is not a guarantee that the conditions for ending the war will be beneficial for Ukraine. One should not confuse American political interests with Ukrainian national interests. They may coincide but are not obliged to.

And another point.

Europe should not be a spectator in the American-Russian play, but a full participant in the negotiations. After all, it is the Europeans who will have to ensure a significant part of Ukraine’s long-term security.

After the meeting of Witkoff and Kushner with Putin, American representatives stated that Europeans would be invited to the next round of negotiations. But Moscow still resists their participation and rejects European proposals for security guarantees.

Conclusion. Zelensky and Arahamia need to be extremely cautious with public promises to end the war in 2026.

Peace is necessary for Ukraine. But not at any cost and not by a specific date. Because if, for the sake of a beautiful New Year’s report for Trump, Ukraine receives a frozen war, a weakened army, and security guarantees without real protection mechanisms, that will not be the end of the war. It will be buying time for Putin at the expense of Ukraine’s future security. And we already know how the Kremlin uses the time given to it.

And remember, ladies and gentlemen: a calendar is not a military strategy, and Trump’s desire to receive a Nobel Peace Prize should not become Ukraine’s foreign policy.

2. A Thousand Cuts: How Ukraine Turns the Russian Rear into a Zone of Constant Risk

While Moscow talks about victories at the front, and Russian propagandists explain to the population that the so-called Russia’s economy demonstrates unprecedented resilience, Ukrainian drones continue to engage in a completely different kind of economic activity. Systematically reducing Russian production capabilities. Without coordination with the Ministry of Economic Development of Orkostan.

The Ukrainian strategy of strikes on the Russian rear increasingly resembles the tactic of a thousand cuts. And there is a certain logic to this.

We are not trying to destroy the entire Russian military economy with a single blow. We force it to spend resources daily on restoring what was still working yesterday.

Oil refineries, oil depots, export terminals, ports, railway infrastructure, ammunition depots, repair enterprises, air defense systems, and radar stations — all these are elements of one large system that ensures Russia’s ability to continue the war. And Ukraine is consistently targeting each of these elements.

The most painful area for the Russian economy is the oil sector. It can be said that the oil industry is the nervous system of Orkostan.

This is no longer about isolated fires for beautiful photos from Russian regions. In the past two weeks, Ukrainian strikes have disrupted the normal operation of ten of Russia’s 35 largest refineries. Just think: a third of the processing capacities have come under pressure from Ukrainian strikes.

Now let’s look at the geography. Omsk, Kirishi, Ryazan, Nizhny Novgorod, Yaroslavl, Samara, Volgograd, Ufa. These are not just border enterprises, where a drone can arrive relatively quickly. In our concept of strikes, the enemy’s vast territory is an additional vulnerability factor.

Russian geography is gradually ceasing to be a reliable defense system against Ukrainian drones. And this is perhaps one of the most unpleasant surprises for the Kremlin.

But refineries are only half the story.

Ports. The next blow to the Russian wallet. You can extract oil, refine it, produce fuel, but if there are problems with storage, transportation, and export, the entire production chain begins to feel the pressure.

And here Ukraine is increasingly working on port infrastructure.

On November 11, the port of Ust-Luga in the Leningrad region was hit. According to SBU information, oil terminals, reservoirs, pumping stations, pipelines, and railway infrastructure were affected. There were also reports of damage to berth facilities.

This is a completely different level of impact. Because a port is not just a few oil tanks. It’s a complex logistical system connecting extraction, processing, storage, rail transport, and export. Damage to one element creates problems for the rest. If such strikes are repeated, routes have to be changed, spare capacities sought, logistics rebuilt, and additional expenses paid.

In other words, Russian oil does not magically disappear, but it becomes more difficult and expensive to turn into real money.

A thousand cuts are not just about the oil industry.

There is another important aspect that sometimes gets lost behind photographs of burning refineries.

Ukraine systematically targets military infrastructure in the Russian rear and in occupied territories. According to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, only in October, the following were hit:

– 19 air defense, electronic warfare, and radar facilities;
– 20 infrastructure facilities of strike drones;
– 27 command posts;
– 47 ammunition, fuel, and material supply depots;
– 8 repair facilities.

This is not just about causing damage. It’s a consistent dismantling of the infrastructure necessary for waging war.

And here arises an interesting pattern.

To protect refineries, ports, depots, and military facilities, Russia has to allocate limited air defense resources over a vast territory. Each additional site that needs to be covered requires more missiles, radar means, calculations, and maintenance. And it turns out, the Russian territory is a bit larger than the capabilities of the Russian air defense system.

But the most interesting part is the cumulative effect.

One damaged refinery can be repaired. One port can be temporarily replaced with another. One depot can be relocated. But when issues arise simultaneously at several enterprises, transportation hubs, and military facilities, the system starts losing stability.

And consequences manifest in several directions:

1. Economy. Oil processing decreases, additional repair expenses arise, logistics costs increase, and budget pressure grows.

2. Fuel supply. It becomes harder to secure the domestic market with gasoline and diesel, as well as to maintain a stable supply for the army.

3. Military logistics. Strikes on depots, railway hubs, and repair enterprises complicate the supply of Russian troops.

4. Air defense. The need to protect more and more objects forces the stretching of the air defense system, creating additional vulnerabilities.

5. Export. Damage to ports and terminals creates risks for oil revenues, which are one of the crucial sources of financing the Russian war.

And the most unpleasant thing for Moscow is that all this requires constant restoration. An installation can be repaired. But if it gets damaged again in a few weeks, the economic efficiency of such repair becomes highly questionable.

Now the main question: why is this important now?

Because the Kremlin is trying to simultaneously wage war, sustain the economy, finance the army, and show its population that there are no serious problems.

But, as I said at the start of the war, and I will repeat: the adversary’s resources are not infinite.

That is why the Ukrainian strategy of a thousand cuts makes strategic sense. It does not promise an immediate collapse of the Russian economy but gradually increases the cost of continuing the war.

And here is another important nuance.

While Trump tries to persuade Kyiv to limit strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, the Ukrainian side demonstrates that a ceasefire cannot be a unilateral gift to Moscow.

A quite logical position. Why should Russian refineries operate smoothly while Russian missiles and drones destroy Ukrainian power plants?

Outcome. Orc-land expected that its vast territory, number of industrial enterprises, and economic resilience would allow it to wage war for a long time with virtually no consequences for its own rear. As some claimed: “Russia can fight for 20 years.” No, it cannot.

Ukraine is making adjustments to the Kremlin’s strategy.

Today a refinery is on fire, tomorrow problems arise at a port, the day after, a railway hub has to be restored, and a week later they are searching for spare parts for damaged equipment again.

And all this happens against the backdrop of war, sanctions, growing military expenses, and the need to maintain the front.

A thousand cuts do not necessarily kill immediately. But sooner or later, the body begins to lose its ability to recover.

And judging by what’s happening, the Ukrainian Defense Forces have studied the Russian economic anatomy very closely.

And it seems it’s time for Russian oil workers to introduce a new position — a specialist in finding intact tanks. Because there is still oil in Russia. But there is less and less confidence that it will safely reach the buyer.

3. The Front. While Russia fights with mass, Ukraine fights with intelligence

There is one feature of the current war that Moscow still seems unwilling to recognize.

Russian military command continues to bet on numerical superiority, pressure with manpower, artillery, and the gradual grinding down of Ukrainian defense. The logic is quite primitive: if ten soldiers can’t take a position, send twenty. If twenty don’t work, send fifty. People are expendable, equipment is expendable, the main thing is to show movement on the map for the next report to superiors.

Of course, it would be wrong to claim that the Russian army doesn’t use modern technology at all. Drones, electronic warfare, and reconnaissance are also available to the enemy. But the basis of its offensive strategy remains mass pressure, huge losses, and attempts to overwhelm the enemy with quantity.

Meanwhile, Ukraine demonstrates a completely different approach. We cannot afford to endlessly compensate for Russian numerical superiority with the number of our own soldiers. Therefore, we have to find solutions that allow us to achieve results with fewer forces, using technology, unconventional thinking, and targeted operations.

And some of these solutions already look like episodes of military science fiction.

Operation “Vivaldi.” When the hunter becomes the prey.
One of the most illustrative examples is the “Vivaldi” operation by the Third Army Corps in the Lyman direction.

While the Russian command was trying to press Ukrainian defenses and create a threat of further advancement towards Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, Ukrainian units began systematically dismantling the Russian offensive system itself. It’s interesting not only that Ukrainian forces shifted to counteroffensive actions but also how exactly they did it.

Reconnaissance drones, FPV, heavy bombers, ground robotic complexes, remote mining, cutting logistics, and creating isolated zones for Russian units.

Ground robots were not just used for delivering ammunition or evacuating the wounded. During the operation, they were dropped by heavy drones directly behind Russian positions. There, they carried out strike and diversionary tasks.

Imagine the scene: Russian soldiers are expecting another Ukrainian assault, and suddenly, a large drone arrives behind them to deploy a ground robot with explosives.

It’s long overdue for Russian commanders to reassess the notion of a secure rear. In reality, Ukraine has demonstrated that a modern offensive doesn’t necessarily look like the movement of a massive infantry and armored units. It’s possible to first deprive the enemy of logistics, disrupt command, isolate their units, destroy reconnaissance means, and only then tackle the task of liberating territory.

It’s a completely different philosophy of warfare.

Operation “Veles”. When war goes underground.

And now, ladies and gentlemen, prepare yourselves. Because the next episode deserves a special place in military art textbooks.

Kupiansk direction. Russian units have already used the gas pipeline for covert penetration into Ukrainian rear. It seemed like another unconventional tactic, allowing the enemy to bypass regular defensive positions.

But the Ukrainian “Khartia” decided that if the enemy mastered underground infrastructure, why not use their own method? Thus, Operation “Veles” was born.

Ukrainian servicemen traversed over 15 kilometers through the gas pipeline, emerged in the rear of Russian units, combining their underground advance with the actions of ground groups and drone strikes.

The diameter of the pipe was about 1.2 meters. Imagine the conditions: limited space, lack of normal communication, complex navigation, the need for special training, and the constant threat of encountering the enemy.

And here’s one detail I find particularly indicative. The enemy used the pipe to penetrate Ukrainian rear. Ukrainians studied this experience, developed their own operation, and used the same infrastructure against Russian units. We aren’t just reacting to the enemy’s actions. We study their tactics, adapt them, and find ways to use them against them.

It seems the Russian army has discovered underground warfare, and Ukraine decided to show who’s boss of communications here.

Two armies — two different philosophies of war.

Now let’s try to see the broader picture.

Russia has a larger mobilization resource, significant stockpiles of armaments, and the capability to continue exerting pressure on several fronts simultaneously. That’s why it can afford a war of attrition strategy, where human losses become part of the calculation.

Ukraine is in completely different conditions. We need to preserve our personnel, increase the efficiency of each unit, and maximize the technological advantage where it compensates for resource shortages. That’s why:

– FPV drones and heavy unmanned aerial vehicles;
– ground robotic systems;
– autonomous reconnaissance systems;
– remote mining;
– integration of aerial and ground unmanned systems;
– precise coordination of actions between different units.

The discussion is no longer just about the use of individual drones. We are gradually moving towards a model where unmanned systems become full participants in combat operations: conducting reconnaissance, delivering ammunition, evacuating the wounded, mining routes, attacking positions, and supporting infantry advancement. This represents a fundamentally different level of organizing combat operations.

For the future of warfare, I would highlight three important points.

First — numerical superiority is no longer a guarantee of success. It still holds great importance but no longer ensures automatic advancement. The more transparent the battlefield becomes thanks to drones, the more costly the concentration of manpower and equipment becomes.

Second — the role of the soldier on the battlefield is changing. More and more tasks previously performed exclusively by humans can be transferred to robotic systems. This does not mean the disappearance of infantry, but it gradually changes its functions and reduces the need to expose military personnel to unnecessary risk.

Third — the advantage goes to those who adapt faster. In modern warfare, it is not enough to have more tanks, artillery, and soldiers. One must find new solutions faster than the enemy, implement technologies, and change tactics.

And here, Ukraine has significant potential.

In summary, while the Russian command tries to solve 21st-century tasks through methods of mass pressure and attrition, Ukrainian units demonstrate how modern technologies can change the very logic of combat operations.

Operation “Vivaldi” showcased the capabilities of integrating aerial and ground robotic systems in offensive actions.

Operation “Veles” demonstrated the ability of Ukrainian forces to turn the opponent’s unconventional tactics into their own advantage.

And these are not isolated glamorous episodes for social media. These are signs of changing the nature of war.

Of course, technologies alone do not win wars. People, training, production, ammunition, competent command, and stable supply are needed.

But the direction of development is already clear. Russia tries to win by quantity. Ukraine seeks ways to win by efficiency.

And if Moscow continues to measure military success by the number of people sent into attacks, it may eventually find itself fighting an army it no longer recognizes. Because while Russian generals count assault groups, Ukrainian engineers are figuring out how to avoid yet another assault.

Welcome to 21st-century warfare, ladies and gentlemen. However, it seems that the Russian command has not yet received a software update.

4. “Bayonet to the ground.” When weapons become a tool of internal explosion

There is an old military formula: “Bayonet to the ground!” Its meaning is quite simple: there is no need to defeat the enemy on the battlefield if you can convince his soldiers to refuse to fight, turn their weapons against their own command, or simply stop following orders.

This tactic is far from new. It was used during World War I, revolutions, and numerous military conflicts of the 20th century.

Trotsky also talked about it, describing the agitation directly in the trenches: intimidating soldiers, convincing them of the futility of resistance, calling to lay down arms and not fight.

But the most interesting thing is that such a strategy has today received a completely new technological embodiment.

It is no longer enough for Russia to pressure Ukraine solely with missiles, artillery, and manpower. Moscow perfectly understands: it is impossible to defeat the Ukrainian army with numerical superiority alone. Therefore, alongside military actions, work is being done to undermine the Ukrainian rear from within.

Here, real social problems come to the forefront: mobilization, unauthorized leave from units, service conditions, conflicts with TCCs, societal fatigue, and distrust towards certain military command members.

It is important to understand: these problems are not invented. They exist, and Ukraine must address them.

But this is precisely why they become the perfect material for enemy information operations. The enemy’s goal is not to eliminate the problem but to turn it into a weapon against Ukraine itself.

On November 2, we saw a rather revealing example. In Petropavlovska Borshchahivka near Kyiv, messages began to spread about an alleged torture chamber where about forty people were held against their will, abused, beaten, and even driven to death. Emotional video recordings appeared, claims of alleged medical workers, calls to urgently come and free people.

And people really began to gather at the scene. Clashes with military personnel and police erupted, service vehicles were damaged, and an attempt was made to prevent the removal of military personnel from the building.

But subsequent investigation showed a completely different picture. According to the SBU, one of the organizers used a fake representation of belonging to the medical service, reconnaissance of the place was conducted in advance, and provocation scenarios were discussed in correspondence. Law enforcement stated that one of the goals was to free a serviceman who had previously left a unit without permission. In the building were military personnel, including people who returned after AWOL, and recruits awaiting assignment.

Here arises a very important question. Why was the information campaign built specifically around the theme of allegedly illegal detention of people? Because it is an extremely painful topic for Ukrainian society.

It is enough to show an emotional video, add some loud accusations, create an impression of violence and lawlessness — and part of the audience is already ready to pass judgment without understanding the circumstances.

Then the crowd effect kicks in.

People come not to find out the circumstances but to free supposedly tortured individuals. Social outrage turns into a clash with the military. Videos spread across the internet, and Russian information resources get exactly the picture they orchestrated for.

Now let’s look at what’s happening through the eyes of the Russian information headquarters. They do not need to prove that the Ukrainian army is bad. It is enough to create the impression that Ukrainian society starts to perceive its own army as an adversary. Imagine the impact such stories have:

– Military personnel begin to be perceived not as defenders, but as people from whom protection is needed.
– Relatives of the mobilized become a potential audience for manipulation.
– Any conflict with military representatives becomes a reason for mass outrage.
– Trust between the civilian population and the Defense Forces is gradually eroding.
– Instead of uniting around a common threat, society begins to sort out internal relations.

This is exactly what’s called undermining the rear.

Moreover, Russian propaganda doesn’t even need to create every conflict independently. It’s enough to find an existing problem, pick it up, blow it out of proportion, and direct public outrage in the desired direction.

It’s noteworthy that the Center for Countering Disinformation and Ukrainian law enforcement reported signs of a pre-organized campaign with external interference. According to the CCD, reports of a “concentration camp in Borshchahivka” were massively spread by Russian Telegram channels.

On November 12, the SBU and National Police reported the detention of 13 participants in the unrest. Seven individuals, according to law enforcement, were placed in custody.

But there is another point that should not be overlooked. The military ombudsman is checking the circumstances of the servicemen’s stay at this site. The Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that the National Guard’s internal investigation is complete, and the materials are being transferred to the State Bureau of Investigation for a legal assessment of the military’s actions.

And this is correct. If there were violations of the servicemen’s rights, those responsible should be held accountable. Combating Russian provocations does not absolve Ukrainian structures from responsibility to their own citizens.

Ukraine must learn to protect not only the front but also society.

I see three principal tasks here.

The first is transparency. The less information about problems within the army, the more space for Russian manipulations. Problems need to be investigated, and the results shown to the public.

The second is responsibility. Illegal actions of individual military representatives cannot be justified by the war. But organized violence against military personnel cannot be passed off as civic valor.

The third is informational resilience. Telegram channels, fake medics, and unknown organizers cannot be allowed to turn real human problems into a tool for eroding trust in the Defense Forces.

And most importantly, it is necessary to understand that the Russian strategy is not limited to calls for desertion. Its goal is much broader: to make Ukrainians doubt each other, stop trusting the army, conflict with the state, and ultimately lose their sense of shared responsibility for the country.

Conclusion. While the Russian army tries to pressure Ukrainian defense with numbers, the Russian information machine tries to do the same with Ukrainian society.

On the front line — pressure with manpower. In the rear — pressure with fear, distrust, provocations, and artificially inflated conflicts.

And here we return to the old formula “Bayonet to the ground.” Only now, it’s not necessary to be in a trench convincing a soldier to drop his rifle. It’s enough to find a discontented person, provide the necessary information, create an emotional picture, and direct the crowd to where it will collide with Ukrainian military personnel.

Russia does not necessarily have to defeat the Ukrainian army on the battlefield if it can convince Ukrainian society that its main issue is its own army.

However, there is one problem with this strategy. Ukrainians already know quite well the cost of Russian “liberation” to believe every sensational message from Telegram unconditionally.

Nevertheless, we cannot relax. Because the enemy understands perfectly: a divided society is an additional front where it doesn’t even have to use missiles.

Our task is not to let it turn the Ukrainian home front into another battle line. And remember, ladies and gentlemen: when the enemy cannot break the bayonet at the front, it will surely try to convince the soldier to plant it in the ground themselves.

5. The Long Memory of Northern Monarchs. Ukraine Returns to Major European Politics

There is one interesting feature in European history: states can change borders, dynasties may disappear, empires can collapse, but historical memory sometimes proves to be much more enduring than political regimes.

And today, when we talk about the future of Ukraine in Europe, I propose we remember a person who, perhaps better than many modern politicians, understood the importance of international connections.

Yaroslav the Wise.

In the 11th century, Yaroslav the Wise not only strengthened the state, developed Kyiv, and managed the country’s internal affairs. He built a system of international relations through dynastic marriages. His daughters became queens of European states:

– Elizabeth became the wife of the future King of Norway, Harald Hardrada.
– Anastasia married the Hungarian King Andrew I.
– Anna became the Queen of France, wife of Henry I.

Yaroslav himself was married to Ingegerd, daughter of the Swedish King Olof Skötkonung.

This was not just a family story. Dynastic alliances strengthened diplomatic relations, trade connections, and political influence of Kievan Rus. That is why Yaroslav is often called the “father-in-law of Europe.”

And here’s what’s especially interesting.

A thousand years ago, Kyiv was connected by familial and political relations with the northern European monarchies. Today, centuries later, we are witnessing the formation of an entirely new strategic alignment of Ukraine with Northern Europe.

Of course, modern diplomacy is built not on royal marriages, but on common interests, security, economy, and political commitments.

But the historical parallel is quite symbolic. Today, the rapprochement of Ukraine with the countries of Northern Europe and the Baltic region is especially noticeable. Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are increasingly coordinating their support for Ukraine. And it’s no longer just about humanitarian aid.

This involves defense cooperation, arms production, energy security, financial support, joint projects, and long-term commitments.

It is noteworthy that in February 2026, the leaders of the NB8 countries confirmed the strategic nature of support for Ukraine. Their joint statement included over 42 billion euros of already provided military, financial, and humanitarian aid, as well as nearly 12.5 billion euros of planned military contributions for 2026.

Now, pay attention to the political component.

In June 2026, the leaders of Ukraine and the NB8 countries adopted a joint declaration on deepening cooperation in the field of security and defense.

And in August, a meeting of leaders of the northern and Baltic states took place in Kyiv, after which support for Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO was confirmed. The declaration included a rather interesting idea:

The security of Ukraine is an integral part of Europe’s security, and Ukraine itself is already a provider of security for the European continent.

This is a very significant shift in the perception of Ukraine.

Until recently, many European politicians viewed us primarily as a country needing help to defend itself. Now, a different concept is increasingly voiced: Ukraine itself possesses unique military competencies that all of Europe should utilize.

And these are not just beautiful diplomatic formulations.

This is where, in my opinion, the most interesting part begins. What could Ukraine be like after the war ends?

I see several directions that can determine its place in Europe for decades to come.

First — the defense industry. Ukraine has gained enormous experience in modern warfare. Drones, electronic warfare systems, robotic complexes, missile technologies, reconnaissance systems — these are not just Ukrainian developments for its own front. They are the potential foundation of a new European defense industry.

Europeans urgently need to build up their military capabilities, and Ukraine has much to offer: technologies, engineers, production competencies, and practical combat experience.

Second — the new architecture of Europe’s security. Ukraine can become a key participant in the containment system of the eccentric oil power to the east and northeast of the European continent.

Cooperation with the northern and Baltic states looks particularly promising. Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and the Baltic countries fully understand the Russian threat. For them, a strong Ukraine is not a charitable project but an element of their own security.

The Swedish analytical center SCEEUS, in its 2026 report, directly proposes viewing Ukraine as a natural extension of Europe’s northeast flank and developing deeper NB8 cooperation with Ukraine in defense, intelligence, and countering hybrid threats.

Third — economic integration. Ukraine’s recovery could become one of Europe’s largest economic projects. Energy, transport, industry, construction, agriculture, defense production.

But it is important not to repeat an old mistake: to rebuild destroyed buildings but leave the old management mechanisms.

We need not just a rebuilt country. We need a country with functional institutions, independent courts, protected property rights, and clear rules for investors.

Fourth — political weight. After this war, Ukraine will no longer be perceived solely as an Eastern European country needing protection.

We will have a key voice in matters of European security, defense policy, and relations with the Eastern aggressor. This is why Ukraine’s integration into the EU and NATO is significant not only for Kyiv. It changes the very configuration of European security.

But there is one big “if.” And it doesn’t concern Moscow, Washington, or even Brussels. It concerns ourselves.

This is where the beautiful historical parallel ends and the unpleasant Ukrainian reality begins.

One can speak endlessly about the European future, a strategic alliance with northern monarchies, EU and NATO membership, joint weapons production, and a new security architecture.

But there’s a problem that can’t be solved with arms supplies or diplomatic declarations: corruption and the merging of political power with criminal interests.

It’s no longer just about familiar stories of kickbacks on purchases or officials suddenly becoming property owners beyond their official income.

It’s about a more dangerous phenomenon — the infiltration of organized corruption interests into state institutions, the law enforcement system, the prosecutor’s office, and the mechanisms for distributing state resources.

Operation “Midas,” investigations by NABU and SAP, and cases involving high-ranking officials, heads of state structures, and political entourage members have shown the scale of risks.

The European Commission in its 2026 report noted that anti-corruption bodies continue to investigate high-level corruption, but at the same time, there are ongoing attempts to pressure their independence by other state structures.

The same report describes investigations of alleged organized criminal groups, including those related to illegal activities of fraudulent call centers and bribery of law enforcement officials.

Here arises a question that should concern every Ukrainian.

How can you build a European state if some government representatives use state institutions for their own financial and criminal networks’ interests?

How can you count on the trust of European partners if the independence of anti-corruption bodies must be protected from attempts at political interference?

How can you invite European investments if the investor is uncertain whether their business will be protected from officials’ arbitrariness and their influence groups?

And most unpleasantly: the war did not eliminate these problems. In some areas, it created additional opportunities for abuse because large financial flows, closed procurements, and extraordinary powers require even stricter control.

If such a system continues to strengthen, Ukraine risks becoming a state where European institutions, elections, parliament, and law enforcement agencies formally exist, but the actual influence on decisions is divided among political groups, financial clans, and criminal interests.

This model can rightly be called a move towards a mafia state. And this is no longer just a corruption problem. It is a threat to the Ukrainian project itself.

Because European integration implies not only receiving money and political guarantees. It implies changing the rules of the game.

And Europeans are not obliged to accept Ukraine into their political and economic club just because it heroically resisted Russian aggression.

Summary. A thousand years ago, Yaroslav the Wise connected Kyiv with European monarchies through dynastic unions. Today, Ukraine is once again building deep relationships with Northern Europe, but on a completely different foundation—shared security, economic interests, technology, and a political future.

There is a certain historical irony in this. Once, the daughter of a Kyiv prince became the queen of Norway. Today, Ukraine becomes an important partner for countries governed by the descendants of that very Northern European political tradition.

History certainly doesn’t repeat itself literally. But sometimes it beautifully comes full circle.

Ukraine has the opportunity to become one of the key states of the new Europe. Not a buffer zone between Russia and the West. Not a perpetual asker for military aid. Not a territory whose fate is decided by others. But an independent state with a strong defense industry, a powerful army, a developed economy, and genuine political influence.

But to do this, it’s not enough to defeat Russia on the battlefield. We also need to overcome our own corrupt system. Because we can hold back Russia with weapons. But a mafia state, if we allow it to fully form, can destroy our European future from within.

And here’s my final thought.

Yaroslav the Wise left his descendants a state that was part of the greater European politics.

Our task is to leave the next generations a state that will not just remember its European past, but have a full-fledged European future.

And I would strongly dislike historians writing a thousand years from now about how Ukraine won the war for independence, got a historic chance to become part of Europe, but lost to its own corrupt officials.

Because that would be the most costly victory we managed to lose.

Glory to Ukraine! Everything will be Ukraine!
I learned…

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