Information on the current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 29.04.2026.
1. Another attack by Ukrainian drones on oil infrastructure facilities has been recorded in Russia.
– According to preliminary data, the Perm linear production dispatch station in the Malinovsk region might have been hit. Judging by the published images, a fire broke out on the premises, which may indicate damage to key elements of the pumping system.
– The Perm LPDS is a hub station of the Transneft system and performs a critical function in the transportation, storage, and distribution of oil through main pipelines. Oil flows through this facility towards the Perm Refinery and other industrial centers, as well as towards export infrastructure.
– If the station is damaged, there may be disruptions in pumping and temporary disruptions in logistics chains. Similar attacks are increasingly shifting from port terminals to internal system nodes, increasing the vulnerability of the entire transportation infrastructure.
– Even localized damage to such facilities can lead to the redistribution of flows and additional stress on other sections of the network.
2. Russian “Nornickel” reports a sharp decline in the production of key metals.
– At the beginning of 2026, Nornickel demonstrated a significant reduction in the production of major metals. In the first quarter, nickel production fell by 28% quarter-on-quarter, copper by 12%, palladium by 14%, and platinum by 26%. Annually, the company also recorded a decline: platinum production decreased by 26%, palladium by 18%, copper by 10%, while nickel output decreased by 0.3%.
– Nickel output has been declining for the third consecutive year, indicating systemic problems in the industry.
– Despite the absence of direct sanctions against the company, “Nornickel” faces restrictions on settlements, a shortage of Western equipment, and complications in logistics.
– New EU restrictions create additional risk: a ban on operations with the Murmansk port, which is key for exporting non-ferrous metals. As a result, even one of Russia’s metallurgy flagships is showing degradation in production indicators.
– This increases pressure on export revenues and underscores that technological isolation and sanction restrictions are gradually undermining the fundamental industries of the Russian economy.
3. Sources of economic financing in Russia have sharply narrowed: essentially, the only resource left is the internal savings of the population.
– This was stated by the head of the Central Bank of Russia, admitting that after 2022, access to international capital markets for Russian companies is practically lost.
– According to her, a significant portion of financing was previously provided through cheap external resources — the savings of European and US citizens, allowing businesses to obtain loans at low rates and increase production for export. Currently, this channel is completely closed, and global financial resources have become inaccessible.
– As a result, the economy is forced to rely almost exclusively on internal savings, accompanied by high inflation and expensive loans. This model limits business investment opportunities and restrains economic growth, as domestic resources are insufficient for full-fledged development financing.
– It is essentially about financial isolation, forcing the economy to operate in conditions of capital scarcity and increased pressure on the population as the main resource source. This exacerbates structural imbalances and increases the vulnerability of the economic system in the long term.
4. Cement production in Russia continues to show a sharp decline against the backdrop of slowing construction activity and reduced investment in the sector.
– According to industry estimates, in March, production volumes decreased by 17% year-on-year, and by the end of the first quarter, the reduction reached 24% year-on-year. At the same time, the dynamics of domestic demand are also deteriorating.
– The industry association “Soyuzcement” forecasts that cement consumption in 2026 may decrease further to 25.9%, reflecting a continued contraction in construction activity in both residential and infrastructure segments.
– The decline in demand is explained by a combination of factors: high loan rates, limited access to financing, rising construction costs, and an overall reduction in investment activity in the economy.
– Additional pressure is created by the slowdown in industrial production and a decrease in the volume of new projects.
– As a result, the cement industry, which is one of the fundamental indicators of the construction sector’s condition, records a steady decline, which may indicate a broader cooling in the economy and a decrease in domestic demand for infrastructure development.
5. The Russian “shadow fleet” continues to operate despite London’s statements.
– Almost 100 vessels linked to Russia’s “shadow fleet” passed through British waters within a month following strong statements from Prime Minister Keir Starmer.
– Since the statement on March 25, at least 98 vessels subject to British sanctions have passed through UK waters. This effectively matches the levels of previous months and indicates a lack of real deterrence.
– Atlantic Council expert Elisabeth Braw notes that without practical actions — inspections and detentions — such statements are perceived as formalities. As a result, the sanctions regime loses effectiveness. Unlike the UK, other European countries, including France, Belgium, and Sweden, have been more actively inspecting and detaining suspicious vessels in recent months.
– The situation also exposes structural problems in the UK: reduced naval capacity, lack of a specialized coast guard, and legal limitations.
– This creates a “window of opportunity” for Russia, which continues to use shadow schemes to bypass sanctions and support oil revenues despite public pressure from the West.
6. Russia is attempting to prepare for the complete loss of the European LNG market by expanding its fleet of gas carriers ahead of the final embargo set to take effect in 2027.
– According to industry sources and LSEG, four tankers for transporting liquefied natural gas have been added to the Russian registry — “Orion,” “Luch,” “Mercury,” and “Cosmos,” built back in 2005–2006.
– The vessels are not new: all changed owners at the beginning of 2026, transferred to companies registered in Hong Kong and Turkey, and subsequently re-registered under the Russian flag.
– Previously, the tankers were owned by an Omani structure, indicating the use of workaround schemes to form an additional fleet amid sanction constraints.
– Currently, all four gas carriers are moving in the northern Atlantic, with one heading towards the Murmansk area, where LNG transshipment infrastructure, including the floating storage “Saam,” is located. This hub is used for transloading gas from Arctic projects onto conventional tankers, allowing partial compensation for logistical limitations.
– The fleet expansion is occurring amid existing EU restrictions: from April 2026, there is a ban on LNG imports under short-term contracts, extending to long-term agreements from January 1, 2027.
– In response, Russia is forced to reorient supplies to Asian markets, requiring longer routes and more ships. At the same time, reliance on old tankers and complex transshipment schemes highlights limited resources and increasing costs.
– As a result, the Russian LNG sector faces deteriorating transport economics and reduced export efficiency, increasing pressure on the industry in the long term.
7. The UAE has announced its withdrawal from OPEC effective May 1, 2026.
– The UAE officially announced its withdrawal from OPEC and the OPEC+ format, which means a sharp weakening of the production coordination system that Saudi Arabia has maintained for decades.
– This move effectively opens up the possibility for Abu Dhabi to increase production without quota restrictions. The decision is related to a review of oil strategy and a desire for greater flexibility amid an unstable market.
– The exit of one of the key Gulf producers undermines confidence in the entire cartel architecture, which has influenced the global supply and demand balance for over 60 years.
– If other participants follow the UAE’s example, the market could shift to a more fragmented model without centralized control. Additional tension is created by the situation around the Strait of Hormuz, where threats of blockage have already provoked price spikes.
– Simultaneously, the UAE has a strategic advantage due to export routes through Fujairah, allowing them to bypass this narrow corridor.
– For Russia, this transformation poses risks. An increase in oil supply, amid weakened coordination, pressures prices and reduces budget revenues, which are critically dependent on energy exports. This increases the vulnerability of Russia’s financial system and limits the ability to compensate for sanctions losses.
8. Croatia and Bosnia launch a gas project to reduce dependence on Russia.
– Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina signed an agreement to build the Southern Interconnection gas pipeline, which is to connect Bosnia’s gas system with Croatia’s infrastructure and the LNG terminal on the island of Krk.
– The new route will allow Bosnia access to alternative gas sources through the LNG terminal in Croatia. The investor and developer is the American company AAFS Infrastructure and Energy. The project’s estimated cost could reach $1.5 billion.
– Currently, Bosnia is almost entirely dependent on gas supply from Russia, delivered via Serbia and Bulgaria through the TurkStream route. The launch of the new interconnector is expected to significantly change this structure, providing access to the global LNG market.
– The project is part of a broader trend in Europe — the gradual displacement of Russian gas from the region. For Russia, this means further loss of sales markets and a weakening of the energy influence that has been used as a tool of political pressure for decades.
