Ballistic missile strikes cause significant damage to Ukraine and compel it to seek a response in the absence of interceptor missiles. However, the Defense Forces are not the first to tackle such a problem.
During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the international coalition faced the challenge of countering Iraqi mobile missile complexes “Scud” (the export version of the 9k72 “Elbrus” missile complex, the standard Soviet 8k14 missile, and its German modernization Al-Hussein with extended range). These actions were designated as a separate operation called Great Scud Hunt.
The Iraqi armed forces had pre-equipped launch positions, mobile launchers on MAZ-543 chassis, and their own modifications of both the chassis and missiles. After the start of the air operation on January 17, 1991, Iraq responded with missile strikes on Israel (about 38-42 missiles), Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf countries (about 41-46 missiles) to provoke a response from Israel and split the coalition.
The 8k14 missiles were inaccurate (deviation up to 600 m), but their strikes had a strong psychological and political effect. On February 25, one missile hit a barracks housing US troops in Dhahran, killing 28 servicemen. Overall, Iraq carried out about 88 successful launches (some sources mention 93). The Iraqis employed highly effective tactics, the launchers mostly moved at night, conducted quick launches (10-15 minutes) and withdrew, camouflaged themselves, skillfully used terrain, deployed high-quality French-made dummy decoys, and maintained minimal radio communication.
The international coalition began to combat the Iraqi missile forces. In the first days of the campaign, coalition forces attacked all known launch positions (about 25), shelters, production facilities, and missile fuel storage sites. Strikes were also carried out on suspicious locations (bridges, overpasses, coverts, wadis). However, Iraqi missile attacks continued. There arose a need to create and deploy an anti-missile defense system.
The territory of Iraq was divided into special zones (“Scud boxes”) – western Iraq, from where launches against Israel took place, and southern Iraq. Daytime patrols were mostly conducted by A-10 aircraft, and nighttime by F-15e with LANTIRN infrared navigation and targeting systems, F-16, British Tornado, and A-6, among others. Satellite warning systems DSP, reconnaissance aircraft TR-1, U-2, and later J-STARS, infrared and radar sensors were widely used. Between 1,500 and 2,500 sorties were carried out for missile defense missions (5 to 15% of the total number of sorties during the air campaign).
From late January to early February, British SAS groups and American Delta Force (1st Detachment), supported by the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, entered western Iraq (areas “Scud Alley” and “Scud Boulevard”). The groups operated on foot or in vehicles (Land Rover, Humvee, Pinzgauer), conducted reconnaissance, guided aviation, set ambushes, and attacked logistics and command posts. The groups were delivered by helicopters hundreds of kilometers into Iraqi territory.
The protection of objects from missile strikes in Saudi Arabia and Israel was carried out by Patriot anti-aircraft batteries. Early warning from satellites allowed for timely response. The effectiveness of the Patriot was initially reported as high, but operation results led to a downward revision.
The operational-tactical results of all these actions were limited. During the operation, pilots and special forces reported the destruction of dozens (over 80-100) of mobile launchers. Post-war assessments by the Pentagon, Gulf War Air Power Survey, and UN Special Commission showed that there were almost no confirmed destructions of mobile launchers. Many “destroyed” targets turned out to be decoys, ordinary trucks, or other objects. Iraq retained a significant portion of its missile potential: dozens of ready Al-Hussein missiles, a significant number of launchers (estimates vary but not less than 10). Stationary objects and missile production suffered more damage.
Lesson learned from “Desert Storm”:
• ballistic missile launchers in desert areas are extremely difficult to find and destroy even with absolute air superiority;
• better sensors, real-time intelligence, integration of special forces and aviation are needed;
• realistic expectations should be maintained regarding “body count,” i.e., the count of casualties and damage.
The experience of 1991 greatly influenced the further development of missile defense and tactics for combating mobile launch systems.
The best results were achieved in Kolomna by PJSC “NPK KB Mashinostroyeniya.” This design bureau is the developer of the tactical missile system “Tochka” 9k79, its upgraded variant “Tochka-U,” the operational-tactical complex “Oka” 9k714 (destroyed under the INF Treaty, terrified NATO), and the operational-tactical complex “Iskander” 9k720. “NPK KB Mashinostroyeniya” is also involved in the development of the “Kinzhal” missile. The defense forces are aware of this, and on the night of November 10-11, 2023, a friendly drone visited the facility. Later (in 2024-2025), there were attempts at sabotage and assassination attempts on the management of the design bureau, but that wasn’t us.
The result of the learned lesson was a rather non-trivial solution – the designers offered the Russian army a “missile brigade” kit, meaning the army simultaneously receives a set of 51 vehicles, including 12 self-propelled launcher units 9P78-1 (on MZKT-7930 chassis), 12 transport-loading vehicles 9T250 (also on MZKT-7930, with a crane for reloading missiles), 11 command-staff vehicles 9S552 (on KamAZ chassis), an information preparation point 9S920, a regulation and maintenance vehicle, 14 life support vehicles (guard room, dining room, bath, etc.). There are 16 armies in the Russian Armed Forces, with missile brigades in each, except the 51st (the so-called “Donetsk People’s Militia”) and the 3rd (similar “Luhansk”). There were rumors that a fourth division was being introduced to the brigades. No one has confirmed it yet, but assembling the equipment and missiles requires something, which seems problematic today for the opponent’s military-industrial complex.
It is clear that such expensive equipment will not be dragged into the operation area, and it’s worth having something in the east of the country. Most likely, the missile brigades of the opponent’s armies act as rather strange combined tactical groups, the core of which is a missile division, reinforced with 9S920 machines, a regulation and maintenance vehicle, and other life support vehicles. Note that without the 9S920, preparing flight tasks for the missiles is difficult and time-consuming, and automatically transmitting them to the launchers is impossible. The same goes for the regulation and maintenance vehicle: a missile won’t fly without being checked in this vehicle. These are the first two critical focal points to look for. The rest of the targets in this cluster are the main armament of a standard missile division: four self-propelled launchers 9P78-1 and four TLV 9T250. The division has eight missiles on the launchers and another eight on the TLV, totaling 16, meaning the first salvo is eight missiles and the second is another eight.
Where to find this menace?
The officially declared maximum range of the 9m723 ballistic missile is up to 480 km (with a lighter warhead – up to 700 km). The 9m728 and 9m729 cruise missiles officially fly the same 480 km, which complies with the US-Soviet Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, but there are opinions that the Russians are lying and the 9m729 flies up to 2000 km. This might be why the USA withdrew from the treaty on August 2, 2019, and is working on its own Long-Range Precision Fires program to replace the outdated ATACMS.
In practice, most of Ukraine’s territory (except for Zakarpattia, parts of Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Chernivtsi regions when launched exclusively from standard positions) is in the potential strike zone with a combination of launches from different directions. The flight time of ballistic missiles is from 1-2 minutes (border cities like Kharkiv or Odessa during strikes from Crimea, where the missile explosion precedes the alert siren) to 5-7 minutes (the deeper rear areas).
From position areas in the Kursk and Bryansk regions, the enemy covers the entire north, central, and a significant part of eastern Ukraine: Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kyiv, Cherkasy, partially Dnipro and Kirovohrad regions. From the Rostov region, they target the east and south: Donetsk, Luhansk, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, partially Kharkiv region, and the south. From Crimea – south and southwest: Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Zaporizhzhia, partially Dnipropetrovsk, and deeper rear areas of Ukraine.
All sensible rocket launcher operators are constantly changing their exact positions, especially since the mobility of the complexes allows this. The enemy is well-camouflaged and operates exclusively in dispersed combat formations.
The main launch areas of the Iskander missile systems against Ukraine are the border regions of the Russian Federation and the temporarily occupied Crimea. Analysis shows that the 448th Missile Brigade of the 20th Army (the last one to be rearmed with Iskanders) has deployed its positions in the Kursk region (areas of Shumakove, Cheryomushki, and the town of Shchigry). This is one of the most active directions, where they primarily target Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Poltava regions, and sometimes further afield.
In the Bryansk region, from the positional area near Klintsy and other border locations, the 112th Missile Brigade of the 1st Tank Army fires at Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and other regions in the north and center of Ukraine (the brigade needs further clarification as it has also been seen in the Voronezh region, and Koreans have arrived, with six Hwaseong-11c missile systems, a sort of North Korean “Iskander”).
In temporarily occupied Crimea, positional areas have been noted near Novoselivske, Cape Tarkhankut, in the Kozacha Bay (near Sevastopol), and near Simferopol. From here, the first missile brigade of the 49th army targets southern Ukraine (Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia) and deeper targets. There have been reports of combat activity by the 12th Missile Brigade of the 58th Army. Both armies conduct operations in the Zaporizhzhia region, so it’s no surprise that their missile brigades are in Crimea. The 15th Coastal Missile Brigade fires Oniks missiles at Odesa and other cities, but it is currently outside the scope of this publication.
Launches were also recorded from the Belgorod, Voronezh regions, and Krasnodar Krai. However, the main combat launches occur from areas close to the border (often 100-200 km from the line of contact), which significantly differs from the tactical regulations established in the corresponding guidelines.
Thus, it becomes clear that finding a missile launcher in position is extremely difficult, as confirmed by the experience of the international coalition in Iraq. The search is complicated by the absence in Ukraine of a national system for early detection and warning of a missile attack, the ability to maintain constant air surveillance over potential positional areas on the enemy’s territory, or to deploy a significant number of Special Operations Forces units there.
Simply activating Starlink over the Russian border areas won’t suffice. Unconventional steps need to be considered.
On the cover: Launch of an OTRK “Iskander” missile. Photo: Ministry of Defense of the occupiers
