Sanctions are timely. 07.02.2026

Sanctions are timely. 07.02.2026
Volodymyr Omelyan

Information regarding the current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 02.07.2026​​.

1. The budget situation in Russia deteriorated sharply at the start of the year: in January, the federal budget was recorded with a deficit of 1.718 trillion rubles — almost half of the annual plan.

– Budget revenues for the month amounted to 2.362 trillion rubles, which is 11.6% less than a year ago. The key hit was on oil and gas revenues: they collapsed by 50% to 393 billion rubles, the lowest level in the last five years. The growth in non-oil taxes by 4.5% (to 1.969 trillion rubles) did not compensate for the losses.
– Formally, the Ministry of Finance planned to reduce the budget “gap” from 5.7 to 3.8 trillion rubles, but in reality, the deficit may grow to 10 trillion rubles. Reasons include discounts on Russian oil, export problems, particularly to India, and the general deterioration of external economic conditions.
– In a negative scenario, the Russian authorities will likely resort to raising taxes, increasing fiscal pressure on non-oil industries and on people’s incomes. Meanwhile, financial problems are unlikely to make the Kremlin reduce military spending.
– Putin is likely to pressure the Central Bank to issue more money, continue raising taxes, sell state-owned property, and expand the practice of business nationalization.

2. At the end of 2025, the largest Russian exporters sharply reduced their sale of foreign currency, increasing pressure on the financial system and the ruble.

– According to the Central Bank of Russia, net sales by 29 companies in December fell by 32% to $4.7 billion, the lowest since November 2022. In January, the figure rose to $5.1 billion but remained one of the lowest for the entire observation period.
– Compared to the beginning of the year, when volumes reached $10–12 billion per month, sales more than halved. The Central Bank explains this by the decline in prices for Russian oil: the average price of Urals in November dropped to $45 per barrel, and in December to $39.
– Additionally, companies reduced their activity on the currency market due to accumulating rubles for debt repayments.
– Demand for currency from the population also plummeted — from 148.8 billion rubles in November to 49 billion in December and 36 billion in January.
– Meanwhile, by the end of the year, Russians purchased currency worth 1.12 trillion rubles, indicating continued distrust in the ruble.

3. The loss of Russian “KamAZ” increased 11 times amidst the collapse of the truck market.

– The largest Russian truck manufacturer “KamAZ” recorded a sharp deterioration in financial performance for 2025.
– The company’s net loss according to Russian accounting standards (RAS) increased 11 times and reached 37 billion rubles. Loss from sales amounted to 22.9 billion rubles, while a year earlier the company showed a profit of 909 million rubles.
– Gross profitability collapsed almost 32 times to 757 million rubles, and revenue decreased by 2.5% to 315.2 billion rubles.
– The company’s management associates the worsening results with a deep crisis in the truck market and admits that at the beginning of 2026 there are no signs of market recovery, and truck sales may decrease by approximately 20%, creating additional risks for the company’s financial stability.

4. The share of loss-making companies in Russia increased to almost 29%.

– As of January–November 2025, the share of loss-making organizations in Russia increased to 28.8%, compared to 27.1% a year earlier, according to Rosstat data.
– Accordingly, the share of profitable companies decreased from 72.9% to 71.2%. According to official statistics, 44,900 organizations received a profit for the reporting period, with their total financial result being 32.965 trillion rubles, 2.7% less than last year.
– Meanwhile, the number of companies that ended the period with losses reached 18,200. The total volume of losses increased by 8.1% and reached 7.535 trillion rubles.
– The data indicates a further deterioration in the financial condition of the Russian corporate sector amidst a slowing economy, increasing debt load, and declining business profitability.
– If the trend continues, the share of loss-making enterprises may continue to increase in 2026, intensifying pressure on the budgets and banking system of Russia.

5. Russia secretly sent billions of dollars in cash to Iran to support the ayatollahs’ regime.

– In 2018, Moscow transferred at least $2.5 billion in cash to Iran, bypassing American sanctions. A key role in the scheme, according to the investigation, was played by the defense-related Promsvyazbank — a financial institution closely connected with the Russian military-industrial complex.
– In just four months of 2018, the bank made at least 34 cash dollar deliveries, each ranging from $57 million to $115 million. The total weight of the transported banknotes reached five tons.
– The logistics of the deliveries was multi-layered and carefully disguised. The money was first transported by rail from Moscow to Astrakhan, then by sea across the Caspian to the Iranian port of Amirabad, and from there by rail to Tehran.

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