Kostiantyn Yeliseyev / Dzerkalo Tyzhnia
Not new “turbo programs,” but fulfilling commitments
For Ukraine, full-fledged membership in the European Union is not just a foreign policy goal. It is one of the most reliable guarantees of our independence, territorial integrity, democracy, security, and prosperity.
This is why today, in the conditions of war, we cannot afford to lose time, opportunities, and the trust of our partners.
Reformatting the government may give a boost to accelerating real Eurointegration, or officials may once again get stuck in the mire of producing new “turbo programs,” institutions, positions, plans, and conferences. Such a risk exists because instead of accelerating the implementation of the National Adaptation Program to EU legislation, over a thousand pages long, approved by the government on April 1 this year, the new government is being proposed to write a new accelerated accession program. This resembles Eurointegration populism and imitation rather than real integration and implementation of the Copenhagen criteria.
Joining the EU is not just diplomacy. It is a long and demanding path of restructuring the state, economy, society, and institutions. And Ukraine must prove by the end of 2026 that it can transition from declarations to execution.
I would highlight five primary priorities in the relations between Ukraine and the EU for this period.
The first and main priority is the real fulfillment of obligations within the negotiating cluster “Foundations.”
This is the foundation of the entire accession process. It concerns the rule of law, democracy, judicial independence, anti-corruption, public administration, financial control, public procurement, and statistics. This cluster opens first and closes last. That is, the European Union will evaluate Ukraine not once, but throughout the entire negotiation process.
The questions will be very specific. Are democratic institutions really functioning? Is there an independent judiciary? Are anti-corruption bodies protected? Is there parliamentary control? Is freedom of speech and political pluralism ensured? What rights does the opposition have? Is there no politically motivated pressure on opponents and civil society?
On December 11, 2025, the Kachka–Kos declaration was signed with a list of ten primary steps in the fields of democracy, rule of law, judicial independence, and anti-corruption. Ukrainian authorities committed to fulfilling them by the end of 2026. Currently, according to expert assessments, less than 20% has been completed, and the prospects are doubtful. Therefore, a simple question arises: what kind of “turbo mode” of Eurointegration can be declared if even ten steps are being implemented with a significant delay?
We must understand that fulfilling membership criteria is not ten or even a hundred decisions. It’s thousands of laws, government resolutions, ministry decisions, changes in the operation of institutions, and the daily practice of their implementation. The EU assesses not only whether we have adopted the correct law. It evaluates whether this law works.
Second priority — ensure the opening of the remaining negotiation clusters. Currently, two out of six are open. Ukraine must actively work with the European Commission, the EU Council, and member states to quickly open the clusters of the internal market, competitiveness, green transformation, resources, and agriculture.
Yet, in parallel, we need to abandon the policy of artificial dates. Populist slogans about Ukraine’s EU membership by January 1, 2027, have failed miserably. The European Union assesses not whims or political deadlines but the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria.
The speed of our movement towards the EU depends primarily on the quality and pace of reforms. Not on the loudness of statements. Not on emotional pressure on partners. Not on the argument that Ukraine is heroically fighting, although this heroism is indeed unprecedented.
The heroism of Ukrainians has opened the doors to Europe for us. But reforms, institutional capacity, and trust will guide us through these doors.
Therefore, the task by the end of 2026 is not to invent new political formulas but to fulfill the already agreed criteria, show real progress, and create grounds for political decisions in the EU.
Third priority — inclusivity.
European integration cannot be the affair of just the government, one office, or one political force. It must be a national platform for Ukraine’s transformation. This process should involve parliament, government and opposition, local government, business, civil society, experts, universities, and youth.
Why is this so important?
Because joining the EU will change the rules of life for everyone: entrepreneurs, students, farmers, judges, officials, communities, universities, hospitals, NGOs. It is not abstract diplomacy. These are new competition standards, new demands on the state, new opportunities and challenges.
If society does not understand what is changing and why, even the correct reforms may cause fatigue, resistance, or distrust.
Therefore, European integration must become an honest conversation with society. Not propaganda of success, not a set of beautiful reports and presentations, but an open explanation: what we are changing, how much it will cost, who will benefit, who will need support, and how Ukraine is preparing for life within the EU.
Fourth priority — honesty in reforms.
If decisions that actually contradict European principles are made under European slogans, it will quickly destroy trust. Trust is the main currency in the negotiation process.
If we talk about judicial reform, it should truly enhance the independence of the courts. If we talk about anti-corruption, then NABU, SAP, and other institutions must be independent, and the State Bureau of Investigations should be reformed. If we talk about parliament, it should be a place of genuine discussion, control, and quality law-making, not formal voting.
The EU will look not only at the texts of laws but also at the political context, procedures, inclusivity, transparency, and the real impact of reforms on institutions.
Therefore, European integration legislation must be maximally protected from political manipulation. It cannot become a tool of internal struggle. And it certainly cannot be a cover for decisions that contradict the spirit of European standards.
By the end of 2026, Ukraine must demonstrate not only the ability to adopt European laws but also the political will to live by European rules.
A unique objective assessment of the achievements of the Ukrainian government on the EU track will be given by the European Commission in its regular annual report on Ukraine’s progress for 2026 at the end of this year. And currently, judging by the first signals from the institutions and capitals of the EU member states, serious challenges await our government.
Fifth Priority — Diplomacy with EU Member States.
Even if Ukraine qualitatively implements reforms, the accession process will still depend on the political decisions of all member states. And there will be challenging issues: agricultural competition, the EU budget, cohesion funds, historical memory, national minorities, economic interests of neighboring countries. Therefore, Ukraine must work not only with Brussels. Systematic work with Warsaw, Budapest, Bratislava, Bucharest, Berlin, Paris, and other capitals is necessary.
We need to not expect another veto but to prevent it. Not react to crises but address risks in advance. Not create additional fronts with neighbors but build complex yet necessary compromises.
Separately, it is important to ensure that interim formats of integration do not become a substitute for full membership. Pre-accession integration — yes. Participation in programs, policies, sectors of the EU — yes. But “associated membership” as a political ceiling for Ukraine — no. The Ukrainian position should be clear: any interim format should bring us closer to full membership, not substitute it.
Therefore, by the end of 2026, Ukraine must focus on five practical things — strong democratic institutions, real reforms instead of declarations, opening all negotiation clusters, inclusivity of the European integration process, professional diplomacy with each EU member state.
This is what can create a new quality of trust between Ukraine and the European Union. And this is what can bring us closer to the main goal — full membership of Ukraine in the EU.
If we go through this path honestly, professionally, and together, Ukraine’s membership in the European Union will become not just a diplomatic decision, but a true historical transformation of the country.
