Today — Zaporizhzhia direction.
1. I will remind our readers about the composition of forces and means (approximate) of the enemy (Russian troops) operating in this direction.
The core consists of troops (forces) of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) of the “Dnepr” grouping of forces, reinforced by units and subunits of the 18th CAA of the same group and parts and formations of the airborne troops, namely:
58th CAA
– 19th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) operates as part of the 392nd, 429th, and 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiments (MRR);
– 42nd MRD operates as part of the forces of the 70th, 71st, and 291st MRR + a number of units from the two “Chechen” regiments — 270th MRR “Akhmat-Kavkaz” and 78th Motorized Regiment (MR) special purpose (SpP) “Sever-Akhmat”;
– 136th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (SMRB);
– 100th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade (SRB);
– Combined regimental tactical group from the 4th Military Base (MB) of the Russian troops (Tskhinvali, South Ossetia).
18th CAA
The main forces of its 47th MRD — 1152nd, 1153rd, and 1154th MRR — operate in this direction. This formation, created on the territory of the temporarily occupied Crimean peninsula, belongs to the category of “mobilization reserve” (MR) and was deployed as part of the expansion of the Russian armed forces in the period 2022-2023.
Airborne troops (AT)
– 7th Air Assault Division (AAD) operates in this direction with at least two of its “regular” air assault regiments (AAR) — 108th and 247th AAR;
– 76th AAD, according to a number of signs, operates in this direction with its main forces — 104th, 234th, and 247th AAR. Although, possibly, part of this formation operates in another direction;
– 45th Separate Special Purpose Brigade (SpP Brigade) of the Airborne Troops, as well as the 104th AAD, likely operate in this direction with part of their forces (separate units).
2. Current Situation
The enemy continues to attempt to restore the advancement of their forward units and subunits towards Zaporizhzhia, conducting offensive/assault actions from the line of Prymorske — Stepnohirsk in the north and northeast directions (on both sides of the E-105 road), as well as towards Stepove — Pavlivka (thus attempting to break into the area of Magdalynivka — Novoyakovlivka — Pavlivka — Lukyanivske). Russian troops also occasionally attack towards Novopokrovka — Mala Tokmachka, trying to reach the southeastern outskirts of Orikhiv and outflank the defense of Ukrainian Armed Forces units in the Novodanylivka area.
In addition, it is evident that the command of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army is attempting to prevent further withdrawal of its frontline assault groups and units (small infantry groups) that have entrenched in the Stepnohirsk area, southwest of Lukyanivske and in the southern part of Prymorske.
Over the past week, both Russian and Ukrainian forces have made several significant efforts to improve their positions in the tactical zone through offensive and counter-offensive actions in certain areas and directions, including:
– The forward units of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division (likely supported by units of the 47th Motorized Rifle Division and the 7th Air Assault Division) in the Prymorske area have attempted several times to advance northward, aiming to restore the position that existed before the start of Ukrainian Armed Forces’ counter-attacks in this area, mainly along Pokrovska Street. Apparently, not very successfully for themselves.
– Several Russian assault groups (most likely from the 7th Air Assault Division, possibly reinforced by separate units of the 47th Motorized Rifle Division) in the Stepnohirsk area, acting along Radianska, Tavriiska, and Ahrarna Streets, attempted to break through to the central part of the city and thereby flank Ukrainian Armed Forces’ counter-attacks toward the “Vysotky” area.
However, despite this, the Ukrainian Armed Forces continued rather active activities directly in Stepnohirsk, “cleansing” and pushing the enemy out of the city in a general direction from north to south. In addition, combat clashes were recorded from the interchange east of Stepnohirsk to Hnidyi Street, on both sides of the E-105 road.
– To the east and southeast of Stepnohirsk, there were also ongoing confrontational battles in the Kamianske — Lukyanivske and Stepove — Pavlivka directions. Russian forces (likely units of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division, 7th Air Assault Division) attempted to hold a number of their positions southwest of Lukyanivske and again advance with somewhat significant forces from the southwest to Pavlivka and Novoyakivlivka. They did not manage to achieve significant tactical success.
Moreover, further attempts by the enemy to hold the positions of their small infantry groups in the Lukyanivske area are complicated by the fact that the Ukrainian Armed Forces sometimes persistently counter-attack in the Stepnohirsk area while holding several positions between Kamianske and Stepove on the southern and northern banks of the Yanchekrak River, creating a very “uncomfortable” position for Russian infantry groups near Lukyanivske on their flanks, especially regarding the replenishment and supply of their personnel and material and technical supplies.
– In the zone of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division (evidently with quite active support from its 76th Air Assault Division units), the Russian command continues persistent attempts to break through to Orikhiv through Mala Tokmachka, operating along the road and railway passing through it from Orikhiv to Polohy, and from Novopokrovka, simultaneously attempting to bypass the left flank of the Ukrainian units defending in the Novodanilivka area. So far, not very successfully.
As I understand, after their initial tactical successes achieved a month ago when Russian forces managed to capture half of Mala Tokmachka, the advance units of the enemy “stalled,” getting drawn into exhausting and unproductive battles for Mala Tokmachka itself.
The situation for Russian troops on the extreme right flank of the 58th Combined Arms Army of Group “Dnepr” is likely complicated by the fact that in the area of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, their command cannot concentrate a maximum amount of forces and resources for a direct “thrust” on Orikhiv. They are forced to redirect part of their forces to the Bilohirya — Luhivske line to provide maximum assistance to the 5th Combined Arms Army of Group “Vostok,” which is attempting to advance west and southwest of Huliaipole. Therefore, Russian troops have not yet managed to break through to Orikhiv from the east and southeast, encountering Ukrainian Armed Forces’ defenses at the Mala Tokmachka — Novodanilivka line.
3. Prospects
Currently, regarding the situation in the Zaporizhzhia direction, it is quite possible to formulate a couple of rather obvious operational-tactical conclusions:
– The command of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army clearly overestimated its own forces, attempting to SIMULTANEOUSLY solve two tasks of the respective level — to break through north along the Dnipro (reach the Malokaterynivka — Komyshuvakha line) and actively “participate” in flanking Orikhiv from the east and southeast together with the troops of Group “Vostok.”
I fully understand the arguments that likely prompted this decision. The main reason was probably that this army is considered the most powerful within Group “Dnepr” (it has 2 full divisions + reinforcements from the 18th Combined Arms Army and airborne forces). Additionally, it was constantly being strengthened by reserves from both Group “Dnepr” (47th Motorized Rifle Division) and strategic reserves (at least the 7th and 76th Air Assault Divisions). Moreover, it has very convenient, relatively short routes and communications for quickly deploying troops in its rear and for logistical needs (via the Crimean “hub” to Melitopol and further to either Tokmak or Vasylivka).
This means the command of the 58th Combined Arms Army has the ability to effectively regroup and maneuver its troops quickly, concentrating them on chosen necessary sectors and directions, while providing comprehensive material-technical support and accumulating logistical means for the offensive. They can do all this very swiftly and conveniently.
Furthermore, the 58th Combined Arms Army benefits from the Russian army and tactical aviation group, already concentrated and deployed at Crimean airbases. There’s no need to relocate it; it’s already in close proximity to the areas where parts and units of this army are engaged. Therefore, the approach time to them is short, and the entire area of the 58th Combined Arms Army is sufficiently covered by both the army’s own air defense systems and corresponding systems of the Russian Aerospace Forces.
In other words, the command of the 58th Combined Arms Army had and still has a plethora of factors “FOR” making such a decision.
However, it is clear that the command of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army, when deciding to advance across its ENTIRE line, did not consider one small but nonetheless important, albeit “non-obvious,” factor. Specifically, the “slicing” of a front line over 50 km wide for the advance of the 58th Combined Arms Army does not yet correspond to its real capabilities in terms of combat strength and numerical composition and, consequently, the need to maintain the required density of operational combat order and echeloning.
Thus, according to Soviet (Russian) standards, the attack zone of a combined arms army can range from 35-50 km (depending on the appropriate width of the breakthrough area). However, this is by no means enough for two, even reinforced motorized rifle divisions, even when they are strengthened with airborne assault units and various “Kadyrovtsy” and “Ahmattsy”.
In this sense, the situation does not change even after the regrouping of Crimean mobilization “misfits” into the 47th Motor Rifle Division within this army’s zone. For an offensive on the OPPOSITE flanks of the 58th Army (which is how it is now trying to advance towards Zaporizhia), and even more so across its entire zone (which clearly implies an additional task like the “storming” of Orikhiv given the appropriate decision), its forces are still, to say the least, insufficient.
Compare these attempts by the Russian 58th Army to advance on a broad front with similar efforts made by other Russian armies (especially in terms of their effectiveness) on other operational directions. For instance, in the zone of the 25th Army, advancing in the Lyman direction (“Zapad” Command) or the 2nd Army (“Center” Command), they are significantly smaller than the 58th Army. This, in turn, allows them to ensure a greater concentration of forces and assets on the necessary sectors and directions (and, consequently, achieve certain results), even with much smaller forces than the 58th Army.
I fully understand a certain logic in the case of the 58th Army. As they say, “a big ship” (in the sense of a large army) — “a big voyage” (in the sense of the maximum possible attack zone). However, the principle of concentration in operational art has not yet been canceled. If the parts and formations of the 58th Army are “smeared” across its entire zone even in a “lightened” form (concentrating a certain part of them only on the flanks), the result will be 6 months of “semi-successful” battles for Stepnohirsk without significant advancement, but with the exhaustion of seemingly quite significant initial forces and means (even taking into account the reinforcements of this army).
— The second conclusion suggests itself and is quite obvious. The very advance of the 58th Army along the Dnipro in a relatively narrow sector with the simultaneous “lagging” of the opposite Orikhiv flank from an operational point of view seems, to say the least, somewhat strange.
Any operations officer, observing these persistent attempts to “ram” the Ukrainian defense along a narrow strip along the Dnipro in the area of Prymorske and Stepnohirsk, while having a “static” situation in the center of the zone and on the other flank in the area of Orikhiv, would immediately, to put it mildly, raise an eyebrow. In such a case, the likelihood of the emergence and practical implementation of a completely obvious and logical decision regarding a flank counteroffensive from the Orikhiv district of the Ukrainian Armed Forces against this stretched Russian “corridor” along the Dnipro sharply increases, with fairly high chances of success.
As of today, I cannot say that the Russian command of the 58th Army does not understand this. It seems they do see all the consequences of this disposition of their own forces. This is evidenced by a series of their recent attempts to “sharply strengthen” their actions specifically in the Orikhiv direction, of which, however, only one ended with minimal tactical success in the area of Mala Tokmachka.
In my opinion, the most likely scenario for further developments directly towards Zaporizhzhia is probably the main efforts of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army command shifting towards the Orikhiv defense area of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (likely chiefly through encirclement from the east and west). Simultaneously, it will evidently try to maintain its tactical “gains” in the area of Prymorsk and Stepnohirsk.
At the same time, it is apparent that it heavily relies on the 5th and 35th Combined Arms Armies of the Eastern Military District eventually reaching the outskirts of Orikhiv from the east (i.e., from the direction of Huliaipole), which would greatly ease the 58th Combined Arms Army’s command to address the “problem” of Orikhiv.
If the numerous reports that have recently appeared in several media outlets about the movement of some mysterious Russian “significant reserves” through Mariupol and Melitopol are true, then, likely, in the very near future we will indeed witness another large-scale attempt by the Russian command to finally “capture the Orikhiv area.” After all, without this, further attempts to break through to the immediate approaches to Zaporizhzhia (including the 58th Combined Arms Army’s stripe) seem, to put it mildly, problematic. Moreover, the Russian command is most likely to try to solve this task exclusively through the joint efforts of both the 58th Combined Arms Army of the Dnipro Military District and the 5th Combined Arms Army of the Eastern Military District, as the 58th Combined Arms Army currently clearly cannot handle it on its own.
Photo: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
