Information on the current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 27.04.2026.
1. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) announced a massive attack on military targets of Russia in occupied Crimea.
– Alpha units conducted an operation at the Russian Black Sea Fleet base in Sevastopol, as well as at the “Belbek” military airfield. According to the intelligence service, several key targets were hit by drone strikes.
– Among them were the large landing ships “Yamal” and “Filchenkov,” the reconnaissance ship “Ivan Khurs,” the training center “Lukomka,” the headquarters of the electronic intelligence of the air defense forces, the “Mys-M1” radar station, as well as the MiG-31 aircraft and the technical infrastructure of the “Belbek” airfield.
– The SBU emphasizes that such operations are systematic in nature and are aimed at the consistent destruction of key elements of Russia’s military infrastructure — fleet, aviation, intelligence, and air defense.
– It concerns not only the loss of equipment but also the reduction of the enemy’s ability to control air and sea space, cover its own forces, and plan further attacks. This is not the first such strike: on April 18, the SBU also reported the targeting of three Russian military ships in Crimea.
– A series of such attacks indicates a systematic weakening of Russia’s military presence on the peninsula and increasing vulnerability of its key objects even in deep rear areas.
2. In Russia, the state of regional finances is rapidly deteriorating: the deficit of the federal subjects’ budgets, which already reached a historic maximum last year, could grow to almost 1.9 trillion rubles in 2026.
– After jumping to 1.5 trillion rubles in 2025, the “hole” in regional budgets will increase by approximately another 400 billion. Notably, the largest deficit formed in the so-called donor regions, where income from profit tax — a key source of revenue — sharply declined.
– Overall, budgets fell short by 480 billion rubles, or 8.3% year-on-year. The systemic nature of the crisis is also confirmed by macro indicators: half of the regions recorded a decline in industrial production and construction, every third shows a decrease in the agricultural sector, and the number of regions experiencing a fall in investments doubled — from 23 to 46.
– Meanwhile, consumer demand is slowing in 80 regions, further undermining the tax base. To cover the deficit, regions have already spent about 1 trillion rubles in reserves and increased debt to 3.5 trillion rubles — the maximum in the last 15 years.
– At the same time, prospects for improvement appear limited: high interest rates, logistical costs, and labor shortages will continue to pressure business profitability, and therefore tax revenues.
– An additional pressure factor remains war expenses, which are shifted to the regional level: recruitment financing absorbs about 1 trillion rubles annually. As a result, the budget system is increasingly destabilized, and possibilities for its stabilization are narrowing.
3. Gazprom’s gas production in Russia in 2025 decreased by 3.6% — to 405 billion cubic meters from 420.1 billion the previous year.
– Overall, gas production in Russia decreased by 3% over the year — to 663.3 billion cubic meters. The production cut is happening amid a drop in exports, which collapsed to decade lows after losing the European market.
– As a result, Gazprom is forced to reduce production due to lack of demand and limited ability to reorient to other markets.
– Notably, the company has practically stopped publishing full statistics, indicating a deterioration in the gas sector and increasing opacity.
– Overall, this points to a systemic crisis: Russia is losing key gas markets and is unable to quickly compensate for these losses even with alternative directions.
4. Russia’s military expenditures in 2025 rose to 190 billion dollars, reaching 7.5% of GDP, reflecting further militarization of the economy amid war.
– For comparison, Ukraine spent 84.1 billion dollars, which is about 40% of GDP. These data were published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
– In total, global military spending in 2025 reached 2.89 trillion dollars, increasing by 2.9% in real terms. The largest expenditures traditionally fell on the USA, China, and Russia — together 1.48 trillion dollars, or 51% of the global total.
– Despite the overall decrease in spending in the USA (to 954 billion dollars, –7.5%), other regions are actively increasing armaments: in Europe, spending increased by 14%, and in Asia and Oceania — by 8.1%.
– The growth of Russia’s military spending occurs against the backdrop of a decline in civilian economic sectors and an increasing concentration of resources on the war. A share of 7.5% of GDP indicates a critical level of economic burden, limiting development opportunities and exacerbating structural imbalances.
– At the same time, Ukraine’s 40% GDP indicator reflects the forced nature of defense spending under full-scale aggression, while Russia continues to divert significant resources to warfare, deepening its economic dependency on the military sector.
5. Russia increasingly relies on a “shadow fleet” as a key tool to bypass sanctions, but this model is becoming more vulnerable and risky.
– This was discussed during a session at the Council on Foreign Relations about the future of sanctions on the oil sector. Participants emphasized that a significant portion of Russia’s oil exports is already conducted outside the Western insurance, financing, and control system.
– This involves a network of tankers with opaque ownership, frequently changing jurisdictions, disabling tracking systems, and operating in the “gray zone” of the global market. At the same time, this dependency indicates not strength, but structural degradation of Russia’s energy exports.
– Having lost access to transparent and stable markets, Russia is forced to switch to more expensive, less efficient, and riskier logistics schemes. Further tightening of sanctions — particularly against ships, insurance mechanisms, and financial intermediaries — could significantly complicate the operation of this system.
– Special attention is suggested to countries and companies that act as intermediaries in the transportation and payment of Russian oil. It is particularly noted that the “shadow fleet” creates not only sanction risks but also environmental risks: many vessels are outdated and operate without proper insurance, increasing the likelihood of accidents. Russia’s oil industry increasingly depends on opaque schemes that can function only as long as there are gaps in sanction control.
– Their gradual closure creates a long-term threat to Russia’s export revenues.
6. Russian business has effectively admitted the inability to abandon foreign software at least until the end of the decade.
– Companies remain dependent on Western and Asian solutions, despite the declared policy of import substitution. Estimates suggest that businesses will continue using foreign software at least until 2030–2031.
– Most companies have developed a mixed IT infrastructure combining Russian, Western, and Asian products. A survey of 300 specialists showed that two-thirds of companies face challenges with such a fragmented system.
– The refusal to abandon foreign software is not happening for technical reasons. Many companies have licenses purchased before 2022, valid until 2030–2031, effectively cementing dependence on foreign solutions for several more years. Meanwhile, 36% of employees note a lack of competencies to support the complex mixed infrastructure.
– The situation demonstrates a systemic failure of the “technological sovereignty” policy: despite sanctions and political statements, Russia remains critically dependent on foreign software, and there is currently no rapid replacement for these solutions.
7. Russia faces increasing instability in the oil products market.
– Several tankers with diesel fuel were forced to change course mid-voyage, indicating growing imbalances and the speculative nature of trade. At least two tankers with cargoes of ultra-low sulfur diesel each approximately 37,000 tons were redirected mid-course to Brazil.
– Both vessels loaded in the port of Primorsk at the end of March, but after covering a significant part of the route, buyers changed, indicating traders’ attempts to redirect supplies to more lucrative markets against the backdrop of a price spike due to the conflict around Iran.
– One of the tankers is currently heading to the Suez Canal, while the other turned in the Atlantic and is moving towards the Strait of Gibraltar, with the final destination remaining uncertain.
– Additionally, two more vessels with approximately 106,000 tons of diesel, shipped in April, have stopped and are drifting without a clear route, which is atypical for established logistical chains.
– Such instability indicates a loss of predictability in export flows. After losing the European market, Russia is forced to operate within a limited circle of buyers, where even large consignments can be resold or redirected en route depending on the market situation.
– As a result, the energy sector increasingly depends on short-term spot deals and price fluctuations, undermining income stability and heightening risks for the entire export model.
8. The conflict around Iran has revealed and intensified cooperation among authoritarian regimes, with Russia and China playing key roles.
– As political analyst Joshua Kurlantzik notes, such regimes are increasingly supporting each other to maintain power and form an alternative global system outside democratic rules.
– Over the past decade, interaction between autocracies has become systematic. Russia is consistently expanding military-political ties — from a “no-limits partnership” with China to security agreements with military regimes in Africa.
– In particular, agreements have been signed with Myanmar, as well as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, indicating Moscow’s attempt to build a network of loyal regimes.
– The common goals of such alliances are clear: to keep authoritarian leaders in power, undermine democratic institutions, and form alternatives to the post-war world order.
– Special emphasis is placed on the financial sphere — reducing the role of the dollar and switching to other currencies, primarily the yuan. Amid sanctions, Russia has intensified cooperation with China and Iran in creating alternative financial mechanisms outside the SWIFT system.
– Iran, controlling the Strait of Hormuz, even signals readiness to encourage yuan-denominated transactions for energy transit. This gradually forms a habit of using the Chinese currency among importers, especially in Asia.
– Notably, even some U.S. partners in Asia are beginning to resume energy purchases from Russia and Iran, indicating a pragmatic departure from sanction discipline. This strengthens Moscow’s position but simultaneously shows its dependence on a narrow circle of buyers and the need to work through political agreements and discounts.
– The war also creates risks of division among democratic countries and a weakening of the U.S.’s role as a global power center. If these processes deepen, authoritarian regimes could gain more influence on regional and global levels.
– Despite this, the trend is not unequivocal: authoritarian models do not always guarantee stability or success. However, the overall dynamic suggests that cooperation between such regimes is strengthening, and Russia remains one of the key drivers of this destructive interaction for the global system.
