Today we have the Kupiansk direction.
The Russian troop group (TG) “Zapad” supported by part of the forces of the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) TG “Sever” continues attempts to capture the Kupiansk area and unblock the remnants of their assault groups encircled in the western (central) part of the city.
As part of this task, in the first half of January this year, the command of TG “Zapad” carried out some regrouping of its forces and assets in this direction (on the right flank of the 1st Tank Army/TA sector) to enhance the offensive capabilities of its tactical groups (TGr) operating in the direction of the city of Kupiansk. In particular:
– The enemy relocated part of the forces and assets from the sector of the 47th Tank Division (td) to the area of Lyman Pershyi. Possibly, we are talking about units of one or two motor rifle regiments (mrr) of this division, the 272nd and 245th mrr, totaling at least 1-2 motor rifle battalions (mrb).
– In the sector of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division (mrd), operating to the south and southeast of Kupiansk, reinforcements probably also arrived (possibly part of the forces of this same division that previously operated in the sector of the 20th CAA on the Lyman direction).
– Also, the command of the 6th CAA (TG “Sever”) apparently regrouped its 68th mrd, operating on the bridgehead north of Kupiansk, concentrating its main forces on the left flank of this formation (this probably concerns at least two of its motor rifle regiments, the 121st and 122nd mrr).
Thus, it can be asserted that currently in the offensive on Kupiansk, parts and units of at least three formations (divisions) from the 1st TA and the 6th CAA are participating, which correspondingly are part of TG “Zapad” and “Sever” — the 2nd mrd, 47th td, and 68th mrd. Moreover, units of the 27th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (smb) of the same 1st TA and possibly a number of units of the 11th Army Corps (AC) of TG “Sever” are also actively participating in the battles in the Kupiansk area.
It is obvious that the command of TG “Zapad” of the Russian troops has received an unambiguous order “to restore the situation” in the Kupiansk area and align it with those “results” previously publicly announced by the top military-political leadership of the Russian Federation. This implies capturing the entire defense area of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the city of Kupiansk and the settlement of Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi, as well as eliminating the bridgehead of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the Oskil River east of the city.
However, at the moment, the Russian military command in this direction is far from achieving the goals set by its military-political leadership in the Kupiansk direction. After unsuccessful attempts to unblock the remnants of its assault units encircled in the western (central) part of Kupiansk, the Russian command is likely to soon try to strengthen its overall offensive actions against the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ bridgehead on the Oskil to the east of the city.
Meanwhile, the enemy continues attempts to break through to the encircled units, advancing from the north along the Oskil River, both from their bridgehead north of the city and from the northeast, in the following directions:
– Lyman Pershyi – Kucheriivka,
– Zapadne – Holubivka.
As of the evening of 28.01.2026, Russian assault groups likely managed to push the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Holubivka area several hundred meters west of the village. However, the road running through the village southward toward the city remains under the control of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and therefore the advance of Russian infantry groups into the city is blocked. Additionally, Ukrainian Armed Forces units confidently hold their positions in the Selyansky Lane area and the Kupiansk “Extreme Park.”
In turn, the enemy’s attempts to break along the eastern bank towards the area of the destroyed bridge over the Oskil, in the part of Kupiansk called “Zaoskyllya,” have not been particularly successful so far. Individual assault groups of the enemy (Russian troops) occasionally break into the area of Lyceum No. 7, the Milk Canning Plant, and the “Ambar” warehouse, but they have not yet managed to secure themselves there and are regularly pushed out to the north of the city.
Moreover, it is evident that the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to hold Kucheriivka and Petropavlivka in this direction, which greatly complicates the enemy’s ability to conduct attacking/assault actions along the narrow strip (a kind of “corridor”) from the east near the Oskil due to the flanking fire from the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the Russian assault groups and units deploying there for advance southward.
In fact, in these directions, Russian troops are quite limited in their ability to maneuver their forces and means during the organization and execution of offensive actions. Each time the enemy attempts to advance along the river on both banks southward (into the city), entering these “corridors,” they face not only effective frontal but also intense flanking fire from the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces located on their flanks, nearly throughout the depth of their combat formations.
Of course, in such conditions, the chances of the Russian command unblocking the remnants of its assault units encircled in Kupiansk, so to speak, by the shortest route, are small.
I think this is precisely why the command of the Russian Grouping “West” decided to slightly change the “methodology” of accomplishing this task, becoming more active against the ENTIRE Ukrainian Armed Forces’ bridgehead located to the east and southeast of Kupiansk.
In this context, it is worth noting that the shift of focus by the command of the 1st Tank Army of the “West” Group to frontal and flanking actions against the Ukrainian bridgehead is quite justified. Instead of constant ineffective attacks/assaults through narrow targeted “corridors” along the Oskil, the enemy decided to attack the city on wider front sections, particularly frontally (i.e., from the east and southeast). And there is some sense in this…
The fact that Russian forces have a significant numerical advantage in forces and assets in this direction is fully recognized by their command. However, after several fruitless and unsuccessful weeks of unblockade actions, it seems they concluded that they cannot exploit this advantage effectively in these very narrow “corridors.” This is precisely a case where one of the main principles of operational art (the principle of “concentration of forces and means”) simply does not work, or let’s say, works very poorly.
Therefore, it seems the Russian command decided to simply stretch Ukrainian forces over a wider front to reduce the overall stability of the entire Ukrainian Armed Forces’ defense system in this direction.
In this case, the Ukrainian command, striving to hold positions not only in a few narrow areas but across several broader sectors of the front, would be forced to decrease the already critical tactical density of its frontline units’ formations, attempting to cover as many areas of enemy activation as possible. It would also be limited in using its few reserves, and so on. Then it’s a matter of “technique.” The Russian command will only need to identify and choose the most vulnerable “breakthrough area” and deliver a concentrated strike using reserves kept specifically for this purpose.
This is why, in my opinion, in the near future, in the Kupiansk direction, Russian forces will not only continue to advance along the “corridors” along the Oskil but also become “sharply more active” in the following directions:
– Pishchane — Kurylivka, and then towards Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi (they have ALREADY become more active here),
– Kolisnykivka — Hlushkivka, which means further advance towards Kivsharivka and the same Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi.
It is quite possible that, as part of these changes, Russian forces will also try to expand one of the “corridors” along the Oskil (most likely the eastern one), breaking through to Petropavlivka and Kucheriivka.
In summary…
Personally, I have no doubt that the Russian command will inevitably try to align the real situation in this direction with the loud statements made earlier by its higher military and political leadership.
In this context, they will obviously need ADDITIONAL forces and means, as in previous battles for Kupiansk, TGRs from the 1st TA and 6th ZVA, aimed at it, were quite severely “battered.”
This raises an interesting question — how and where will the Russian command find them? So far, the command of the Russian 1st TA and 6th ZVA are trying to achieve the necessary concentration (and corresponding effect) through purely internal army regroupings.
However, this clearly does not change the situation drastically. Obviously, more serious reinforcements will be needed. In my view, the Russian command has two solutions in this matter:
– either to use part of its strategic reserves in this direction (which means we will see the regrouping here of several more or less full-strength brigades or 1-2 so-called “new” divisions),
– or the enemy will be forced to decrease its activity in the operational directions adjacent to Kupiansk — Velykoburlukskyi, Lymanskyi, and possibly Vovchanskyi, and thereby “load” Kupiansk with additional forces and means.
I think we will understand how exactly this will happen in reality over the next month.
Photo: 93rd OMBR Kholodny Yar
