Information on the current losses of Russia due to sanctions as of 09/23/2026.
1. Russia’s federal budget deficit in 2026 will almost double the initial plan and will be about 3% of GDP.
– In monetary terms, this is about 6.9 trillion rubles. At the beginning of the year, the authorities planned a deficit of 3.8 trillion rubles, or 1.6% of GDP.
– At the end of the summer, the forecast was raised to 5.1 trillion rubles, but this figure is also expected to be increased. The main reason for the worsening budget situation remains the rapid increase in military spending and additional financing needs.
– In the first half of the year, Russia spent 10.7 trillion rubles on the army and arms purchases — 30% more than in the same period last year. Military spending for January–June accounted for 43.8% of all federal budget expenditures and 57.3% of all tax revenues.
– It is estimated that by the end of the year they may reach 9% of GDP — the highest since Soviet times.
2. Russians have started withdrawing money from banks more actively.
– Russians’ funds in banks decreased by 107 billion rubles, or 0.2%, in August, reported the Central Bank of Russia. The regulator explained this by seasonal expenses on vacations and preparation for the new school year.
– However, last year in August, the funds of individuals in banks, on the contrary, increased by 70 billion rubles. The current outflow is the largest since the fall of 2022, when, amid the announced mobilization, Russians massively withdrew savings from banks.
– In September 2022, individuals’ funds decreased by 458 billion rubles, and in October — by another 98 billion rubles.
3. The Russian aluminum giant “RUSAL” is looking for buyers for its assets due to problems with alumina supplies.
– The largest aluminum producer in Russia, the international public joint-stock company “United Company RUSAL,” has begun exploring the market for the sale of the Windalco alumina complex in Jamaica and bauxite assets in Guyana.
– In Guyana, RUSAL holds a stake in Bauxite Company of Guyana with a capacity of over 2 million tons of bauxite per year, but the enterprise has not been operational since 2020 due to a conflict with workers. The capacity of Jamaica’s Windalco is 502 thousand tons of alumina per year.
– The attempt to dispose of foreign assets occurs amid RUSAL’s severe problems with raw material supply following the loss of access to key alumina sources due to sanctions and restrictions.
– The company lost supplies from the Mykolaiv Alumina Refinery in Ukraine and access to its share of production at Queensland Alumina in Australia after an export ban to Russia in 2022. Additional pressure is mounting on the Aughinish plant in Ireland.
– RUSAL is trying to compensate for the losses through investments in China’s Hebei Wenfeng and India’s Pioneer Aluminium, as well as seeking new projects in Indonesia. Meanwhile, dependence on alumina remains an issue: by the end of the first half of the year, the company was supplied with only 89% of its needs.
4. The crisis of demand in Russian industry is intensifying.
– In September, the share of Russian enterprises that assess demand for their products as normal decreased to 36% from 41% in August. Thus, only slightly more than a third of enterprises consider demand to be sufficient.
– Enterprises are also increasingly reporting an excess of finished goods in warehouses. The balance of stock assessments rose to +6 points in September, and expectations for increased production worsened after significant improvement in August.
– The weakness in industry is also indicated by the PMI business activity index. This indicator reflects the dynamics of production and new orders: a value below 50 points indicates a contraction in business activity.
– In August, the PMI of Russian manufacturing fell to 48.8 points from 50.7 in July. New orders were decreasing, and production declined for the first time since April.
– Weak demand is particularly pressing on enterprises oriented towards domestic and investment demand. A high key interest rate makes loans more expensive, restraining both consumption and business investment in development.
5. Russia has once again worsened its forecast for the gas industry, as quickly compensating for the loss of the European market is proving difficult.
– In 2026, gas production is expected to be at the level of 683.1 billion cubic meters, and the LNG export forecast has been reduced from 40.3 to 35 million tons. Russian pipeline gas supplies to Europe fell by 44% to 18 billion cubic meters as early as 2025. This is the lowest level since the mid-1970s.
– New forecasts show that Russia will not be able to quickly replace the lost volumes. Expectations for pipeline exports in 2029 have been lowered from 127.5 to 119.5 billion cubic meters, and LNG exports from 66.2 to 64.5 million tons.
– High prices remain a certain compensation. The forecast for the export price of Russian gas in 2026 has been raised from $336.3 to $402.9 per thousand cubic meters.
– This temporarily supports the income of the gas industry but does not solve its main problem — the shrinking of traditional markets.
6. The EU agreed to remove Alisher Usmanov and Mikhail Fridman from the sanctions list, while extending restrictions for three years against nearly 3000 other individuals and entities linked to Russia.
– The decision was made under pressure from France and Luxembourg. Latvia was opposed to the exclusion of the billionaires until the end. France linked its stance to national security issues and the release of French citizens held by Azerbaijan.
– According to available information, Baku exerted pressure on Paris regarding Usmanov.
– Luxembourg insisted on removing Fridman, who filed an arbitration claim against the country for $15.8 billion. Luxembourg claimed its position in the case would be weaker if only Usmanov were removed from the sanctions list.
7. India is reducing purchases of Russian oil, with a potential further decline in September.
– Russian oil imports to India in August decreased by 16.5% compared to July — approximately to 2.1 million barrels per day. According to preliminary data from Kpler, shipments may decline further in September — to around 1.9 million barrels per day.
– Despite the reduction, Russia remains the largest oil supplier to India, but its position is weakening. Overall Indian imports in August also decreased by 8.8% — to 4.44 million barrels per day.
– Meanwhile, India increased purchases from other sources: imports of Iraqi oil rose by about a quarter, to 171 thousand barrels per day, and Saudi oil by 1.5%, to 328 thousand barrels per day.
– Indian refineries are now more actively purchasing oil on the spot market for deliveries in October–November. The reason is the risk of US tariffs up to 100% for countries buying Russian oil.
– This poses a threat to Moscow of further reduction in one of its main export markets. If the trend continues, Russia risks losing a significant portion of Indian demand, which has become one of the key channels for selling its oil after losing the European market.
8. Russian oil exports are declining, and sanctions along with the return of Saudi Arabia are increasing pressure on Russia’s revenues.
– The export of Russian oil to global markets is decreasing, and Moscow’s situation is becoming more complicated on several fronts—due to American sanctions risks, increased competition from Saudi Arabia, and problems within Russian oil refining.
– In the four weeks leading up to September 20, average shipments were 3.53 million barrels per day, and weekly volumes fell even further after the suspension of shipments in Novorossiysk.
– An additional blow to Russian exports could be a reduction in purchases by India. After the resumption of the Saudi East-West pipeline operations, Indian refineries receive an alternative source of raw materials.
– New Delhi may reduce the share of Russian oil in its purchases to 20–30% compared to over 50% earlier. This potentially means a loss of more than 1 million barrels per day of Russian exports.
– The pressure is also increasing from the USA: the president has been given the authority to impose tariffs of up to 100% against the largest buyers of Russian energy resources. For Moscow, this creates a risk of further reduction of a key source of foreign currency income.
– Meanwhile, Russian oil is accumulating due to processing issues. Ukrainian strikes are disabling Russian refineries almost daily: last week, nearly 1 million barrels per day of processing capacity were fully or partially halted.
– The excess oil must be directed for export. In 2026, Russian maritime oil shipments are about 300,000 barrels per day above the average level of any full year since the start of the full-scale war.
– In the week leading up to September 20, Russia shipped about 24.99 million barrels of oil on 32 tankers. At the same time, Novorossiysk did not send out any batches of Russian oil.
– The volume of “oil on water” is estimated at approximately 105 million barrels. Russia is forced to simultaneously seek new buyers for the growing surplus of oil and retain key clients, primarily India and China.
– A reduction in Indian demand by more than 1 million barrels per day would create a serious problem for Moscow in redirecting such volumes to other markets.
