Ihor Semyvolos / AMES Center for Middle Eastern Studies
Analysis Using Conflictology Analytical Tools
The developments between our countries in 2026 did not arise from nowhere–these issues have very old and deep structural roots. However, the current serious escalation was triggered by a combination of specific factors. Before delving into the situation using conflictological tools, it is worth honestly naming these “pain points.”
I. Context and Main Triggers of Escalation
Main Spark: May 2026
It all started when Volodymyr Zelensky signed a decree to award an elite unit of the Armed Forces of Ukraine the honorary title “in the name of the heroes of the UPA.” In Ukraine, this step was perceived naturally: during four years of exhausting war, it was needed to boost morale and strengthen the internal patriotic narrative. But in Poland, where the Volhynia issue is extremely painful, this was perceived as an open and deliberate slap.
It is important to understand that Warsaw’s sharp reaction is not a sudden whim. The Polish consensus on the assessment of those events was formed long ago: the Sejm officially recognized the events in Volhynia as genocide of Poles back in 2016. Since then, new streets or memorial signs related to the UPA have regularly appeared in Ukraine. However, this never caused such a storm before–everything was limited to restrained statements by embassies, diplomatic notes, or concern from historians. This proves that the historical consensus in Poland existed for years as a principled but controlled position that united both the government and the opposition. But in 2026, due to a combination of other factors, this longstanding issue was turned into a tool for public escalation.
Political Shift of President Nawrocki
Internal Polish politics added fuel to the fire. The newly elected President Karol Nawrocki, who took office in 2025 from the Law and Justice party (PiS), was looking for a loud way to make his mark and secure solid support from his conservative electorate.
Here lies a deep political irony: relatively recently, as head of the Polish Institute of National Remembrance (IPN), Nawrocki stated that Ukrainians have the full sovereign right to name their streets or military units after the heroes they see fit. However, after taking the presidential seat, he quickly adapted to new electoral sentiments. His maneuver with the order–when the sitting president of an allied state is demonstratively stripped of the highest state award during a bloody war–is an unprecedented step. Only a leader consciously playing for escalation for ratings achievements could take such a radical turn from his own words.
Shift in Polish Public Sentiment
Unfortunately, Nawrocki’s games found fertile ground. In recent years, the attitude of ordinary Poles towards Ukrainians has changed dramatically: if in 2022, on a wave of genuine solidarity, it was positive among 83% of citizens, by 2025, this figure had fallen to a record low of 30%. Society simply grew tired.
This was clearly demonstrated by the presidential elections in Poland: in the first round, more than half of the voters (51%) cast their votes for candidates with openly skeptical or anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. Moreover, even liberals from the “Civic Platform” began to propose canceling child benefits for those Ukrainians who do not pay taxes into the Polish treasury. Anti-Ukrainian slogans have simply started bringing easy political dividends to all parties in Poland — it is no longer the monopoly of the right-wing radicals.
Unequal Conditions of War
The worst part of this situation is the colossal, unfair asymmetry between our countries. Poland is protected by the NATO umbrella and can afford to engage in conflict, risking only diplomatic relations. For Ukraine, any quarrel with neighbors during the war is a matter of survival. That is why Navrotsky dared to act so boldly, something he would never have dared in peacetime. Ukraine’s military vulnerability, unfortunately, has simultaneously become both the reason why Warsaw decided to press harder and the main constraint for Kyiv, which simply cannot afford to respond with full force.
II. What Lies Inside the Conflict? (Analysis by Galtung’s Triangle)
To understand why tensions flare so often between the countries, it is not enough to only listen to what politicians say on camera. Conflictology teaches us to look at three levels of the problem: hidden contradictions (Contradiction), psychological attitudes of the parties (Attitudes), and their actual behavior (Behaviour).
1. Contradiction (Deep-seated contradictions — what is the incompatibility?)
Here we deal with several layers of ironclad structural differences, where the interests of Kyiv and Warsaw objectively clash:
The battle for status and the future. The real core of the tension is how both countries see their role in post-war Europe. Poland is accustomed to and wants to continue being the main “advocate” and conduit for Ukraine in the EU and NATO, while also maintaining leadership status throughout the region. Ukraine, after four full years of large-scale war, has won enough subjectivity to categorically refuse the role of the “junior partner,” to whom older neighbors dictate how to reconcile with their history.
The agricultural wall. This is pure economics. On the European market, two absolutely incompatible models inevitably collided: Ukrainian giant agroholdings with low production costs and Polish small farmers who stay afloat only thanks to Brussels subsidies. Grain, sugar, berries, logistics — all of this has become a battleground in the process of Ukraine’s integration into the EU.
Warsaw’s geoeconomic fear. For years, Poland has been the main recipient of financial infusions from Brussels. Ukraine’s accession would radically change everything: the lion’s share of European agricultural subsidies and equalization funds would simply shift to Kyiv because our country is large and needs rebuilding. This financial fear of losing billions of euros is often masked under fierce historical disputes, yet it is a powerful independent driving force of Polish resistance.
Asymmetry of vulnerability. Poland is protected by NATO and can afford to raise the rhetorical temperature — for it, this will not have existential consequences. For Ukraine, any loss of support during the war is a matter of life and death. This asymmetry in itself generates deep hidden resentment and distrust.
2. Attitudes (Attitudes – what do the parties think and feel?)
The emotional and ideological background through which Kyiv and Warsaw view each other:
From the Polish side: a volatile mix of genuine solidarity, deep psychological fatigue from the Ukrainian topic (*Ukrainian fatigue*), and growing disappointment with the formula “we gave you everything when it was toughest, but saw no gratitude.” The Volhynia issue, previously a trump card only for right-wing radicals, became advantageous even for liberals after the societal shift of 2022–2025.
Moreover, a steadfast stance has existed in Polish politics for over 15 years: “You won’t enter Europe with Bandera.” This consensus was institutionalized on February 25, 2010, when the European Parliament adopted an official resolution on Ukraine, condemning the awarding of the title Hero of Ukraine to Stepan Bandera. One of the key lobbyists for this position in Brussels was the Polish Member of the European Parliament from the liberal “Civic Platform,” Paweł Zalewski. Even then, he explicitly warned Kyiv: if Ukraine seeks EU membership, it must reconsider its evaluation of Bandera. Later, in 2017, the leader of the PiS, Jarosław Kaczyński, repeated this formula verbatim to Petro Poroshenko, and in 2018, Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski proclaimed it as the official line of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus, the entire Polish political elite has shared the belief for over a decade and a half that it has the right to issue ultimatums to Ukraine regarding its historical memory.
From the Ukrainian side: there is a sense of injustice and resentment. Society and the government, after four years of extremely difficult struggle, view it like this: the country is bleeding and fighting for the survival of all of Europe, while allies take advantage of the moment of vulnerability and present historical accounts. This is perceived as outright blackmail. Meanwhile, in Kyiv, they often underestimate how deeply the Volhynia issue is ingrained in Polish identity and perceive any remarks from Warsaw solely as hostile propaganda or internal political games, significantly limiting the space for flexible diplomatic maneuvering.
3. Behaviour (Behavior – how does this manifest in actions?)
Fortunately, the conflict has not yet crossed a dangerous line, but specific unfriendly actions from both sides have already become a reality:
From the Polish side: real border blockades by farmers, which Tusk’s government turned a blind eye to or simply did nothing about, delays in ratifying important bilateral agreements, and harsh political ultimatums – stating that without unhindered access to exhumations, Ukraine’s progress towards the EU will be blocked.
From the Ukrainian side: Kyiv has also stopped being silent. There was Zelensky’s sharp statement at the UN General Assembly, where he compared the grain blockade to Russia’s actions, or the statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2026 about readiness to “mirror respond” to any unfriendly steps from Warsaw.
However, despite all this loud verbal confrontation and diplomatic scandals, the behavior of the parties stops at the edge of words and economic jabs. The main thing is that security and military cooperation, weapons transit, and data exchange continue as usual. The pragmatic instinct of self-preservation in the face of a common threat still prevails over emotions.
III. Where Are We Now? (Assessment on the Glasl Escalation Scale)
German conflictologist Friedrich Glasl’s scale divides any confrontation into nine stages and three major phases. The first phase is Win-Win. The second is Win-Lose. The third is Lose-Lose. Today, the conflict is confidently in the second phase: a stable Level 4 with dangerous elements of Level 5.
We have already passed Level 3 (“Actions Instead of Words”). We saw real border blockades, deliberate delays in ratifying agreements, and open public ultimatums.
Level 4 (“Coalition Building”) is unfolding in full. Both countries are actively seeking support on the international stage (Kyiv appeals to Brussels and Washington, while Warsaw leverages its status as an EU member).
Elements of Level 5 (“Loss of Face”). This is where the scandal with the order pushed us. When the current leader of an allied state has an award demonstratively taken away during wartime and then mirrors the action by returning it along with former presidents, it’s a direct attempt at public humiliation.
Why haven’t we fully descended to Level 5?
The conflict teeters on the edge. Despite all the political theater, real economic, military, and intelligence cooperation continues. Diplomatic channels are open, and neither side is systematically trying to isolate the other globally. The security corridor (fear of Russia) is the only concrete factor keeping the parties from total catastrophe.
What Could Further Destabilize the Situation? (Escalation Factors)
Political races in Poland. Anti-Ukrainian slogans have become profitable for all parties. Any candidate will be tempted to boost their ratings by “defending Polish interests.”
Symbolic mines. Any new Ukrainian decision regarding the commemoration of UPA or another anniversary of the Volyn tragedy will instantly become sparks for new outbursts.
Specifics regarding the EU. The closer Ukraine gets to real negotiations on joining, the stronger the resistance will be. Issues of agricultural quotas and subsidies will turn this conflict into a fierce Euro-integration war over real money.
IV. Anatomy of the Crisis: Tree of Problems and Goals
If the entire conflict is imagined as a tree, the daily social media scandals are just the leaves. To understand why it grows, one must uncover the roots and look at the trunk of the problem.
ROOTS – The Deep-Seated Causes From Which Everything Grows
1. A historical wound without mutual healing. The Volyn tragedy of 1943–1945 still causes pain to each society in its own way. For Poland, it’s an unequivocal genocide (2016 Sejm decision). For Ukraine, it’s a complex and tragic chapter in its own liberation struggle. There is no common view.
2. Unequal status. Poland has long had a seat at the EU and NATO table, while Ukraine is just a candidate critically dependent on the neighbor’s support. This inequality automatically triggers a lecturing tone (“paternalism”) from Warsaw and a natural resentment in Kyiv.
3. Competition for leadership. Both states see themselves as major players in Central and Eastern Europe. But they have different resources: Poland has institutional ones, while Ukraine has enormous military and moral authority. They are jostling elbows on the same field.
4. Agrarian Wall and Fear of Brussels. Large Ukrainian agro-holdings and small Polish farmers inevitably get in each other’s way. Moreover, Warsaw is panicked by the fear of losing EU subsidies, fueling this hidden financial conflict.
5. Domestic Political Games. Anti-Ukrainian rhetoric has become a profitable commodity in Polish elections. The conservatives from PiS have used it for years, but now even Tusk’s liberals have adapted to this societal trend.
6. Mutual “Blind Spot”. Polish society prefers not to recall their harsh colonial policies in Ukrainian lands during 1920–1939. On the other hand, the Ukrainian official narrative tends to romanticize the OUN and UPA, suppressing the facts of ethnic cleansing of Polish civilians. Both sides suffer from historical amnesia, and without acknowledging this, an honest dialogue is impossible.
TRUNK – Central Problem
It is impossible to simultaneously synchronize historical justice, tough agrarian interests, and strategic partnership during a major war. Politicians on both sides are pressed by electoral pressure. Volhynia in this system is merely a symptom. The real fuel for the crisis is Poland’s economic fear of losing EU funds and its reluctance to see a neighboring equal Ukraine.
CROWN – The Consequences We See and Will Face in the Future
Level 1. What is happening right now: border blockades, delays in document ratification, loud media scandals between presidents, and an unprecedented demarche with the return of awards.
Level 2. Medium-term threats: Ukraine will face obstacles at every stage of negotiations with the EU. Trust between the military and intelligence services will decline, and ordinary people will increasingly believe in negative stereotypes about one another.
Level 3. Long-term catastrophe: The greatest risk is that after the war, instead of a powerful alliance, we will end up with a “cold peace.” The two neighboring countries will be neither true allies nor open enemies, dooming the region to constant instability.
TREE OF GOALS – What the Desired State Should Be
Main Goal: To create a platform for relations that allows history, agrarian business, and security to be dealt with in separate spaces. Memory issues and economic disputes must be resolved by specialists without hindering strategic partnership.
What Needs to Be Done at the Root Level:
Launch a real joint historical commission with a full mandate: analyze everything as one process – from Polish “pacifications” in the Kresy during the interwar period to the tragedy of 1943–1945.
Write clear transitional economic mechanisms in the EU that will protect the small Polish farmer while opening up the market for Ukrainian business.
Sign a new fundamental agreement on strategic partnership, which clearly establishes the rules of the game after the war.
V. Tree of Conflict According to Simon Fisher
This methodology requires dividing the conflict into visible symptoms, nearest triggers, and fundamental root causes.
1. VISIBLE SYMPTOMS (What’s on the surface?)
The diplomatic scandal of the year: Karol Nawrocki demonstratively withdraws an award from Volodymyr Zelensky, and the Ukrainian side reciprocally returns orders to Warsaw. Further road and transit blockades by Polish farmers.
Stern ultimatums from Polish officials on exhumations as a condition for the EU. Bureaucratic slowdown in ratifying bilateral security and economic agreements.
2. IMMEDIATE CAUSES AND TRIGGERS (What lit the fuse?)
Trigger 1. Zelensky’s decree. Naming an elite unit of the Ukrainian Armed Forces after “UPA Heroes.” The move was intended purely to boost morale but ignited a spark in Polish society.
Trigger 2. Nawrocki’s political start. Poland’s new president from PiS sought a high-profile topic to mobilize his conservative electorate. The Volyn topic proved to be the ideal tool.
Trigger 3. Ukrainian burnout. Four years of full-scale war have exhausted the Ukrainian society’s nerves. There is a sharp feeling of resentment: while the country fights for Europe’s survival, neighbors attempt to take advantage of vulnerability and issue ultimatums.
Trigger 4. Institutional void. There was no working “safety valve” between the countries—a structure that could have defused this crisis at the expert level, avoiding a public scandal between presidents.
Immediate cause 1. Political split in Warsaw. The conflict between Tusk’s government and Nawrocki’s presidency impacts Ukraine. Both have electoral incentives to act tough: Nawrocki attacks on camera, while Tusk acts quietly, deliberately not preventing farmers from blocking borders.
Immediate cause 2. Political deadlock over exhumation procedures. There is a serious distortion of reality here. Ukraine officially lifted its seven-year moratorium on search-exhumation work at the end of 2024, and in 2025-2026, the State Commission regularly issued specific permits to the Polish Institute of National Memory (including June 2026 permits for Ostrivky and Volia Ostrivetska in Volyn).
However, the problem did not disappear but shifted focus: Warsaw now demands not just the lifting of the moratorium but full abandonment of Ukrainian bureaucratic procedures, granting it the right to dig anywhere without fulfilling reciprocal requirements for organizing Ukrainian gravesites in Poland. For Polish conservative society, this issue lies deeply in the religious sphere—”to bury according to Christian customs,” so any legal Ukrainian document verification is perceived as “Kyiv’s ill will.”
Fueling the fire is the fact that many locations where, according to Polish family stories, there are supposedly hundreds of victims, real excavations show either emptiness or graves of completely different wartime forces (Soviet partisans, German soldiers, etc.). The objective fact that victims were often simply not present (or their number was electorally exaggerated) is taboo for the Polish political sphere. It is more convenient for Warsaw to blame Kyiv for “blocking” than to acknowledge methodological errors in its historical memory, making this track a source of perpetual controlled escalation.
3. ROOT CAUSES (Deep foundation)
(A detailed analysis of these points is provided in Section IV “Roots,” where their conflictological status according to Fisher is recorded)
1. The War of Identities. The incompatibility of the image of Kresy/Volyn as a crime without context and the Ukrainian perception of OUN-UPA as a symbol of the liberation struggle.
2. Polish Imperial Amnesia. Lack of insight into the consequences of Warsaw’s policies from 1920–1939.
3. Ukrainian Romanticization. The exclusion of the facts about the cleansing of the Polish civilian population from the official narrative of the liberation struggle.
4. Structural Inequality. The asymmetry of vulnerability that turns any compromise during the war into an appearance of capitulation for Ukrainian society.
5. Absence of an Arbiter. No international institution (EU, NATO) has the tools or mandate to arbitrate this conflict.
6. Politicization of Numbers. Institutionalization of the figure “100,000 Polish victims” as a political dogma of the Sejm, which completely closed it off from free academic discussion.
VI. Scenarios for Development: How to Exit the Nosedive?
The awards scandal made it clear that the escalation was initiated by the Polish side, and the Ukrainian presidents’ demarche was a forced response. Based on this, five scenarios were calculated:
Scenario 1. Tusk Distances Himself from Nawrocki
Prime Minister Donald Tusk uses the president’s radical step to attack him domestically as an actor who harms regional security for the sake of ratings. However, due to his own agrarian base and societal shift, Tusk will not seek full reconciliation with Kyiv. At most, the rhetoric will be toned down while maintaining economic pressure.
Likelihood of partial success: moderate.
Scenario 2. Quietly Lying Low (Silent De-escalation)
The parties make a step back without any official statements or fanfare. Contacts at the ministerial level are resumed, rhetoric disappears from the front pages, and specific disputes are resolved technically. This is a freeze, not a resolution, but it reduces the temperature.
Likelihood: high in the short term.
Scenario 3. Rebuke from Senior Partners (External Pressure)
Washington or Brussels enters the game. Behind closed doors, they make it clear that the public squabble over historical awards complicates the broader security agenda and hinders logistics. This immediately forces both capitals to be restrained.
Likelihood: high if the conflict impedes specific military or financial tracks.
Scenario 4. Unexpected Symbolic Breakthrough
The Polish side independently, without preconditions or ultimatums, initiates the creation of an entirely new joint commission with a full historical mandate (from 1920 to 1945). This is the only scenario for real resolution of the trauma, but it is unrealistic due to electoral races in Poland.
Likelihood: low in the near future.
Scenario 5. Controlled Tension Under a Security Umbrella
Both countries accept the new reality: we are no longer “romantic friends,” but tough, selfish neighbors. Publicly, politicians continue exchanging sharp jabs, while fierce economic wars over quotas, markets, and customs continue.
However, “behind the scenes,” a security corridor operates smoothly without any disruptions: air defense work, repair of heavy equipment, weapons logistics by rail, and intelligence exchange are maintained at the highest level of trust. Both capitals clearly understand: if Ukraine does not endure, Russian tanks will be on the Bug tomorrow.
Probability: the most realistic long-term state. This is not a solution to the problem but a stable equilibrium that both parties can endure.
VII. General Conclusion: Ukraine’s Strategic Framework
The analysis proves: attempts to appease the Poles, emotionally appeal to “gratitude,” or hope for the altruism of Tusk’s government no longer work. Anti-Ukrainian sentiments and economic protectionism in Poland have become systemic factors. The only correct course for Ukraine is to “stick to its line” by channeling diplomacy into the realm of rational, institutional, and legal pressure.
Ukraine must become a predictable but very assertive and self-serving neighbor to Poland in the following areas:
1. Transition to a common security interest: Our approach should be based on the cold axiom that the security corridor is their existential interest, not a service to us. In military and logistical matters, Ukraine must speak from a position of strength, as Warsaw depends on our resilience just as much as we rely on their transit.
2. Economy according to EU rules: Since the agricultural conflict is structural, capitulation or voluntary export restrictions for the sake of “good relations” will only lead to new demands from Warsaw. Sticking to our line here means negotiating not emotionally, but legally through Brussels; actively using European arbitrations, WTO rules, and European Commission tools. Compromises in the EU must be exclusively mutual (Win-Win).
3. History as a sovereign right: The formation of a national pantheon of heroes and honorary unit names is Ukraine’s exclusive sovereign right, not subject to international bargaining. However, actions should be strategic, outplaying Warsaw on its own field: Ukraine should continue issuing permits for technical search operations strictly within current legislation, as is done after lifting the moratorium. This fully undermines the arguments of Polish radicals about Kyiv’s “unchristian behavior” or “memory blocking.” The formula is simple: we ensure a transparent European procedure for exhumations and demand the same mirrored respect for Ukrainian burials in Poland, while firmly and uncompromisingly curbing any attempts by Warsaw to dictate our identity.
4. Asymmetric diplomacy: If Poland tries to block or complicate our steps in the EU, it is strategically more beneficial to build direct, rock-solid alliances with those who make decisions and finance processes – with Washington (in the future), Berlin, Paris, or directly with the European Commission leadership in Brussels. When there is a direct agreement with “shareholders,” the behavior of a regional “manager” becomes much less critical.
A true, equal resolution of this knot will only be possible after the end of the hot phase of the war when Ukraine reduces its critical military dependence on Polish logistics and can negotiate with Warsaw from the position of a strong, independent, and integrated European institutional state.
