Today — Zaporizhzhia direction.
1. Composition of enemy forces and means (Russian troops) operating in this direction.
Their core mainly consists of troops (forces) from the Russian operational-strategic grouping “Dnepr,” which operates in two separate operational directions — the Pridneprovsky (Kherson) and Zaporizhzhia themselves.
Currently, the main efforts of its command are concentrated on the latter, i.e., on the right flank of the entire operational zone of this grouping — in the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) sector. Besides the 58th CAA troops (forces) themselves, airborne troops (VDV) units and formations are also engaged, assigned to it to operate on the most important operational-tactical sections and directions, as well as part of the 18th CAA forces. Specifically:
58th CAA
– The 19th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) operates together with its main forces — the 392nd, 429th, and 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiments (MRR).
– The 42nd Motorized Rifle Division has 3 “line” regiments — the 70th, 71st, and 291st MRR + 2 “Chechen” ones — the 270th MRR “Akhmat — Kavkaz” and the 78th Motorized Special Purpose Regiment (MTP SpP) “Akhmat — Sever.” Directly in the Zaporizhzhia direction, units of the first three + 270th MRR “Akhmat — Kavkaz” are recorded, and there is a possibility of the presence of separate units of the 78th MTP SpP.
– The 136th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (SMRB).
– Combined regimental tactical groups (TG) from the 4th and 201st military bases (MB) of the Russian Federation, respectively from Tskhinvali (South Ossetia) and Dushanbe, Kulob, and Bokhtar (Tajikistan).
18th CAA
– Operates mainly with parts and units from its “mobilization” 47th MRD — the 1152nd, 1153rd, and 1154th MRR of territorial troops (TrT), formed in Crimea. At least one of its three regiments undoubtedly operates in the Zaporizhzhia direction.
Airborne Troops (VDV)
– The 7th Air Assault Division (AAD) operates in the Zaporizhzhia direction with at least two of its “regular” regiments — the 108th and 247th Air Assault Regiments (AAR).
– The 76th Air Assault Division (104th, 234th, and 237th AAR), according to “external indicators,” operates in this direction with its main forces, although, possibly, part of the division is engaged in another direction.
– The 45th Separate Special Purpose Brigade (SSPB) of the airborne troops — probably engaged with separate units, the same as the 104th AAD.
In addition to the aforementioned forces and means, units of the 100th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade (SRB) and units of several “motorized rifle regiments TrT,” such as the 1445th, 1119th, etc., are recorded in the 58th CAA sector.
This week, several sources simultaneously reported on the regrouping of additional enemy forces and resources in this direction as part of the Russian command’s preparation for a “major offensive on Zaporizhzhia” in the spring and summer of this year. However, I currently have no reliable information about the movement of any significant Russian formations into the zone of the Russian 58th Army Corps.
In this context, I can only suggest that the command of the “Dnepr” group may be attempting to reinforce this direction by reallocating units from the Dnipro (Kherson) direction, for example, by moving additional units from the 104th Airborne Division or the 49th Army Corps (205th Motorized Rifle Brigade) to the 58th Army Corps’ zone.
2. Current Situation
Currently, in the zone of the 58th Army Corps, Russian troops are conducting low-intensity offensive/assault operations in the tactical zone, trying to resume the advance of their forward (assault) units towards Zaporizhzhia, mainly acting from the lines of Prymorske — Stepnohirsk and Stepove — Mali Shcherbaky. Additionally, in the zone of the 76th Airborne Division, the enemy regularly attempts to fully capture Mala Tokmachka and advance towards Orikhiv. However, as of the evening of March 17, 2026, they have not achieved significant success in this endeavor. Specifically:
- Forward units of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division of the 58th Army Corps (likely supported by elements of the 47th Motorized Rifle Division and the 7th Airborne Division) made several concerted attempts to reclaim positions in Prymorske, which were lost due to several successful counterattacks by the Armed Forces of Ukraine a bit earlier. These attempts were made by the enemy using the dried-up riverbed of the Kakhovka Reservoir to bypass the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the flank. This did not bring them much success, although presumably a few Russian “infiltrators” managed to “get ashore” near Horkoho Street and hide there.
- In the area of Stepnohirsk, stubborn stand-off battles continue, the enemy (likely units of the 47th Motorized Rifle Division supported by separate units of the 108th Airborne Regiment of the 7th Airborne Division) attempted to eliminate the penetration of the Armed Forces of Ukraine into the central part of the city, advancing from the traffic circle located west of Stepnohirsk along Radianska Street towards Molodizhna Street. This did not help them.
- In the direction of Stepove — Pavlivka, Russian troops (likely units of the 247th Airborne Regiment of the 7th Airborne Division) made several attempts of assault actions (likely to “return” to Pavlivka and secure there with more or less significant forces).
Overall, in Prymorske, Russian troops continue to steadily hold only a small strip of territory around Pokrovska Street in the southern part of this settlement.
Currently, most of Stepnohirsk is considered a “gray zone.” The Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to hold its northern part (north of Radianska Street), although in several areas they managed to push back Russian infantry groups to the area of the “high-rises” in the south of Stepnohirsk.
These efforts did not bring significant results to the Russian troops even tactically. The enemy only managed to push forward the infantry groups of the Armed Forces of Ukraine north of Stepove by a few hundred meters.
– In turn, after several unsuccessful attempts to fully gain control of Mala Tokmachka and the adjacent area from the west, the units of the 76th Air Assault Division are likely to shift their main efforts to the northeast (along the line of Bielohirya – Lupivske), trying to support an offensive on the adjacent flank of the Russian 5th and 35th Combined Arms Armies, which are operating southwest of Huliaipole and have recently managed to advance in the areas of Myrne and north of Zahirne.
– Southwest of Orikhiv, the Russian command continues to amass assault infantry, likely preparing for activity in the directions of Nesterianka — Orikhiv and Shcherbaky — Novopavlivka. It is quite possible that units and subunits of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 58th Combined Arms Army will be used for this purpose.
Currently, it is evident that the enemy will have to make significant efforts to secure these actions from the western flank.
Regarding the penetration of individual Russian troops and their “very small” infantry groups into the tactical depth of the battle formations of the front-line units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, such “infiltrators” have been detected not only in Prymorske but also in Lukianivske, east of Stepnohirsk, and in several areas north of the Stepove-Shcherbaky line.
By themselves, they do not pose a significant threat, as they are forced to focus primarily on their own survival rather than active offensive/assault actions. However, if there is a delay in their “clearing” and elimination, the enemy’s tactical command, knowing their location, gains the opportunity to gather them there, not only persistently sending more “infiltrators” to follow in their footsteps but also organizing their supply and logistical support (ammunition, food, water, etc.) via tactical UAVs. In this case, sooner or later, their numbers become “critical,” and they then become more active, attacking the positions and strongpoints of the defense system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the rear and flank, particularly in the tactical depth of their battle formations.
The problem is that the Armed Forces of Ukraine simply do not have enough combat-ready infantry not only to hold forward positions but also to timely “clear” these “infiltrators.” All this is sharply complicated by the active use of tactical UAVs by both sides. Therefore, in several cases, they not only survive but also accumulate in critical quantities for the defense system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in specific areas and directions precisely because the corresponding algorithm of “detection – destruction/clearing” works either with a delay or not at all.
3. Further Prospects for the Development of the Situation
In this sense, I would highlight several factors that, in my opinion, will have a very significant impact on the whole situation in the Zaporizhzhia direction in the more or less short term. Namely:
– It is evident that the Russian command in the Zaporizhzhia direction will soon have to resolve a certain dilemma related to choosing what is more important for them at the moment – the elimination of the Orikhiv defense district of the Armed Forces of Ukraine or a breakthrough to the approaches to Zaporizhzhia from the south along the Dnipro, as well as independently understanding how to accomplish each of these tasks.
From the perspective of operational art, the advancement of Russian troops in a relatively narrow strip (between Stepnohirsk and the channel of the former Kakhovka Reservoir), even without considering the fact that Orikhiv and its surroundings are still under the stable control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, appears, let’s say, somewhat “contradictory.”
Moreover, there is a significant water obstacle in the form of the Konka River (in its lower course), where a powerful defense line of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is located (I suspect, along the entire length from Malokaterynivka to Komyshuvakha and further east).
In this sense, even the “fall” of Stepnohirsk (and I remind you, it is far from having “fallen,” moreover, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have carried out several effective counterattacks there, further narrowing the already narrow strip of Russian troops’ advance along the Dnipro) does not fundamentally resolve anything. After all, as long as the Armed Forces of Ukraine hold the Orikhiv defense area, the troops of the Russian 58th Army, stretched along this narrow strip along the Dnipro, will constantly be under the threat of being “cut off” (in other words, under constant threat of counterattacks by the Armed Forces of Ukraine) from the right flank. Additionally, the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to hold several positions slightly north of Lobkove, which are already beyond this flank of the Russian units that broke through to Prymorske.
This means that the Russian command, in order to reach the outskirts of Zaporizhzhia, will be FORCED to attempt to advance within the 58th Army’s strip on as wide a front as possible, which, in turn, will lead to a situation where the immutable laws of operational art begin to “turn” not in its favor, since in this case, the evident dispersion of Russian forces and resources in the 58th Army’s strip will begin. In this regard, the advance of Russian troops from the Stepove-Shcherbaky line to the north, towards Pavlivka and Novoyakovlivka, becomes critically important for the further advance of the Russian 58th Army.
Moreover, the situation may worsen even more if the Russian command tries to tackle both tasks simultaneously (a breakthrough towards Zaporizhzhia and the elimination of the Orikhiv defense area of the Armed Forces of Ukraine). After all, in such a case, the 58th Army command will be forced to stretch its front of advance even more, as it will have to use the forces and resources needed to flank the 58th Army’s advance along the Dnipro from the west.
Based on all of the above, the credibility of reports that the Russian command will try to “break through to Orikhiv” soon is quite high. Given an adequate assessment of the situation in the Zaporizhzhia direction, it currently has only one possible solution, if, of course, it still has the “strong desire” to see the DniproHES with its own eyes — to first attempt to capture Orikhiv and the surrounding area, and only then attempt to move from the south to the north along the Dnipro towards Zaporizhzhia.
– Moreover, to fulfill all these “desires” of the Russian “commanders,” they will need a true flood of troops. Furthermore, they need to be fresh and combat-ready.
Currently, in the operational-strategic sense, the corresponding level of the Russian military command prefers the Eastern Operational Group over the Dnipro Operational Group, logically assuming that the further advance of the former may (has a chance to) quickly eliminate all these issues with Orikhiv by a simple breakthrough to it from the east. It is there that the lion’s share of reinforcements, strategic and other reserves are concentrated, combat formations are strengthened, and operational troop formations are organized, etc. At the same time, it seems they’ve even decided to involve the 76th Air Assault Division from the Dnipro Operational Group, having placed it on the joint flank for both groups.
The issue for the Russian command is “only” that all of this is “read” by the Ukrainian command as well, and recently they quite successfully inserted a couple of sensitive stabilizing “crutches” into the lines of the 36th and 29th CAA of the “Vostok” group, creating, shall we say, certain inconveniences on the northern flank for the main strike army of the “Vostok” group (5th CAA). Although this did not result in a complete halt of the advance on Orikhiv from the side of Huliaipole, it significantly slowed it down.
In the previous review of the Zaporizhzhia direction, I already wrote that if there is a simultaneous attempt by the 58th CAA to advance along the Dnipro with an attempt to “storm” Orikhiv, the command of the “Dnipro” group will still be forced to “reallocate” its other operational direction of the Prydniprovske (Kherson) to gain additional forces and means for the Zaporizhzhia direction. After all, under conditions when it’s also necessary to advance on Kostyantynivka, Lyman (and then, likely, Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, attempting “among other things” to capture Dobropillia, Kupiansk, and a few kilometers of the border territory in the Sumy and Kharkiv regions), the Russian command will find it quite difficult to “find additional reserves” for the “Dnipro” group.
– And the third factor directly affecting the current situation in the Zaporizhzhia direction is the level of offensive potential of both Russian groups operating towards Zaporizhzhia and in the Huliaipole direction. Considering this, it is evident that they clearly are not in an optimal state.
In reality, at the moment, the “Dnipro” group has stalled (although in some areas the 58th CAA continues to attack, evidently trying to resume its advance), and the “Vostok” group is still “crawling” forward (I mean, towards Orikhiv), but very, very slowly, sometimes with daily advances measured in hundreds or even tens of meters.
In other words, before the “leap to DniproHES,” the Russian command needs to RESTORE this offensive potential in both of its groups, not to mention augmenting it.
Based on the prevailing current method in the Russian military of organizing and conducting an offensive at the tactical level, it’s obvious that this potential lies primarily in the infantry. That is, to break through to Zaporizhzhia (and in any other direction), the Russian command urgently needs a LARGE quantity of human resources. The question of where to get them literally by TOMORROW is rhetorical, because for a summer campaign, a hypothetical mobilization in Russia is ALREADY LATE, as mobilized troops still need to be properly PREPARED for the offensive (equipped, clothed, armed, supplied, fed, and at least minimally trained). This requires money, resources, and most importantly, time. For this year’s summer offensive, mobilization should have been carried out no later than the past winter…
Therefore, I personally have a rather interesting question — WHO exactly is the Russian command planning to attack Zaporizhzhia with this spring and summer?
Photo: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
