Today — Lyman direction.
1. The command of the Russian military group (GF) “Západ” continues attempts to eliminate the Lyman bridgehead of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) on the Siverskyi Donets River and take an enveloping position relative to the AFU defense area around the city of Sloviansk (from the north and northeast), reaching the Siverskyi Donets on a broad front (from Sviatohirsk to Zakitne).
To accomplish this task, the enemy (Russian troops) deployed an appropriate operational-tactical group of forces in this direction, consisting of units and formations of the 20th and 25th combined-arms armies (CAA) GF “Západ” and separate forces and means from the 1st tank army (TA) GF “Západ,” assigned to them as reinforcements.
In terms of combat and numerical composition (BNC), this grouping is quite comparable to enemy groupings operating in several other active operational directions, for example, with GF “Center” operating in the Pokrovske/Dobropillia direction, or with GF “Vostok” operating in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivsk directions. In particular:
The 20th CAA includes:
– 144th motorized rifle division (mrd) – 254th, 283rd, and 488th motorized rifle regiments (mrr), 59th tank regiment (tr);
– 3rd motorized rifle division – 252nd, 362nd, and 752nd motorized rifle regiments, 237th tank regiment;
– In this army’s zone, reinforcements from the 2nd mrd from the 1st TA (consisting of its 1st and 15th mrr) also operate.
The 25th CAA:
– 67th mrd – 31st, 36th, and 37th mrr, 19th tank regiment;
– 164th separate motorized rifle brigade (smrb);
– 169th smrb;
– 11th separate tank brigade (stb).
Apart from the mentioned forces and means, several units from the “territorial troops” (TT) of the “russian armed forces” and their so-called “mobilization reserve” (MR) also operate in this direction. Their total number likely comprises approximately 2-3 separate “motorized rifle/rifle regiments” and up to 3-4 (possibly up to 5-6) separate “motorized rifle/rifle battalions.” All of them are either under the operational control of parts and formations of both armies that operate in the Lyman direction as “attached forces and means,” or are part of their regular composition.
It should also be noted that almost all units and parts of both armies (especially the front ones) have formed so-called “assault units/groups” — most often “separate assault companies,” less frequently “separate assault battalions,” which are directly used for conducting attacking/assault actions in the tactical zone at the most critical areas and directions.
2. Currently, the advance units and formations of both armies are attempting to “isolate” the Liman defense area of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in order to proceed to its full-scale assault as quickly as possible, including:
– Units and subunits of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Arms Army, reinforced by separate units of the 1st and 15th Motorized Rifle Regiments of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 1st Tank Army, are acting from the bridgehead on the Chornyi Zherebets River, trying to encircle Lyman from the north and northwest, acting from the line of Seredne – Shchadraholove towards Oleksandrivka, as well as towards Shchadraholove – Drobysheve and Kolodiazi – Stavky.
– In turn, the forward units and subunits of the 25th Combined Arms Army aim to encircle Lyman more deeply from the south and southeast, while focusing on “penetrating” their forward assault groups and subunits directly into the city, primarily from the east. In this sense, they are attempting to break through from the line of Dibrova – Ozerne to the Brusivka and Staryi Karavan area, as well as utilizing the forest between Yampil and Lyman to “draw in” additional small infantry (assault) groups into the city.
In practice (in a tactical sense) these actions during the reporting period look as follows:
– The enemy continued active attacks/assault operations in the Drobysheve and Novoselivka areas, trying to fully control Drobysheve and advance to the Siverskyi Donets in the direction of Novoselivka — Yarova. They were unsuccessful. Their separate small infantry groups, which previously “infiltrated” into the Yarova area, were evidently gradually “cleared out.”
– Attacks from Sredne towards Oleksandrivka also did not yield positive results for the Russian 20th Combined Arms Army. The enemy’s small and “ultra-small” infantry groups, which infiltrated widely into the Sosnove — Oleksandrivka — Novoselivka — Yarova area, are being gradually eliminated by forward units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Thus, the enemy, which has been conducting combat operations in this area almost all spring, has still not fully taken control of either Novoselivka or Drobysheve.
– Attacks by the enemy in the direction of Kolodiazi — Stavky were also unsuccessful. The Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to hold their positions in the area of the latter, as well as north of Zarichne (Myrne area).
– Meanwhile, efforts of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army to the south and east of Lyman were evidently also unsuccessful. Moreover, its left-flank units evidently encountered some difficulties due to active resistance from the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Ozerne and Yampil areas, where Ukrainian units managed to reclaim several separate positions from the enemy.
The only possible positive result for this Russian army is the expansion of its assault infantry presence in the Dibrova area, where the enemy persistently attempts to break through the forest towards Brusivka and Staryi Karavan. They also deserve “recognition” for holding positions along the Lyman-Zakitne road, which goes through the forest, where the enemy is clearly under quite strong flank pressure from the Armed Forces of Ukraine (as fairly intense combat clashes are recorded in the Ozerne and Varadero beach areas).
– Attempts by the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army to increase their presence on the southeastern outskirts of Lyman were also unsuccessful. It is evident that small infantry groups of the enemy are present only in a few blocks in the area of Vyshneva and Partizanska streets. Numerous reports that appeared in Russian sources about allegedly “pulling” some “new assault groups” into the city (even naming streets Podstepna and Yubileyna) are likely not reliable. At least, I do not have confirmed information about the presence of the enemy in the northern and northeastern areas of Lyman.
Thus, it can be stated that despite quite active actions by the advanced units and formations of both Russian armies (the 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies) in the Lyman direction over the past few “latest” weeks, the enemy has not yet managed to directly assault the Lyman defense area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, essentially becoming bogged down in a series of low-result and poorly interconnected tactical actions around it.
3. Regarding the future prospects (operational significance) of the Russian command’s efforts in this direction, based on all of the above, a couple of fairly obvious conclusions can be made:
– The command of the “West” grouping has evidently “dragged out” with Lyman. In the context of preparing and conducting a possible summer “general offensive” by Russian forces on Sloviansk and Kramatorsk, they have clearly “delayed” with the Lyman defense area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In other words, the formation of the northern flank, encompassing the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, has yet to be achieved by the Russian command, and meanwhile, it is already June.
If they continue to “drag out,” and judging by the tactical dynamics, the chances of this scenario are quite high, then the Russian “South” grouping will still have to independently “batter” the Ukrainian defense in the Sloviansk direction, exclusively from the east, which by itself reduces the chances of its ultimate success in this hypothetical summer “general offensive operation.” At least in the part concerning the neighboring “West” grouping’s 3rd Combined Arms Army which is advancing south of the Siverskyi Donets.
Although, by all formal indicators, the forces and resources concentrated in the strips of the Russian 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies are quite sufficient to achieve the result necessary for the Russian command in the Lyman direction in the shortest possible time. I would say they even have a certain “reserve” there. But so far, they have not achieved this result.
– At the same time, it should be noted that in the context of fulfilling the task of liquidating the Lyman defense area of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, this enemy troop grouping, with part of its forces, particularly the main forces of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division and at least one regiment of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division (probably referring to the 283rd Motorized Rifle Regiment), is forced to act from its bridgehead on the Chornyi Zherebets River not in the direction of Lyman, but from the Ridkodub — Novovodyane line towards Borova.
It is likely related to the Russian command’s desire to achieve a more significant result on an operational-tactical level than just capturing Lyman and eliminating the local defense area of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Specifically, there is a desire to completely “collapse” the AFU defense along the Oskil and Siversky Donets rivers, at least in the Borova–Zakitne segment, and to reach the confluence of the Oskil with the Siversky Donets (the Synychyne–Studenok–Yaromivka–Tykhotske area). For this, almost the entire 20th CAA is used as a kind of “battering ram” or “cutting tool,” which simultaneously includes two full-fledged, staffed motorized rifle divisions.
At the same time, it should be noted that the average distance of this operational-tactical “penetration,” which is so “desirable” for the Russian command, is approximately 35-37 km, which currently seems, let’s say, a “rather complex and protracted task” for the Russian army. Moreover, the 20th CAA itself is now forced to simultaneously advance on diverging directions, effectively “striking with spread fingers” rather than a concentrated “fist.” In this sense, the situation is not improved by the regrouping of part of the forces of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division of the 1st TA into the zone of the 20th CAA.
In reality, the Russian 20th CAA is currently forced to solve a whole “heap” of tasks in different sectors of its tactical zone simultaneously — advancing toward Sviatohirsk and Oleksandrivka, breaking through to the northern and northeastern outskirts of Lyman, attempting to move towards Borova, etc. In the near future, it is obvious that this army will also try to break through to Oskil via Maliivka in the direction of Pisky-Radkivski. There aren’t enough divisions for this, regardless of whether they are staffed or “full-strength.”
On the other hand, the area of the neighboring 25th CAA, as for a “standard” Russian combined arms army, which consists of one motorized rifle division and three separate brigades at the same time (one of which is a tank brigade), looks, let’s say, “somewhat modest.” But that’s if you don’t consider the fact that Lyman is directly in front of it, and it is obviously “ordered” to storm it (with the help of the 20th CAA) as the “main player.” However, at the moment, instead of directly storming Lyman, the Russian 25th CAA is “temporarily stuck,” breaking through the significant forested mass around it.
On the one hand, the presence of a significant forest seems to be a positive factor for the opponent (one can attempt, using the abundant “greens,” to more or less simultaneously and covertly move a whole horde of their assault infantry directly to the city or to the necessary section of the AFU’s defense). But on the other hand, the simultaneous overcoming of numerous forested and swampy areas of the terrain by significant forces takes much more time than moving them across open spaces. And this is even without considering the very active counteraction to all these movements by Ukrainian drones.
Let’s summarize.
The group of Russian troops concentrated and deployed precisely on the Liman direction, by their numerical strength, is quite a vivid proof that the Russian command places considerable importance on the issue of its “full-scale return to the Oskil.” Especially in the context of a possible offensive operation against the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.
However, the current results of this group are no less eloquent proof that not everything in this war is determined solely by the “mechanical” increase in the number of relevant forces and means. This group reached the nearest approaches to Lyman and Yampil back in the winter. However, spring has already passed, and the Lyman defense district of the Armed Forces of Ukraine not only “continues to function” but also significantly, and in some places quite sensitively, “retaliates” against the enemy.
Photo: 5th Separate Heavy Mechanized Brigade
