Why Ukraine is fighting is clear to most of its citizens. What Ukraine’s victory looks like is not clear to anyone, as politicians have not presented this outline to society.
The opponent has things much clearer. During the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 7, 2024, Putin clearly articulated the theory of victory over Ukraine and bet on a protracted war of attrition. The theory involves continuing the gradual creeping advance into Ukraine over a long period and hindering the Defense Forces from conducting successful operationally significant counteroffensive operations. Putin believes that Russia can win a war of attrition if it destroys Ukraine’s will to resist and the will of Ukraine’s partners to continue their support.
Russia increasingly tries to follow the strategy of a war of attrition, but its losses this year exceed recruitment rates, and financial and material costs are continuously rising. The Kremlin exaggerates its tactical gains, emphasizing the continuity of advancement, meaning Russian military systematically misinforms the President of Russia about the actual state of affairs on the front line.
The enemy attempts to “creep forward” in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions, as internal information consumption in Russia requires at least some kind of victory, since capturing yet another barn is increasingly difficult to sell as a notable military achievement.
Given this situation, the Russian army is focused on capturing our “fortress belt” and is once again trying to improve its positions in Pryazovia.
The “fortress belt” issue is being addressed by two enemy military groups – “South” and “Center”. Slightly north, near Lyman, they are assisted by UW “West”.
In the north of the “fortress belt”, the operational situation should be considered in connection with three operational directions at once – Lyman, Sloviansk, and Kramatorsk. Here, the 3rd Army is advancing with the forces of the 6th, 85th, 88th, 123rd, and 127th brigades of the enemy’s “South” Group. The enemy is delivering two strikes in the general directions of Siversk – Sloviansk along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River and Bakhmut – Sloviansk on both sides of the E40 road, attempting to break through with their leading formations from the east and southeast to Sloviansk and from the east to the approaches of Kramatorsk. The 4th brigade of the 3rd Army is engaged in combat near Kostyantynivka. The so-called “Russian Volunteer Assault Corps” is also advancing here.
The enemy is fighting along the Yurkyvka – Rai-Oleksandrivka line, 12 km from Sloviansk, and in the Vasiutynske area, 8 km from Kramatorsk. As the 3rd Army progresses towards the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, its attack zone narrows, increasing the density of its troops, allowing the enemy command to not only conduct assault operations with sufficiently high intensity but also maintain this pace for a fairly long time.
The enemy is trying to reach the lines of Starodubivka – Mykolaivka, Orikhuvatka – Nikanorivka, and Vasylivska Pustosh – Vasiutynske. From the last line, a turn of the left-flank formations of the 3rd Army towards Kramatorsk should be expected.
In the Zakitne – Kryva Luka area, the forward units of the 3rd Army have gained full control of the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River, with the enemy’s forward assault groups already spotted on the southeastern outskirts of Piskunivka. Active enemy assault actions continue in the directions of Rai-Oleksandrivka – Mykolaivka and Rai-Oleksandrivka – Orikhuvatka. Separate enemy infantry groups broke through to the forest area south of Mykolaivka, entrenching approximately 1 km from the southern outskirts of the village. The enemy’s attempts to break through from Rai-Oleksandrivka to Orikhuvatka and to pumping station number 2 of the “Siverskyi Donets – Donbas” channel were unsuccessful.
The advance of the forward units of the 3rd Army on both sides of the Sloviansk – Bakhmut road is developing in a tactical zone, with enemy assault groups advancing from Fedorivka Druha along the channel to Yurkyvka and reaching the northern outskirts of Zapovidne.
The command of the 3rd Army, with a simultaneous advance along the E40 road and the Siverskyi Donets – Donbas canal to the northwest and north (i.e., towards Sloviansk), has already begun to turn its left flank forces towards Kramatorsk. Here, enemy assault groups crossed the canal and are securing positions in Tykhonivka and Malynivka, preparing to continue the advance towards Vasyutynske and Pershomarivka. Additionally, the enemy is attempting to break through towards Markove – Bilokuzminivka.
The enemy’s advancement pace remains low, 4-8 km over two months. The combat capability of the aggressor’s forward units has noticeably decreased, which is a consequence of the management style of Lieutenant General Ihor Kuzmenkov, commander of the 3rd Army, which military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets described with the formula “advance under any conditions always, immediately, and everywhere.” This decline in combat capability is primarily observed in the forward units of the 6th and 123rd brigades.
Our 11th Corps units have been unable to stop the enemy’s advance and stabilize the situation but continue to hold several positions in both the Kryva Luka and Rai-Oleksandrivka areas.
Reinforcements to the 3rd Army should be expected. The 3rd Army’s forces will attempt to break through to the Mykolaivka – Starodubivka line (Sloviansk TPP area), which, if successful, will worsen the defense capabilities of the Third Corps of the Defense Forces in the Lyman direction. They will attempt to capture Orikhuvatka and the area of pumping station number 2 of the “Siverskyi Donets – Donbas” canal, which will mean reaching the outskirts of Sloviansk. Breaking through to the Vasylivska Pustosh – Vasyutynske line will mean an approach to Kramatorsk.
Without creating appropriate operational densities of troops, maintaining defense through improved command alone will not be possible. The 3rd Army is the only one among all enemy groups that has gotten closest to the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration and has a real chance to break through to Sloviansk or Kramatorsk “on the run.” The enemy is aware of the sparse formations of the 11th Corps and will continue to employ infiltration tactics across as many fronts as possible. These actions will be accompanied by the wide use of strike UAVs, artillery fire, and air strikes.
The issue of wide inter-positional areas and low-density battle formations can be resolved through strict control of territories without Ukrainian infantry – aerial surveillance, sensors and motion detectors, automated reconnaissance-signal fields, in short – everything that allows detection of enemy infantry. The next step is effective counteraction: an enemy soldier within the Defense Forces’ line of sight must be guaranteed not to appear here a second time. Therefore – explosive and non-explosive barriers with densities above standard, FPV drones constantly hovering in swarms, MLRS, standby artillery with cluster munitions, and ground robotic complexes capable of engaging.
The new commander of the 11th corps faces a clearly non-trivial task, which he and his staff must resolve very creatively.
On the southern flank of the “fortress belt”, in the Dobropillia direction, the enemy continues the offensive with the troops of the 51st Army (1st, 5th, 9th, 110th, 114th, 132nd brigades) of Task Force “South” and the 2nd Army (27th division, 15th, 30th brigades) of Task Force “Center”, who are breaking through from the south and southeast to the near approaches of Dobropillia, attacking with their main forces in the general directions Pokrovsk – Dobropillia and Novotoretsk – New Donbass. The 2nd Army’s offensive on its right flank is supported by the 41st Army (35th, 55th, 74th brigades) of Task Force “Center”, attacking with part of its forces in the direction of Udachne – Serhiivka.
As in the northern “belt,” the enemy uses the tactic of infiltrating assault groups in the maximum number of areas. In the Sofiyivka – Novomykolaivka direction, small scattered groups of infantry (two to three soldiers) infiltrated the plantings south of Novomykolaivka and the village itself. In the Dorozhnje – Novyi Donbas and Nove Shakhove – Vilne directions, similar groups infiltrated the Novyi Donbas and Vilne areas. Those who survived and were not captured are consolidating in Dorozhnje and on the southern outskirts of Vilne. Numerous infiltration attempts are noted to the west of Rodinske, in the Rodinske – Shevchenko direction, near Vodyanske and in the Vodyanska mine area. The enemy is consolidating on the Shevchenko – Novooleksandrivka line. In the Novooleksandrivka – Matyashevo and Vasylyivka – Myrne directions, the enemy attacked vigorously but managed to establish a foothold only in Vasylyivka.
Overall, the pace of the enemy’s advance towards Dobropillya and Druzhkivka has increased in recent weeks. Infiltration groups of the 177th Marine Regiment reached the southeastern outskirts of Dobropillya, other groups moved from Novyi Donbas to the area north and northeast of Hannivka along the T0514 highway Dobropillya – Kramatorsk. Units of the 9th brigade of the 51st army and the 61st Marine Brigade are attempting to encircle Dobropillya from the east and northeast, relying on the dominant heights south of Step. In the area east of Chernihivka, UAV units are being deployed, and the enemy is concentrating in Bilytske and Matyashevo. The enemy advanced to Kucheryavy Yar and Torske after units of the 228th and 239th Motor Rifle Regiments of the 90th Tank Division arrived there.
It is obvious that the command of UW “Center” in the Dobropillya direction is actively preparing to sharply increase its efforts here shortly. This is explained by the need to accelerate the offensive, primarily to create favorable starting conditions for capturing Druzhkivka and subsequently Kramatorsk in cooperation with the troops of the left flank of UW “South”. Another reason is the urgent need to free up the 51st army for further actions as part of the same “South”.
The rapid capture of Dobropillya significantly improves the enemy’s chances of breaking through to Kramatorsk from the south (that’s why the 51st army is needed). From an operational point of view, success near Dobropillya will ensure coverage of the left flank of UW “South”, which has begun the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk offensive operation, from a counterstrike by the Defense Forces from the southern direction.
We keep in mind that the enemy’s 90th Tank Division has already been drawn into exhausting battles both in its own offensive zone and in the zone of the neighboring 29th Army of the “East” group in the Oleksandrivka direction, where the Defense Forces are persistently counterattacking. Another factor is that the enemy failed to take control of Kostiantynivka, and its 8th Army and the 3rd Corps of the “South” group have fallen behind in the operation’s schedule. This means that the enemy troops will eventually reach the approaches to Kramatorsk in a limited combat-ready state, and on the way, they will have to storm Druzhkivka.
The chances are quite high that the left flank of the 7th Air Assault Corps and the 1st National Guard Corps “Azov” will hold the Dobropillia – Druzhkivka line, and in this case, attempts to bypass/encircle the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration will fail, and the enemy’s offensive will automatically be reformatted into a frontal assault on the well-fortified Defense Forces line, long, bloody, and costly in terms of resources.
Dobropillia is gaining more operational significance every day. The enemy’s command is aware of this and will increase its efforts, including constantly forming new assault groups, which are almost the only tool for its advancement. Excluding a hypothetical mobilization in Russia, the 51st Army has 7 mobilization reserve regiments (86th, 87th, 88th, 91st, 99th, 107th, and 111th), the 2nd and 41st Armies – the 1441st (41st Army) and 1437th Motorized Rifle Regiment (27th Division of the 2nd Army) territorial troops regiments at their disposal. The list of reserve regiments is not exhaustive; there are also battalions.
Orikhiv direction does not relate to the “fortress belt,” but it is the direction where the enemy strikes another blow in the context of their strategic offensive operation, and it also requires reserves and resources from the Defense Forces, thus aiding the main forces of the enemy in the main direction.
The “Dnepr” group of forces is advancing here, which includes the 58th (19th, 42nd divisions, 136th brigade, 100th reconnaissance brigade, 49th separate airborne assault brigade, mixed regiment of the 4th military base in South Ossetia), the 47th division of the 18th army (predominantly manned by Crimeans), the 108th and 247th air assault regiments of the 7th air assault division, several units of the 76th air assault division (main forces near Pokrovsk), the 45th special forces brigade of the Airborne Forces, separate units of the 104th air assault division and the 98th airborne division. On the left flank, the 58th army is actively defending, holding back the Defense Forces’ advance along the Dnepr towards Kamyanske, up to the Yanchekrak river, and on the right flank, it is attempting to encompass the Orikhiv defense area of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the west and east for further assault.
The Orikhiv defense area is a significant obstacle in the opponent’s organization, so the actions of the 5th and 35th armies of its “Vostok” formation on the Huliaipole direction are also subordinated to this goal. This entire army group is trying to break through to the Svoboda – Yehorivka – Chervona Krynytsia – Omelnyk area.
The operational situation in the direction is as follows: the advance of the forward units of the 58th army is almost completely halted, the 19th division on several sections of its advance strip is forced to move to defense.
In the direction of Stepnohirsk – Plavni, Defense Forces units advanced south in Plavni and reached the railway station, moving further south along the E105 road Stepnohirsk – Kamianske. In the area of Stepnohirsk and Prymorske, the enemy attempted to counterattack and unblock the remnants of their assault groups in Stepnohirsk but was completely pushed out of Prymorske. Some of their infantry groups retreated to the former Kakhovka Reservoir bed. Defense Forces cleared small enemy infantry groups in Stepnohirsk itself and in the area south of Lukyanivske and Pavlivka. Our forces are expanding their penetration towards Plavni, complicating the enemy’s ability to hold their positions on the southern outskirts of Prymorske.
The tactically advantageous positions of Defense Forces units in Kamianske are causing significant anxiety for the command of the “Dnepr” task force, especially due to the Ukrainian advance towards Plavni. As a result, the enemy regularly attacks towards Lobkove from the eastern outskirts of Kamianske. The enemy’s assault groups regularly attempt to break through towards Pavlivka from the Stepove – Mali Shcherbaky line and from the area northwest of Nesteryanka. It is crucial for the occupiers to reach the heights in the Novoandriivka area and secure them to control the Orikhiv — Komyshuvakha road and the entire area west of Orikhiv. At the same time, this would pose a threat to Ukrainian units operating east and southeast of Stepnohirsk.
Mala Tokmachka has been resisting for fifteen hundred days. The aggressor’s units have abandoned the foolish notion of storming this fortress and are trying to bypass it from the northeast, advancing towards Luhivske – Bilohiria. Their assault groups were stopped while moving along the Konka River by Defense Forces from positions in Bilohiria, which they confidently hold.
The enemy’s 58th Army finds itself in a situation where it cannot advance on Zaporizhzhia and is forced to focus on isolating the Orikhiv defense area. This operational-tactical deadlock for the enemy command will have to be resolved by joint actions of the adjacent flanks of their “Dnepr” and “Vostok” task forces, meaning the context of further actions by the 58th Army will be determined by the neighboring 5th and 35th armies to the right.
The key issue is the ability to bombard Zaporizhzhia with all available means: the distance from the forward positions on the left flank of the 58th Army to the outskirts of Zaporizhzhia is approximately 25 km, meaning every kilometer lost during the retreat will reduce the arsenal of horrors for Zaporizhzhia, which is unacceptable to the enemy. Therefore, the army headquarters conducted a series of active operations in the defense zone of the 19th Division, attempting to renew the advance of its forward units in the general direction of Komyshuvakha and break through to the Malokaterynivka – Komyshuvakha line. Enemy assault groups infiltrated to the east and northeast of Stepnohirsk, into the Pavlivka areas, between Stepnohirsk and Stepove, to the southern part of Prymorske. Active assault actions resumed in the southern part of Stepnohirsk, between Stepnohirsk and Prymorske. These actions halted the advance of Ukrainian units and allowed the 58th Army to resume operations to isolate the Orikhiv defense area.
The 19th and 47th divisions of the occupiers will press Defense Forces units to the north and northeast from the Stepnohirsk – Mali Shcherbaky line with local counterattacks in the Kamyanske – Lukyanivske and Stepove – Lukyanivske directions. Meanwhile, the enemy will hold its positions in the areas of Plavni and Stepnohirsk. The 42nd Division will try to develop its tactical success in the general directions of Nesteryanka – Novoandriivka and Mali Shcherbaky – Novoandriivka. If the enemy manages to achieve tactical success in the areas southwest and west of Orikhiv, the tactical situation for the Defense Forces in the Orikhiv defense area will significantly deteriorate.
The 5th and 35th armies of the enemy’s “Vostok” will break through in the directions of Hulyaipole – Novoselivka and south of Hulyaipilskyi. If they succeed in reaching the Novoselivka – Hulyaipilske – Charivne – Chervona area with their main forces, the 58th army will likely resume attacks from Novopokrovka towards Mala Tokmachka and from Luhivske along the northern bank of the Konka River to the west. The aggressor will attempt to reach the close approaches to Orikhiv from the east and northeast. The 42nd Division will operate to the west and southwest of Orikhiv.
Once again, the main problem for the Defense Forces here is the low staffing of brigades and the necessity to quickly and efficiently create a control and counteraction system against enemy infiltration groups in overly wide interpositional spaces.
On this note, the Defense Forces will enter the autumn-winter battle season.
Cover photo: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
