Today’s format – brief updates from different directions.
1. In the Sumy direction, combat operations continue in the tactical zone along the entire perimeter of the Russian forces’ incursion into the northeastern part of the Sumy region of Ukraine. The forward units of the Russian group of forces (GF) “Sever” continue attempts to break through to the Pisaryvka-Maryine line to reach effective artillery range for most of their field artillery on the area of Sumy city (15-20 km).
For this, enemy assault groups, formed from their forward units, periodically attack (conduct assault operations) in the following directions:
Andriyivka – Pisaryvka,
Varachyne – Korchakivka,
Yablunivka – Khrapivshchyna,
Yunakivka – Maryine.
Except for the enemy’s advance in the Andriyivka area and its capture (up to 4.5 km), they have not yet succeeded in fulfilling this task. Their forward units still haven’t reached the aforementioned line.
In this direction, battles also continue in the forested area to the north and northeast of Sadky hamlet, where the enemy tries to take control of the northeastern part of the forest, operating generally in the direction of Oleshna — Sadky, as well as east of the border. Currently, Sadky and the adjacent forest areas remain under the control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
2. In the Vovchansk (Kharkiv) direction, a consolidated tactical group (TG) of Russian forces (“Belgorod-Kharkiv”) continues attempts to break through along the eastern bank of the Siversky Donets southward, as well as advance as far as possible in the direction of Vovchansk — Bilyi Kolodiaz.
Within the apparent implementation of this GF’s plan for further advancement along the general Vovchansk – Velykyi Burluk direction, enemy forces and means from the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA), as well as the 11th and 44th Army Corps (AC), after capturing Synelnykove and Tsehelne, attempt to push further south. Currently, assault groups of the Russian TG “Belgorod/Kharkiv” (likely from the 128th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the 44th AC) are already engaged in battles aiming to secure positions in Symynivka and Hrafske, operating in the directions of Lyman — Symynivka and Synelnykove — Hrafske.
Presumably, by trying to advance in the general Vovchansk — Staryi Saltiv direction, this Russian TG’s command is addressing a specific tactical task — securing the right flank of their main forces, which are most likely directed toward Bilyi Kolodiaz.
For over three months of intense fighting in the tactical zone in this direction, the enemy’s advanced units managed to advance south from the Vovcha River, west of the destroyed Vovchansk, by only 4.1-4.2 km. Currently, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) continue to fight to keep Lyman and Vilcha under their control, which clearly significantly slows down the further advance of the enemy’s main forces in the direction of Hrafkove and Syminivka.
As for the main attack direction of the Russian troops in this area — towards Bilyi Kolodiaz, the enemy continues to engage in intense battles on the southern outskirts of Vovchansk and so far cannot make significant progress southeast from there.
In an operational-tactical sense, it is obvious that the enemy’s activation in the direction of Vovchansk a few months ago was due to the clear desire of the Russian command to implement a breakthrough plan in the direction of Velykyi Burluk through converging directions (from Vovchansk, from Milove, and from the bridgehead on the Oskil).
The main role in this implementation is played by the Russian 6th Army, which operates with its own forces and resources on all three directions simultaneously. This is essentially the main problem of the Russian command. The apparent dispersion of the 6th Combined Arms Army’s (CAA) efforts results in them being insufficient for concentrated breakthroughs of the AFU’s defense system even in the tactical zone on any of these three directions (sectors). 4.5 km in 3 months of fighting is not the pace of advance that ensures the quick and effective fulfillment of tasks, apparently set by the Russian command for its subordinate troops in this direction.
Significant reinforcement of the 6th CAA with forces and resources from other formations of the Northern Military District (11th, 14th, and 44th Army Corps/AC) also did not radically improve the situation. The simple reason is that aside from attempts to break through to Velykyi Burluk, the 6th CAA had to redirect part of its forces and means to the Kupiansk direction, where at least two motorized rifle regiments (MRRs) of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) — the 121st and 122nd MRRs — are operating.
3. Directly in the direction of Velykyi Burluk (meaning Russian troops operating towards this settlement from Milove and from the bridgehead on the Oskil River north of Kupiansk), directly in the zone of the 6th CAA, so to speak, in the direction of its “main offensive,” the situation does not look particularly favorable for the enemy.
So, at the end of last year, the forward units of the 6th CAA managed to “cut off” the salient between their bridgehead on the Oskil and the penetration in the Milove area, advancing 7-7.5 km in some areas and reaching the line of Odradne-Dvorichanske.
However, the further advance of the enemy began to gradually “fade,” despite the fact that the command of the Russian 6th CAA was simultaneously trying to advance directly from the bridgehead in the directions of Krasne Pershe — Novovasylivka and Dvorichna — Ridkodub, and also intensified similar attempts to break through in the direction of Milove — Ambarne with the aim of capturing the latter.
Initially, it seems, the Russian command in the zone of its 6th CAA planned with such actions to bypass from the north and south the sufficiently strong “knot” of the AFU defense system in this direction in the Kolodiazne area. Presumably, for this purpose, the enemy was supposed to break through from Milove to Ambarne and further to the Hryhorivka area, as well as advance from Krasne Pershe to Novovasylivka.
Thus, the enemy would have not only surrounded Kolodyazne from the north and south but also effectively opened a path for a direct breakthrough to the outskirts of Velykyi Burluk from the east.
However, the implementation of this plan clearly failed. In my opinion, there were two main reasons for this. First, the 6th CAA simply “overexerted” itself due to its command’s insatiable desire to advance everywhere immediately (resulting in the dispersal of its forces and resources along a front that exceeds the real capabilities of this army—from Vovchansk to Kupiansk). The second reason is the events that recently occurred in the Kupiansk direction, which directly hindered the 6th CAA command’s plan towards Velykyi Burluk (more about the Kupiansk direction in the next review), in which forces and resources from the 6th Russian CAA also participated.
Conclusions
In this review, we essentially examined the attempts of enemy troops’ offensives in the operational zone of the entire Russian military group (MG) “North” (also known as the Leningrad Military District / LenVO), operating in three operational-tactical directions:
– Northern Slobozhansky (Sumy),
– Southern Slobozhansky (Kharkiv/Vovchansk),
– Velykyi Burluk.
Currently, Russian troops are most “effective” in the Southern Slobozhansky (Kharkiv/Vovchansk). Although, in my opinion, this term is very conditional here and refers exclusively to tactical “effectiveness.” The advancement of Russian troops by 4.5 km over 3 months of fierce fighting in the Vovchansk area and also from Milove to Krasne Pershe (up to 7.5 km), let’s say, is not particularly impressive.
However, the actions of the Russian troops in this operational zone can be viewed from another (“broader”) perspective. If, for example, we consider the composition of the forces and equipment operating here—the 6th CAA (68th and 69th Motor Rifle Divisions), the 11th Army Corps (including the 18th Motor Rifle Division + 7th Separate Motor Rifle Regiment), the 14th Army Corps (including the 71st MRD + 80th SRB), as well as the 44th AC (including the 72nd MRD + 128th SRB), it becomes clear that the Russian command attributes significant importance to the MG “North” in an operational-strategic sense.
Especially if we recall that this military group is essentially a kind of “reserve accumulator” (in 2025, it provided the main volume of the formation and deployment of new divisions and corps of the Russian army). This can be explained by two reasons—either the Russian military command considers the aforementioned zone on the territory of Ukraine, where its troops operate, to be very promising from an operational point of view (where success can be achieved quite quickly), or the general strategic “northwestern theater of military operations” (Baltic and Scandinavian countries, against which the LenVO is effectively deployed) suddenly became a priority for the Russian military command at the strategic level (and, consequently, its military-political leadership) for some “strange reason.”
The second version, in my opinion, becomes even more plausible if we remember that the plans of the Russian military command include a point that envisages further build-up of “muscle mass” precisely in the northwestern theater of military operations—forming and deploying yet another full-fledged combined army based on one of the three army corps of this group/district (likely based on the 11th or 14th AC).
Meanwhile, it can be noted that from a military-political point of view, the troops of this group have been assigned an important mission – to “gnaw off” significant “chunks” of territory in the Sumy and Kharkiv regions of Ukraine, probably to eventually form a kind of “exchange fund,” which in the future could be “traded” for what Russian troops could not capture in the Donbas.
For this purpose, the command of the operational group “Sever” currently has two offensive operations of an operational-tactical scale in a semi-active phase, which can, relatively speaking, be called “Sumy” (involving Russian troops advancing on Sumy from the northeast) and “Velykoburluk” (aiming to capture the part of the Kharkiv region located east of the Siversky Donets up to the Oskil, by advancing the main forces of the “Sever” group toward Velyky Burluk).
The fact that the Russian command in the operational zone of the “Sever” group (LenVO), so to speak, has achieved relatively modest (operationally speaking) results does not mean that there were not initially great expectations placed on this group. It is quite possible that such expectations are still held.
Photo: 17th Separate Tank Brigade of Kryvyi Rih named after Kostiantyn Pestushko
