Three remarks about Russia – the average, the high, and the low

Three remarks about Russia – the average, the high, and the low
Oleksiy Kopytko

In recent weeks, the number of posts about economic problems in the Russian Federation has sharply increased in my feed. The tone is also changing towards more euphoric-hysterical notes.

The reason is clear. There is a therapeutic moment. In order to correct and before exposing the cynical reptiloid Ischinger, three complementary remarks about Russia. About the average. About the high. And about the low.

1. When certain integrated and/or averaged indicators are used, it must be remembered that Russia is very large and diverse. Plus, statistics there often lie.

A quarter of the Russian Federation’s economy is Moscow. In Moscow, due to the appropriation of regional revenues, almost all indicators grow (with some exceptions). Moscow is thriving. The “weight” of Moscow and its growth are such that they distort an already distorted average hospital temperature.

Therefore, excluding Moscow, almost all averaged indicators of Russia are worse. And that is positive. It is extremely important to look at the situation across regions. Then the blighted areas become apparent.

Ideally, one should also isolate abnormally successful growth points by region with an analysis of the reasons (I will mention one below). The real picture will be slightly clearer. Overall, it is bleak, trends are correct, but everything is still significantly better than we would like.

This is important to understand in order to allocate forces.

2. About the high – about space. Since Starlinks have added relevance.

Some time ago, I analyzed the dynamics of spam from Russians who send me wishes of all things bad in various messengers. Nothing delights and empowers like these sincere emotional texts 🙂.

So.

Russians who receive my writings are not particularly moved by publications about the successes of the Ukrainian Defense Forces. They are more important for us and our friends in different countries because negatives often overwhelm.

Dear Russian brothers and sisters are wildly irritated by publications on the topic of the future stolen by Putin. Much more than the fixation on current problems.

Because, firstly, the stolen future is the truth. Putin has robbed the currently living generations and at least one unborn. These are irrefutable facts without exaggeration.

Secondly, it is very difficult or impossible to fix. This creates a sense of hopelessness – the same one that Russians are trying to cultivate in Ukraine. Naturally, it irritates them to colic.

The only solution here is to jump out of the war and restore connection with the world. Otherwise, there’s no way.

On this topic, decent materials come out in Russia every day. They just get blurred.

For example, a few days ago an interview was published with the rector of a key Russian technical university, Bauman Moscow State Technical University, Mikhail Gordin. At times, he puffs out his cheeks, keeps a straight face, and all that. But at the same time, he gives hints about space: “…We have undoubtedly fallen a bit behind in terms of technological restructuring – this is a fact, everyone openly talks about it, and now we need to catch up on it… The fact that we have slowed down is true, but we have the opportunity to speed up because the foundation remains. The testing base remains, a lot of developments, and people who practically know how and what is built and designed remain. So with proper attention and funding, not all is lost. We just need to buckle down and work on it…”

Statistics tell us that in 2025 Earthlings conducted 324 space launches, 9 of which were unsuccessful. This includes launches conducted by:

• USA – 176,
• China – 93,
• Russia – 17,
• Europe – 7,
• India – 5,
• Japan – 4.

If measured by launch locations, Russia – 17, and New Zealand – also 17.

The last time Moscow launched fewer (15) was in 2020 (COVID’s doing). Before that, it was in 1961. A sharp decline was noted after 2014.

Putin has set Russia back to pre-Gagarin times. Without any exaggeration, I can say, not every state leader is capable of such a truly historical achievement.

Russia’s lag behind the USA is now tenfold. Behind China – 5.5 times.

Last year, China conducted three launches in the interest of Pakistan, and this year already two for Algeria. This means Russians are gradually losing the launch market for countries that cannot connect with Western countries but also do not want to risk associating with sanctioned Russia.

In 2026, the USA already conducted 15 launches, China – 9, Russia – 1.

In summary: the thesis “lagged a bit” is unfounded. It is a significant lag, and it is accelerating. And that’s if we don’t consider the quality of space manifestations.

As for “catching up” – this implies leading investments. In the 2026 Russian budget, 376.9 billion rubles ($5 billion) are allocated for the financing of the state program “Space Activities of Russia.” This includes everything, including personnel for space.

At the same time, equalization transfers for problematic regions amount to 1 trillion 367 billion rubles ($17.8 billion). The lion’s share of these costs could have been avoided. But they will only grow.

Approximately 85 billion rubles are allocated for compensating Russian Railways to ensure traffic with Crimea under various budget programs. For railway traffic with the so-called “Novorossiya” – another approximately 20 billion rubles. In total – 105 billion in direct expenses only on railways due to the occupied territories.

Meanwhile, 61 billion rubles are allocated for satellite communication and Earth observation, and manned cosmonautics is allocated 111 billion rubles.

There’s no talk of “buckling down” or “catching up” in principle.

The USA and China are already formatting the new stage of the lunar race. Musk will break another dozen Starships but will tweak them eventually. In Russia, however, a discussion can be held – is everything lost or not?

3. On the lower end – literally about sewage.

As I’ve already noted, Russia is undergoing an internal civil utilities war. Our situation is also dire, but we are not yet aiming for superpower status nor invading neighbors out of an excess of emotion.

According to various estimates, 20% to 30% of Russia’s housing and utilities infrastructure is in ruins. Slag that doesn’t even perform basic functions.

According to the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, the accumulated wear and tear of networks reached 75% by the end of 2024, and the wear and tear of water intake facilities is 66.9%. About 20% of the main assets in water intake, purification, and distribution systems are completely worn out. Leaks and unaccounted water consumption make up about 23% of the consumption volume, and the overall wear and tear of communal heating networks is from 40% to 80% depending on the region. In some regions, water losses exceed 50%.

At the same time, the degree of wear increases by 3-5% annually, while renewal occurs at 1-2%. This means the average wear of the system increases, leading to escalating maintenance costs and losses.

Metal pipes (steel, cast iron), which have exhausted their resources, are rapidly becoming unusable. The alternative is replacement with polymer pipes.

In this regard, certain hopes were pinned on the petroleum and petrochemical corporation “Sibur.” In 2020, “Sibur” and the Chinese company Cinopec started building the cyclopean Amur Gas Chemical Complex. Together with the Gazprom’s Amur Gas Processing Plant, which is supposed to supply raw materials to Sibur’s Amur GCC, these enterprises create an advanced Far Eastern petrochemical cluster.

Overall, the Amur region in the past decade has been a true arena of cyclopean constructions. First, the Vostochny Cosmodrome, then the gas processing and chemical plants.
I mentioned anomalies, and due to these mega constructions, the Amur region shows abnormal growth figures for Russia. Construction, for example, has grown by 135%. Strikingly, GDP growth is at least 1.6 times higher than the Russian average. Investment, industry, unemployment, income—all are better.

The capacity of the Amur GCC is about 2.3 million tons of polyethylene and 0.4 million tons of polypropylene. The enterprise is capable of ensuring a sharp increase in the production of polymer pipes for modernizing Russian utilities. For the Amur region’s statistics, this would almost triple industrial indicators.

The nuances are that, firstly, there is no money for modernizing utilities without ending the war (and even for a long time after it), and there will not be.

Secondly, the plant was planned to start operations in 2024/25. But in 2022, European contractors left the project, and a “reconfiguration” of the equipment was carried out. As a result, polyethylene production is expected to start in the third quarter of 2026. And full-fledged operation—not before 2027. That’s if it doesn’t get worse. Initially, it was delayed by a year, then another year… So even on such a key project involving Chinese partners, there is a delay of at least 2 years. This is yet another “success” of the “special military operation.”

Looking over the facilities, sectors, and regions, the list of “results” of the “special military operation” is impressive. It feels like the war is taking place within Russia itself.

I think this sense of a slipping future will put pressure on Russia’s present. Through the loss of confidence. Which may be expressed, for example, in “bank runs.” This is more dangerous than some isolated debts or the loss of stability of a major developer.

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