In today’s texts, we often talk about the “war accounting,” but unfortunately, people often don’t understand this term. There are two reasons for this, the first being that people, in principle, misinterpret the financial algorithms for distributing defense funds. The second reason is that this war has completely broken the logic of forming the necessary cost of means according to the NATO principle.
Let’s start with human misunderstandings.
Repeatedly, when I wrote that interceptor drones affect the war accounting because they must be significantly cheaper than the Russian offensive means (Geran/Gerbera), experts would come to me in comments, pompously declaring: “This is all nonsense you’re writing, that an interceptor drone should be cheaper than the offensive means, because you must also consider the cost of destroyed property.” When I asked them to explain how this should be calculated, people got offended, froze up, and left like an owl-strategist: “We threw the topic at you, and you sort it out yourself, unclear, we’re strategists, not tacticians, it’s your job to understand how to apply my undoubtedly brilliant proposal.” So there are people who still think that statistical jokes about “how the reduction of pirates affected global warming” are not jokes, but really serious analytics. And when you start explaining to such Pastafarians, it takes time, and there are many of them, and it’s difficult to engage in a discussion with each one, considering that you give them arguments, and they start manipulating and shifting the focus, because they don’t want to look wrong. So let’s explain here.
There is the overall budget of the Defense Forces of Ukraine. It is distributed across various expenses. This includes aviation, monetary support, ammunition, offensive drones, missiles, air defense, financial support for the military, and other expense items.
There is a function of offensive capability and defensive capability, if we consider the issue of interceptor drones. That is, there is a certain budget and conditions where everything is needed, but there isn’t enough money for everything. And they try to somehow maintain all these functions and save as much as possible on everything, because they are all needed for war.
Okay, you want to allocate more money to make a more expensive interceptor. From which expense category do you want to take this money? From offensive drones? From the financial support of the military? Perhaps take it from the aviation fuel funds? Well, strategists, what are your proposals? And at this discussion, the person usually slams the door, curses you for not understanding their genius, and leaves into the sunset, switching their expertise from budgeting sums for an interceptor drone to some other field.
Don’t do that. We are engaged in a very difficult war, where we try to economize on many functions to stay afloat. All these functions of the Armed Forces are critically important. Don’t take this lightly.
An interceptor drone’s task is not only to shoot down Russian drones; this task is shared by air defense systems, aviation, and ground-based means, but to do it cheaper than others, making the overall function less expensive. For example, if your F-16 effectively shoots down six Shaheds — four with missiles and two with autocannons, but considering its flight hours, the cost of weapons, fuel, and other expenses, one downed drone costs $300,000 compared to the Shahed’s cost of $70-100,000.
However, if in one system one shoots down six drones with an aircraft, and 20 drones with interceptor drone crews, spending, say, 50 drones with a total cost of one drone at $2,000 — then the average cost of one downed Shahed in the system is already about $70,000, meaning the system can budget somehow. This is a very general example with very ephemeral numbers, but the overall logic should be clear to you. That’s why the logic of some “experts” who run around shouting for “cheap missiles” has no prospect in this system, because any missiles with good capabilities will cost much more than an interceptor drone, thus significantly increasing the cost per downing and only adding pressure on the budget. Moreover, these “experts” don’t mention that we already have inexpensive missiles — both Western LLMs and Ukrainian RK-10 and RK-19 from Luch Design Bureau, and their cost is known (nothing cheap compared to interceptor drones), and their performance against aerial targets doesn’t favour these experts, which is why they stay silent about it. It’s always easier to run around demanding a wonder weapon than to actually create one. But people love wonder weapons. A wonder weapon is simple. Understanding how a system works is difficult. It’s clear where the office of simple solutions is heading, definitely not towards understanding how the system works.
But practice tells us otherwise.
Now we will talk about NATO’s principles of evaluating weapon costs.
The general NATO principle of weapon design was based on the following thesis — “the weapon should be more technologically advanced than the competitors, and how much it costs is secondary; we dominate economically anyway, so we’ll manage, as long as it provides the corresponding advantage.” This gave significant advantage over some bushmen and made the system ultimate against states with small economies and armies. It allowed for quick victories without soldier losses.
The Russian-Ukrainian war has broken this principle. Because when faced with a state capable of producing hundreds of ballistic and cruise missiles per year, with two armies each larger than a million people at the front, tens of aircraft in the sky, and nearly daily missile-drone attacks on countries with hundreds of drones and missiles, no economy can sustain such a burden if the means are expensive and many are needed.
Furthermore, there’s a technological balance, as the more technologically advanced the means — the harder it is to produce them in large quantities.
Let’s analyze different approaches with examples.
The American Anduril showcased the Altius-600 drone. It’s like the Switchblade 600 from another company. This drone costs over $50,000 (50k is probably a minimal estimate), has a good warhead weighing up to 5 kg, likely tandem type, and can effectively engage armored vehicles. However, with armored vehicles not protected by grills, but give people some time, they will realize their mistake later. This drone is supposed to provide the function of striking armored vehicles at the front.
The Russian approach in this is to take 25 “Molniya” drones for these $50,000, and the “Rubicon” crew will work for two days on our positions and logistics. Out of these 25 drones, let’s say two will hit, and another two will cause some damage. Not the best efficiency at first glance.
But.
Now let’s see who allocated the $50,000 better.
The crew on the Altus 600 in two days might not see a single armored unit, and even if it flies to a target, this drone might be shot down by an interceptor. But never mind, even if it flies, it strikes and hits. A very optimistic forecast. 100% efficiency, let’s say.
Meanwhile, the Russian crew will be doing several things over two days with their actions:
1) Blocking our logistics, as continuous “Molniya” flights in the sector halt movement until the drone is destroyed.
2) Drawing upon our small air defense resources, which are also necessary SOU expenses.
3) Taking part in the comprehensive targeting of our objectives, overloading our anti-aircraft crews to guarantee hitting a specific target, and even if a few “Molniya” are shot down, they won’t care because it allowed some other means to reach the target.
4) Attacking any targets along the way, as the general cheapness of the means allows deploying the drone on any target, even a cheap one, where using a more expensive drone makes no sense.
5) Meanwhile, delivering several packages to assault positions using the “Molniya” as a logistics drone.
6) Using “Molniya” to mine several roads and deliver a couple of FPV further behind our lines.
A question to the audience – who used the $50,000 better on the front and made a more significant impact on the opponent?
That’s the point, the Russians with their entire military budget apply money better than the NATO forces. We do it the same way. Some algorithms may differ between us and the Russians, in some things we are better and more efficient, in others – the Russians. But the NATO system, in this regard, still cannot effectively use money. They are still advocates of the “need for more technological means” system, not understanding that the accounting and functions of war have changed. And if their same Altus 600 cannot exist in a system where it flies 100+ km in a comprehensive attack system and doesn’t hit some plane or helicopter, with one in five reaching like our long-range RAM-2X and “Bulava” do, then it makes no economic sense. Because the armor that makes it worth using such a means on a front strike might not be found.
That’s why the experience is valuable for Western companies collaborating with the Ukrainian defense industry. They participate in a competitive environment and, possibly without getting into the nuances, move in the right direction. This is the experience that makes their products more suitable for real warfare. However, companies not involved in applying tools in the Russo-Ukrainian war and focusing on “technological advancement” may end up creating a great tool whose value is not justified by the modern battlefield.
All these algorithms form a complete economic strategy for modern warfare and the proper allocation of funds for various functions.
And we will still have to teach this to our allies.
