Information on the current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 24.07.2026.
1. Ukrainian drones continue to destroy Russia’s logistics infrastructure.
– On the night of July 24, Ukrainian drones attacked several logistics facilities in various regions of Russia.
– The Wildberries warehouse complex and the MLP “Utkina Zavod” logistics park in the Leningrad region, as well as a possible Wildberries logistics hub in Tver, came under attack.
– In occupied Simferopol, local channels also reported an attack on a Wildberries facility, publishing video footage of the strike moment. According to available information, the MLP “Utkina Zavod” logistics park houses warehouses and logistics capabilities of major Russian companies, including Wildberries, Ozon, Petrovich, X5 Retail Group, and others.
– This is the fourth attack on Wildberries logistics facilities in recent days, and the damage has affected about 10% of the company’s logistics infrastructure.
2. Ukraine attacked an air defense missile production plant in Kirov and new Wildberries logistics hubs.
– On the morning of July 24, Ukrainian drones and, according to Ukrainian monitoring resources, FP-5 “Flamingo” missiles struck the Vyatka Machine-Building Plant “Avitek” in Kirov — one of the key enterprises of the Almaz-Antey concern, which produces missiles for air defense systems and other military products. According to Ukrainian sources, at least four production workshops of the plant were damaged, and a large-scale fire broke out following a powerful explosion.
– Simultaneously, Wildberries logistics facilities came under attack. In the Tver region, an administrative building of the logistics center in the village of Elevator caught fire after the attack.
– The series of strikes on Wildberries’ logistics infrastructure has been ongoing for several days and is increasingly affecting the operations of Russia’s largest marketplace, creating risks for logistics, product supply, and business costs.
3. Russia faces stagflation: the economy may shrink by 2% with inflation at 7%.
– Analysts from the Kremlin-aligned Russian Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-term Forecasting (CMASTF) predict that by the end of 2026, Russia’s economy might face stagflation — simultaneous GDP decline and high inflation.
– The base scenario anticipates a 2% GDP contraction with inflation around 7%. Economic activity may decline as early as the second quarter, while inflation exceeds 6%.
– The main factors worsening the situation are budget expenditures, the autumn rise in utility tariffs, and the fuel crisis, which are not controlled by the central bank’s monetary policy.
– CMASTF notes that in stagflation conditions, traditional central bank tools lose effectiveness: demand for goods and services is already weakening, yet prices continue to rise.
– Simultaneously, rising fuel and utility costs increase business expenses, maintaining inflationary pressure.
4. Russia may create an oil hub in Madagascar for exporting fuel to Africa.
– Russia may gain a new logistics platform for exporting petroleum products to Africa. This possibility arises from the reform of Madagascar’s fuel market, which, according to industry participants, may facilitate the purchase of Russian fuel. On July 1, Madagascar’s parliament passed a law establishing a state oil company to monopolize fuel imports.
– This effectively dismantles the system in place since 1999, where supplies were organized by the industry association Groupement Pétrolier de Madagascar (GPM), which includes TotalEnergies, Vitol, Rubis Energie, and Axian Group.
– GPM warns that the new model paves the way for Russian petroleum imports and creates sanction risks for international companies and their clients. The supply of fuel to international airlines, mining enterprises, large construction contractors, and foreign investors on the island may be threatened.
– Five weeks before the law was passed, Madagascar’s Prime Minister Mamitiana Rajaonarison stated in an interview with the Russian agency Sputnik that Russia could invest in building an oil storage facility on the island.
– The implementation of this project could potentially allow Moscow to create a new hub for transshipment and export of petroleum products to the African market amid Western sanctions.
5. Russia’s oil and gas revenues could increase by 60% in July, but remain lower than last year over seven months.
– The revenue of Russia’s federal budget from oil and gas in July may increase by approximately 60% year-on-year due to rising global oil prices and increased proceeds from mineral extraction tax in the second quarter.
– However, this jump will not compensate for the weak results at the beginning of the year. According to the agency’s calculations, from January to July 2026, the oil and gas revenues of the budget will decrease by approximately 11% compared to the same period in 2025.
– The Russian budget for 2026 allocates 8.92 trillion rubles for oil and gas revenues, while total federal budget revenues are projected at 40.283 trillion rubles.
– Last year, oil and gas revenues to Russia’s budget decreased by 24% — to 8.48 trillion rubles, marking the lowest level since 2020. Thus, despite the temporary improvement in July due to more expensive oil, the overall trend shows that the key source of Russia’s budget revenue is still lagging behind last year’s level.
6. Russia is transferring military technologies and combat experience to China for a possible war over Taiwan.
– Russia is increasingly helping China prepare for a possible invasion of Taiwan by transferring military technologies, intelligence data, and practical combat experience from the war against Ukraine.
– Since 2024, Chinese military personnel have been training at a Russian range near Volgograd, learning the use of drones, urban combat, assault on fortified positions, mining, and tactical medicine. The range is regularly used by Russia’s 8th Army, which is fighting in eastern Ukraine.
– Beijing is particularly interested in Russia’s experience in the use and counteraction of drones. According to sources, Chinese military personnel can also gather information directly near the front line in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, analyzing modern combat methods.
– In addition to training, Western officials believe that Moscow is helping China develop air and missile defense systems and transferring technology to reduce the noise of nuclear submarines. This could enhance the capabilities of the Chinese fleet in the event of a conflict around Taiwan.
– Russia may also be sharing intelligence with Beijing about Western weapon systems, including HIMARS rocket systems, which are in service with Taiwan.
– The war against Ukraine has effectively become a source of practical combat experience for China, which the People’s Liberation Army of China has not had since 1979.
– Weakened by sanctions, Russia is increasingly dependent on Beijing, giving China access to military technologies and knowledge that the Kremlin was previously unwilling to share.
7. After Viktor Orban left the position of Prime Minister of Hungary, it became clear that the slowdown of sanctions against Russia was not solely linked to Budapest.
– Governments of other countries that had been hiding behind Orbán’s position for years are now forced to openly defend their own objections to new restrictions.
– During the negotiation of the 21st package of sanctions, several countries achieved the softening or complete removal of certain measures. This shattered expectations that after the change of power in Hungary, the EU would quickly be able to increase economic pressure on Russia.
– Among the countries defending their economic interests was Germany. Berlin opposed strict restrictions on the import of Russian pollock, fearing consequences for the fish processing industry and jobs. Similar concerns were expressed by France and Portugal.
– As a result, the 21st package of sanctions turned out to be softer than initial proposals: certain types of Russian fish imports were not sanctioned, and the exemption for the transportation of Russian LNG to third countries by European companies was maintained.
– One EU diplomat noted that “it was difficult with Orbán, but he never actually blocked entire sanction packages.” It has now become clear that a significant part of the resistance to new restrictions comes from other member states, which previously remained in the shadow of the Hungarian Prime Minister.
8. The EU imposed sanctions against Russian and Belarusian refineries that helped offset the fuel crisis.
– As part of the 21st package of sanctions, the European Union imposed restrictions on five oil refineries in Russia and Belarus, as well as 19 other companies in the oil sector.
– The sanctions affected the Kuibyshev and Novokuibyshev refineries in the Samara region, the Angara refinery and “SevKuzbass-NPZ” in Kuzbass, as well as the Mozyr refinery in Belarus. A structure created to sell Belarusian fuel on the Russian market was also sanctioned.
– After massive Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries and the onset of a fuel crisis, Moscow sharply increased gasoline imports from Belarus. In June, automobile gasoline deliveries exceeded 181 thousand tons, almost three times more than in May, and by the end of the first half of the year, purchases had increased 20 times — up to 453 thousand tons.
– The sanction list also included the Georgian refinery in Kulevi, which operated with Russian oil, companies “Lukoil-Marinebunker,” “Inter RAO,” structures of “Slavneft,” and the Samara division of “Tatneft.”
