Information on current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 19.05.2026.
1. Ukraine continues strikes on Russian oil infrastructure.
– On the night of May 19, drones attacked an industrial facility in Yaroslavl, causing a fire at the enterprise. The likely target of the attack was the Slavneft-Yaroslavnefteorgsintez refinery, one of Russia’s largest oil refineries.
– The plant’s capacity exceeds 15 million tons of raw materials per year. According to industry sources, in 2024 the plant processed 14.9 million tons of oil and produced millions of tons of gasoline, diesel, and fuel oil.
– The strike on Yaroslavl was another episode in a large-scale campaign of attacks on Russian oil infrastructure. Since the beginning of 2026, Ukraine has doubled the number of attacks on Russian refineries.
– Due to damage and shutdowns of plants, Russia has lost hundreds of thousands of barrels of processing capacity per day, and exports of oil products have dropped to a minimum.
2. Russians began withdrawing money from bank deposits for the first time since autumn 2022.
– In March, the volume of term deposits decreased by 288 billion rubles, and overall growth of funds in banks almost stopped — only 0.3% per month, solely due to current accounts.
– Long deposits for more than a year saw the largest reduction. This indicates a decline in trust in the banking system and a reluctance to freeze money amidst economic instability.
– Amid falling interest rates, some Russians started converting savings into other assets or spending on major purchases.
– An additional factor was increased demand for cash due to internet disruptions and problems with cashless payments. In just March and April, the amount of cash in the population increased by almost 0.9 trillion rubles.
– Simultaneously, the car market sharply revived: car sales in March rose by more than 30% year on year, and in April by another 15%.
– This may indicate attempts by Russians to dispose of ruble savings as inflation continues to devalue household incomes.
3. Labor shortage is becoming one of the main long-term problems for the Russian economy.
– The country is already lacking about 1.5 million workers, and by 2030 the deficit could grow to 3 million people. Despite Putin boasting about a record low unemployment rate of 2.2%, for the economy, this is rather a troubling signal.
– The labor market has essentially exhausted its reserves for growth: companies find it increasingly difficult to hire staff, which restrains production, investments, and economic development.
– The problem was exacerbated by the war against Ukraine, mobilization, and emigration. It is estimated that after 2022, Russia lost another 300–400 thousand workers due to population outflow. Additionally, the country lost about 1 million labor migrants due to stricter migration policies. Raising the retirement age only temporarily eased the problem but did not change the trend.
– Even if the war ends, the workforce deficit will remain one of the key factors in the degradation of the Russian economy in the coming years.
4. Russia is increasingly falling into economic dependence on China.
– The so-called “partnership without borders” is quickly turning into a model where Beijing dictates terms, and Moscow is forced to agree due to sanctions and loss of access to Western markets.
– In 2024, Russian exports to China nearly doubled compared to pre-war levels, reaching about $129 billion. The supply is mainly oil, gas, and coal, which Russia sells at significant discounts.
– Overall, China purchased more than €319 billion worth of Russian energy resources, effectively becoming the main source of foreign currency revenues for the Kremlin.
– In return, Chinese exports to Russia reached approximately $116 billion. Beijing supplies cars, electronics, industrial equipment, and dual-purpose goods that help support the Russian military-industrial complex.
– It is estimated that up to 90% of sanctioned technologies Russia currently obtains through China. Sanctions have also forced Russia to almost entirely switch its transactions to yuan and rubles — their share has reached about 99%.
– This has accelerated dedollarization but simultaneously placed the Russian economy in even greater dependence on the Chinese financial system.
– The yuan liquidity deficit is already leading to increased loan costs and strengthening China’s negotiating positions.
– An additional problem for Moscow is the energy dependence on a single buyer. The Kremlin continues to promote new pipeline projects, including “Power of Siberia-2,” which can supply up to 50 billion cubic meters of gas per year.
– However, the implementation of such projects ties Russian exports even more to the Chinese market and its conditions. In this context, potential warming of US-China relations only weakens the Kremlin’s positions.
– Beijing is gaining more benefits from cheap Russian resources but does not show readiness to become a full-fledged ally of Moscow in confrontation with the West.
5. Putin travels to China for the fifth time since the beginning of the full-scale war to try to convince Xi Jinping to agree to the construction of the “Power of Siberia-2” pipeline.
– But the many years of negotiations increasingly demonstrate the weakness of Moscow’s positions and its growing dependence on Beijing. The Kremlin has been pushing for the new pipeline project with a capacity of 50 billion cubic meters of gas per year since 2015.
– After losing most of the European market, Gazprom is practically left without alternatives and now critically needs the Chinese direction for gas sales.
– The topic of “Power of Siberia-2” will become one of the key issues during the negotiations in Beijing. At the same time, previous visits by the Russian president to China did not give Moscow the main thing — a final agreement.
– The main problem remains the gas price. China has been taking advantage of Russia’s weak negotiating position for years, securing maximum discounts. Earlier, Beijing demanded a price close to the domestic Russian level — about $50 per thousand cubic meters, which is almost ten times lower than the levels European buyers used to pay.
– Even the current price of Russian gas for China — about $258 per thousand cubic meters — is approximately 40% lower than for Gazprom’s other clients in external markets. This means that Moscow is increasingly turning into a supplier of cheap raw materials for the Chinese economy.
– Despite the Kremlin’s loud statements about “agreeing on key issues,” the Chinese side has not confirmed Putin’s optimistic statements regarding the project. Beijing is in no hurry to sign final agreements, as it clearly understands: after losing the European market, Russia depends on China much more than China depends on Russian gas.
– For the Kremlin, launching “Power of Siberia-2” has become a matter not only of economics but also of political survival for the energy model that for decades relied on gas exports to Europe.
– But the longer the negotiations last, the more obvious it becomes that the conditions of the future agreement will be dictated by Beijing.
6. China is much more deeply involved in the war against Ukraine than it publicly acknowledges.
– At the end of 2025, Chinese military secretly trained about 200 Russian servicemen at their bases in Beijing, Nanjing, and other cities. Some of them participated in combat activities in Ukraine after returning.
– It is not only about formal joint exercises. According to European intelligence, the Russians were trained in working with FPV drones, electronic warfare, counter-drone systems, mining, and the use of modern aviation simulators. Some Russian military personnel who underwent training in China were later recorded in occupied Crimea and the Zaporizhzhia region in units dealing with drone combat application. Among them were officers and instructors capable of passing on the acquired knowledge to other military personnel.
– It involves direct technological and military assistance to the Russian army from China, despite Beijing’s official statements about “neutrality” and the role of a peaceful mediator. This is especially notable against the backdrop of Putin’s visit to China and Moscow’s attempts to tie its economy and energy sector even more closely to Beijing.
– The Chinese drone industry has become a critically important source of technology for Russia. Previously, the EU had already imposed sanctions against Chinese companies associated with drone development for the Russian military-industrial complex.
7. The US has once again extended the temporary permission for maritime supplies of Russian oil.
– The U.S. Department of the Treasury issued a new 30-day general license allowing the sale of Russian oil already on tankers at sea.
– The decision was announced by department head Scott Bessent. According to him, the license is needed to stabilize the oil market and support countries most dependent on energy imports. Washington also explicitly stated that they aim to prevent a situation where China could massively buy cheap Russian oil.
– The previous license was valid until May 16. Its extension was actively lobbied by India, which faced risks of raw material shortages after the sharp escalation in the Middle East and oil price jumps. Indian refineries have become key buyers of Russian oil in recent months.
– However, even despite the temporary easing, the situation for the Russian oil sector remains unstable. Russia is simultaneously facing a reduction in production, a decline in oil product exports, blows to refineries, and increased expenses on domestic fuel subsidies.
– According to the IEA, in April, Russia’s oil production decreased by 460,000 barrels per day year-on-year, and oil product exports fell to the lowest level on record.
– Even the new license does not guarantee long-term benefits for the Kremlin. The U.S. emphasizes that the easing measures are short-term and solely related to the crisis in the global energy market due to the war around Iran.
8. The London branch of Deutsche Bank was fined in the UK for violating sanctions against Russia.
– The British regulator imposed a fine of 165,000 pounds for conducting two transactions in 2022 in favor of a Russian entity linked to a sanctioned company.
– According to the UK Financial Sanctions Implementation Office, in June and July 2022, payments of approximately 635,000 pounds were processed through the bank’s London office. As a result, the bank violated British restrictions imposed after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
– The violation was discovered by the bank itself: Deutsche Bank reported the transactions to the British regulator back in September 2022, which led to a reduced fine — initially, the penalty could have been 300,000 pounds.
