News from the fronts. 31.08.2026 (video)

News from the fronts. 31.08.2026 (video)
Kostiantyn Mashovets

Today β€” Kramatorsk direction

1. The enemy (Russian forces), as part of their Sloviansk-Kramatorsk operational-strategic offensive operation, continues offensive actions in the Kramatorsk direction with the forces of the 3rd, 8th Combined Arms Armies (CAA), the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) from the “South” troop grouping, as well as part of the forces of the 51st, 41st CAA, and the 90th Tank Division (TD) from the “Center” troop grouping.

In the previous review, we examined the change in the situation directly in the Kostyantynivka direction, where the forces of the Russian 8th CAA and the 3rd Army Corps are active, so today we will focus on the enemy’s actions on its flanks. That is, in the general “directions” of Chasiv Yar – Druzhkivka (and the area north of Chasiv Yar), as well as Sofiivka – Raiske.

At the moment, the enemy has managed to achieve quite noticeable tactical results in these directions, which under certain conditions could assist them in achieving their main operational goal β€” to advance the main forces of their forward units to the near approaches to Kramatorsk from the south and east.

This was made possible by several factors:

– The advance of forward Russian assault groups on the flanks of the Kostyantynivka defense area of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), which allowed the Russian command, in turn, to intensify offensive actions towards Kramatorsk, both in the area of Chasiv Yar (70th MRD and part of the forces of the 3rd CAA), and along the Kazennyi Torets River towards Raiske (left flank of the Russian 8th CAA).

– Quite successful tactical offensive actions by the forward units and subdivisions of the Russian 3rd CAA towards Sloviansk, which apparently allowed the command of this Russian army to allocate part of its forces and means for actions directly towards Kramatorsk from the east.

– And also, the ongoing offensive by Russian forces on the right flank of the operational zone of the “Center” troop grouping towards Dobropillia, which significantly complicates for the Ukrainian command the concentration of sufficient forces and means for the defense of Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka.

At the same time, it should be noted that the advance of Russian assault and small infantry groups in these directions, although quite noticeable tactically, has not yet allowed the enemy command to achieve its main “intermediate” goal β€” to reach the near approaches to the Druzhkivka defense area of the AFU on a wide front with their main forces and begin its direct assault. On the left flank of the 3rd ZVA, they have come “quite close,” not even to Druzhkivka, but to Kramatorsk itself.

2. The current situation in the aforementioned areas is characterized by the following events:

– Assault groups from the forward units and subdivisions operating on the left flank of the Russian 3rd ZVA managed to cross the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal from east to west during the reporting period and made numerous “penetrations” towards Kramatorsk. Specifically, they managed to advance and secure positions in the directions of Fedorivka β€” Nikanorivka, Pryvillia β€” Malynivka, Minkivka β€” Vasyutynske.

However, the AFU likely continue to hold several positions near the villages of Yurkivka and Nikanorivka, as well as along the Vasylivska desert β€” Vasyutynske line. In this regard, the enemy managed to enter Malynivka and Tykhonivka, reach the eastern outskirts of Vasyutynske, and continue active offensive and assault operations towards Pershomarivka, Vasylivska desert, and Nikanorivka. It is evident that positions of certain forward small infantry groups of the enemy (in the Vasyutynske area) are already located about 6.8-7 km east of the Kramatorsk airfield.

– The enemy also continues to actively operate further south in the Markovo β€” Fedorivka directions, likely attempting to break through to Bilokuzmynivka and Mayske β€” Virolubivka, evidently considering the advance of their separate assault groups to Molocharka and Stinka in order to encircle Ukrainian units that continue to defend west of Chasiv Yar (Stinka β€” Mykolaivka β€” Chervone β€” Podilske area).

In this sense, the continued holding of the Virolubivka-Stinka line by Ukrainian troops will be crucial. Moreover, not only for holding the position west of Chasiv Yar but also in Kostyantynivka itself.

– On the opposite flank, Russian assault groups have also advanced north and northeast from Sofiivka (about 3-3.2 km) along the western bank of the Kazenyi Torets River, and separate “micro” Russian infantry groups of 2-3 servicemen are already recorded in the Novomykhailivka and even Novohyhorivka areas.

It is clear that in this sense, the Russian command is trying to bring the main forces of its forward units and subdivisions to the area southwest of Druzhkivka (Novomykhailivka β€” Novohyhorivka β€” Rayske β€” Torske). However, at present, the enemy has managed to achieve “penetration” only with the forces of several small infantry groups, and in some cases, by individual servicemen.

3. Thus, regarding the overall operational situation in the Kramatorsk direction, the following factors should be noted:

– It is evident that the overall pace of the enemy’s advance from the southwest and south towards Kramatorsk largely depends on the stubborn defensive battles of the AFU, which they continue to conduct in the Kostyantynivka area. The Russian command is forced to divert a significant part of the 8th ZVA and almost the entire 3rd Army Corps for this purpose, enhancing them with separate forces and means from the 51st and 3rd ZVA instead of deploying them to encircle Druzhkivka.

– Meanwhile, in the offensive zone of its 3rd Army Corps (on its left flank), the enemy has evidently gained the capability to break directly towards Kramatorsk from the east, bypassing both Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka. Moreover, thanks to the intense “penetration” of its assault groups in the direction of Novodmytrivka β€” Molocharka, it has the opportunity to completely “turn” Ukrainian defenses west of Chasiv Yar and speed up the advance of its 70th Motor Rifle Division towards Chasiv Yar β€” Druzhkivka.

– However, the enemy’s actions along the Kazenny Torets River in the general direction from the southwest towards Druzhkivka have evidently been less successful. Although even there, the enemy continues to carry out quite effective “infiltration” of its separate assault groups. In fact, the continued successful holding by Ukrainian troops of the Novomykolaivka β€” Chervonyi Kut line and the Toretske β€” Torske β€” Pavlivka β€” Pryiut area practically “guarantees” the enemy no less stubborn battles for Druzhkivka than in Kostyantynivka, which it will likely have to storm head-on from the east and southeast.

In other words…

While the Ukrainian command on the entire Sloviansk-Kramatorsk operational axis was and continues to fiercely “fight for the flanks” (holding the Lyman bridgehead and conducting stubborn defensive battles along the Dobropillia – Kostyantynivka line), Russian troops have practically managed to organize and carry out, let’s say, relatively successful offensive actions directly “head-on” towards the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration from the east (along the general directions Sievierodonetsk-Sloviansk and Bakhmut-Kramatorsk), thus creating quite obvious preconditions for successfully completing the first stage of their Sloviansk-Kramatorsk offensive operation β€” reaching the near approaches to both Sloviansk and Kramatorsk by this autumn.

However, its overall successful completion by “the end of the year,” as stated, still appears quite problematic for the enemy. Since it has not yet managed to ensure the operational encirclement of the entire agglomeration to a sufficient depth. The enemy has approached it (and only in some narrow sections) exclusively from the east. Moreover, achieving this encirclement as a PRECONDITION for further advancement on the entire agglomeration and its assault remains “very unclear.” Thus, the prospect of a direct “head-on” assault by Russian troops from the east, especially on fairly narrow sections of the front, still seems the most likely scenario for the further development of the situation in this direction.

 

Photo: ArmiyaInform

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