Sloviansk-Kramatorsk Direction
The enemy (Russian forces) with its 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA) from the “South” group of troops continues its offensive actions towards the city of Sloviansk in the current operational-strategic offensive operation on the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk direction along two main operational-tactical directions:
– Siversk – Sloviansk (along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River),
– Bakhmut – Sloviansk (on both sides of the E-40 road in the section between these two cities).
Additionally, it is evident that part of the forces and resources of the Russian 3rd CAA are also acting towards Kramatorsk, attempting to reach the close approaches to this city (at least to reach the Vasylivska Pustosh — Vasiutynske line).
During the reporting period, the enemy managed to achieve quite significant results on several tactical sections and directions in the offensive strip of its 3rd CAA. This, in turn, created quite favorable conditions for it to continue the offensive from the east towards both Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. Specifically:
– It is evident that on the Zakitne – Kryva Luka section, the advanced units and subunits of the Russian 3rd CAA were able to completely take control of the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets River, and their advanced assault groups have already been noted on the southeastern outskirts of the village of Piskunivka, likely advancing there from the direction of Zakitne and Kryva Luka.
– Active attacking/assault actions of the enemy also continue in the directions of Rai-Oleksandrivka — Mykolaivka and Rai-Oleksandrivka — Orikhovatka, where the enemy, despite counterattacks from the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), managed to hold positions in the forest southeast of Mykolaivka with the forces of several assault groups (units), and also, acting west of the Rai-Oleksandrivka — Mykolaivka road, “penetrate” with several of its small infantry groups into a small forest south of Mykolaivka, where they have “settled” approximately 1 km from the southern outskirts of Mykolaivka (Mykolaivska Street and Andriivskyi Lane).
– However, attempts to advance directly from Rai-Oleksandrivka to Orikhuvatka and to Pumping Station No. 2 (Siverskyi Donets — Donbas canal) have so far been unsuccessful. The enemy was able to advance in this direction from the western outskirts of Rai-Oleksandrivka only by 0.8-1 km, but then apparently encountered difficulties, likely related to the necessity for their assault groups to move further to the canal through fairly open terrain.
– The advance of the forward units and subdivisions of the Russian 3rd AC, operating on both sides of the Sloviansk-Bakhmut road, continues to develop in the tactical zone. There, Russian assault groups have managed to progress from Fedorivka Druha along the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal to Yurkivka and reach the northern outskirts of Zapovidne.
– Additionally, the forces and assets of the 3rd AC moving towards Kramatorsk are currently trying to establish their forward assault groups (units) already west of the canal in Tykhonivka and Malynivka, to subsequently continue advancing towards Vasyutynske and Pershomarivka. Russian command is also making similar efforts in the Markove-Bilokuzmynivka direction.
Thus, it can be stated that Ukrainian troops in the Sloviansk (and partially in the Kramatorsk) direction have not yet managed to stabilize the situation at the tactical level. The enemy retains the ability to further advance its forward assault groups (units) on several tactical sectors and directions. Additionally, the pace of their actual progress remains quite threatening.
It is evident that in the near future, the command of the Russian 3rd AC will attempt to simultaneously achieve several tactical objectives within its advance zone, including:
– Reaching the Mykolaivka-Stardubivka line (i.e., breaking through to the Sloviansk TPP area), which will significantly complicate the situation for the AFU in the Lyman direction.
– Capturing Orikhuvatka and the area of pump station No. 2 on the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas canal, which, combined with achieving the first goal, will allow Russian forces to reach the immediate approaches to Sloviansk.
– Breaking through to the Vasylivska Pustosh-Vasyutynske line, which will enable Russian forces to reach the immediate approaches to Kramatorsk.
Currently, the Russian 3rd AC, with the main forces of its forward parts and units, has reached the following lines and areas:
– Kryva Luka-Rai-Oleksandrivka,
– Lypivka-Dibrova,
– Markove-Minkivka,
– and reached the area northwest of Pryvillia.
At the same time, the aforementioned “penetrations” into the battle formations of the forward Ukrainian units and subdivisions by numerous Russian assault groups, although they do not provide the Russian forces with stable control over these areas (in this sense, one can talk only about a sort of “gray zone”), nonetheless create conditions for further advancement of the main forces of the forward parts and formations of the Russian 3rd AC in the Sloviansk direction. Since its command almost always strives to immediately and rapidly increase the number of assault infantry precisely in those areas where these groups have already managed to gain a foothold, this sharply increases the overall chances for a successful offensive of the main forces of its forward units and subdivisions.
At the same time, despite the fact that this way of organizing and conducting an offensive in the tactical zone is quite slow and “costly” (as it requires almost CONSTANT or at least more or less regular replenishment of significant losses in the personnel of these assault groups, especially in the context of the massive use of tactical drones by the Ukrainian Armed Forces), the command of the Russian 3rd ZVA strives to apply this “methodology” on the maximum possible number of sections along the front. In practice, this means it tries to minimize the use of one of the main principles of “classical” military art — the need to concentrate one’s efforts as much as possible during an offensive, specifically in a limited number of critically important sectors from an operational point of view.
This rather “non-trivial” method employed by the command of the Russian 3rd ZVA has quite a logical and adequate explanation. Evidently, they know that the advanced Ukrainian units and subdivisions currently operating within their offensive strip are experiencing a significant shortage of personnel, forcing them to operate in rather “sparse” combat formations, creating numerous zones and gaps in the so-called “interpositional space.”
Therefore, increasing the number and overall level of intensity of “penetrating” actions by assault infantry (preferably on the widest possible front) gives the command of the Russian 3rd ZVA an additional opportunity to significantly increase the chances of greater effectiveness of such actions. This is because, under such conditions, the Ukrainian command not only lacks the necessary forces and means to counter these relatively “small” scale “infiltrations” by the enemy, but also simply does not have the time to do so due to their high number and practical continuity. This is true even with the mass use of strike and reconnaissance drones by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the tactical zone.
Since such sections are often either poorly covered by fire or not covered at all due to their extent, the successful and effective use of Ukrainian drones against enemy assault groups, attempting to “penetrate” almost “without sleep and rest,” is often limited by a whole set of objective and subjective factors. Starting from the climatic conditions in the given area (fog, intense precipitation, strong winds, etc.), landscape (availability of natural and artificial shelters, concealed approach routes, etc.), to active and passive countermeasures by the enemy.
In other words, the command of the Russian 3rd ZVA, as well as the entire UV “South,” is trying to take advantage of the moment (specifically the fact that it currently plays one of the main roles in the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk offensive operation and therefore has a significant priority over other Russian groups and armies in terms of personnel replenishment and the use of reserves) and hopes as of “now,” having a numerical advantage in assault infantry, to simply “outrun” the insufficiently numerous advanced units and subdivisions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces operating in this direction.
However, in this context, it should be noted that any teams of Russian “assault runners,” even the most prepared and equipped, have one very unpleasant feature for the Russian command. They end sooner or later (ideally, of course, when this happens sooner).
Especially if, in addition to the already organized intensive influence in the tactical zone of Ukrainian aerial drones, SOMETHING ground-based is added. For example, “dense” and regularly updated minefields (mine explosive barriers), a modern system of ground sensors located precisely in this “inter-positional space” and supplemented with various sets of automated defeat systems, etc. And if all of this is combined with aerial drones into a single tactical reconnaissance-fire “complex” and, of course, add “a bit” of the actual Ukrainian infantry, then in this case the Russian “stormtroopers-runners” will clearly not be envied…
Because in this case, it will become increasingly difficult for them to secretly and freely pass, run, and crawl into the tactical rear of the forward Ukrainian units, as the number and length of poorly controlled “inter-positional space” sections in their combat formations will begin to significantly decrease.
Only a “small matter” remains – to implement and scale all this to the level necessary for a complete and total cessation of these Russian “runs.” Moreover, it is clear that this issue needs to take into account not only the already deployed volumes of Russian assault infantry but also their hypothetical “mobilization” increase in the near future.
To me, the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk direction is very suitable as “experimental” in this sense. At least its relevance currently, in the context of the ongoing offensive activity of the enemy, looks quite convincing and obvious.
Photo: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
