Information on current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 18.03.2026.
1. Ukrainian strikes continue to dismantle the Russian fuel infrastructure.
– After the March 16 attack by four drones, the oil depot in Labinsk, Krasnodar Krai, is practically destroyed.
– A large-scale fire broke out at the facility covering an area of about 3,000 m². The fire destroyed 18 out of 20 tanks — nine with gasoline and nine with diesel fuel, as well as seven fuel trucks. The operation of the enterprise has been completely halted.
– Despite local authorities’ claims of a “stable situation,” the fire has been ongoing for several days, indicating serious damage. This oil depot was one of the key ones in the region: its capacity allowed for the storage of up to 9,000 cubic meters of fuel and supplied several southern regions of Russia.
– The actual destruction of such a facility means not only direct infrastructure losses but also additional pressure on fuel supply logistics — another blow to the logistical support of the Russian economy and army.
2. Russia’s oil and gas revenues in March will fall by 52% year-on-year.
– Oil and gas revenues to the federal budget of the Russian Federation in March 2026 will decrease by about 52% y/y — to about 520 billion rubles ($6.4 billion).
– Key factors are lower oil prices in the accounting period and the strengthening of the ruble, which reduces ruble earnings for exporters. Despite the sharp rise in global oil prices (≈+40% since late February) due to escalation in the Middle East and the effective blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, this effect has not yet been reflected in Russia’s revenues.
– The reason is the time lag in tax calculations: they are based on prices from the previous month. For January–March, revenues may total only 1.34 trillion rubles compared to 2.64 trillion rubles a year earlier — effectively halving.
– Given that oil and gas revenues form about a quarter of the budget and are critical for war funding, such dynamics increase fiscal risks. Even a favorable external environment does not give a quick effect, highlighting the structural vulnerability of Russian finances.
– The annual plan of 8.918 trillion rubles is looking increasingly unrealistic without additional pressure on the industry or use of reserves.
3. Russian “Rusal” suffered annual losses due to rising costs and declining aluminum production.
– The Russian aluminum giant Rusal reported a net loss of $455 million in 2025, compared to a profit of $803 million the previous year.
– The key reasons are a sharp increase in costs and a reduction in primary aluminum production. Despite a 22.6% increase in revenue (to $14.81 billion), the financial result worsened due to an imbalance between income and expenses.
– The cost of goods sold increased even faster — by 32.3%, particularly due to the rising cost of alumina and overall increases in production chain expenses.
– Additional pressure comes from sanction restrictions: although there are no direct sanctions against the company, Western consumers increasingly refuse new contracts. The EU’s decision to limit imports of Russian aluminum also narrows sales markets.
– The attempt to reorient towards Asian markets partially compensates for losses but does not solve the structural problem: Russian exports are increasingly dependent on discounts and politically vulnerable directions.
– Even the rise in global aluminum prices failed to save profitability, highlighting the deterioration of the industry’s economics in Russia. As a result, Rusal is entering a phase of declining margins — another signal of systemic pressure on the Russian raw materials sector.
4. The Russian economy has recorded the first decline in business activity since fall 2022.
– As of February, the Business Climate Indicator (BCI) fell to -0.1 points from 0.2 the previous month — effectively entering the contraction zone (below zero).
– The last negative value was recorded in September 2022 after the announcement of mobilization, when the indicator fell to -1.1 points.
– The deterioration was driven by current business assessments: they fell from -7.8 to -9.4 points — to levels previously seen only during acute crises, such as at the onset of full-scale war. Meanwhile, company expectations remain detached from reality and even increased — from 8.3 to 9.6 points.
– The BCI signals an actual halt in economic growth. Similar values were previously recorded either during the pandemic or in shock periods of 2022.
– With such low evaluations of the current state, the economy usually either enters a recession or balances on the edge of stagnation. The Russian economy, despite official statements of “resilience,” is losing momentum and returning to crisis scenarios.
5. Russian businesses are massively moving to cash due to increased tax pressure.
– In Russia, there is a sharp increase in the use of cash — businesses are increasingly offering customers payments “off the books” to minimize tax burdens.
– Since the beginning of 2026, every second Russian has been offered cash payments, and every third has encountered this repeatedly. Meanwhile, 18% receive such offers regularly. In a third of cases, businesses encourage cash payments with discounts or bonuses.
– These practices are most common in small shops — 46%, markets and fairs — 45%, and the private service sector — 21%. The return to cash is linked with increased fiscal pressure: VAT hikes, insurance contributions review, and lowering the threshold for its payment even for small businesses.
– In effect, this signals the expansion of the shadow economy. Instead of an increase in tax revenues, the state receives the opposite effect — an increasing number of transactions fall out of control, undermining the stability of Russia’s budget system.
6. The conflict around Iran begins to impact Russian aviation: Russian airlines risk being left without critically important aircraft parts amid new logistical disruptions.
– Due to the escalation in the region and risks to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, usual “grey” supply channels are disrupted. Previously, a significant portion of components reached Russia via Dubai, but now these routes are effectively blocked or significantly complicated.
– As a result, carriers are forced to urgently rework logistics through China and Central Asian countries, which increases the time and cost of supply — even amid sanctions and failed import substitution efforts. This mostly affects “consumable materials,” without which regular airplane operation becomes problematic.
– An additional blow is to engine maintenance. Some Russian airlines serviced their engines in Iran, but now these opportunities are sharply limited.
– Problems are already manifesting practically. Charter carrier Azur Air has recorded a series of incidents of engine failures and even fires since the beginning of the year. The Russian aviation authority has restricted the company’s operator certificate until June 8, 2026, threatening full annulment if violations recur.
– The situation demonstrates a systemic issue: Russian civil aviation, cut off from legal supplies and technologies, increasingly relies on unstable schemes — which collapse at the first geopolitical jolt.
7. RZD cuts thousands of workers due to losses and a decline in shipments.
– The state monopoly “Russian Railways” plans to lay off about 6,000 employees, or 15% of the central office, including branch managers. The decision was made amid a sharp deterioration in financial condition and a prolonged decline in freight traffic.
– The company seeks to save about 74 billion rubles by 2026 through layoffs, cutting fuel, electricity, and repair costs, as well as restructuring the management system.
– At the same time, this is just a reaction to deeper problems: for the first time since 2020, Russian Railways reported a net loss of 4.4 billion rubles, compared to a profit of 44 billion the previous year. Total debt neared $50 billion, and interest expenses are rapidly increasing.
– The key factor is the decline in freight traffic, which directly reflects the state of the economy. In 2025, transport volumes dropped to 1.1 billion tons — the lowest since 2009. This is a result of sanctions, market losses, and a general decline in industrial activity.
– The company has already cut its investment program by a quarter and begun selling assets. In effect, Russian Railways is shifting into survival mode, signaling a systemic contraction of Russia’s economic base and further deterioration of logistics capabilities.
8. Russia attempts to exploit Cuba’s fuel crisis, but the effect is limited.
– Russian oil may partially ease the worst fuel crisis in Cuba in decades, yet this “aid” is more situational and political than of systemic importance.
– A tanker with approximately 700-730 thousand barrels of Russian Urals crude oil is heading from the Baltic to the Cuban port of Matanzas. This may be the first major delivery in the last three months — the longest pause in fuel supply to the island in at least 12 years.
– However, even if the cargo arrives, the effect will be delayed: it involves crude oil, which still needs to be refined. This takes up to a month, while Cuba is already in a state of acute shortage — the country’s energy system has effectively collapsed, leaving millions without electricity.
– For Russia, such supply is not so much an economic breakthrough as an attempt to maintain political influence in traditional areas of presence. The volumes are insignificant on a global scale, and logistics are complicated by American pressure and risks to shipping.
– Moreover, the very need to look for such “windows of opportunity” indicates the limitedness of markets for Russian oil. Instead of stable exports to large solvent markets, Russia increasingly has to work with crisis-stricken or sanction-vulnerable partners, which increases risks and reduces the long-term sustainability of the export model.
9. Russian oil loses stable markets: deliveries are chaotically redirected between China and India.
– Russian oil flows are becoming increasingly unpredictable: tankers with Urals oil have begun changing their routes while en route. Specifically, the vessel Aqua Titan, which was heading to China, has turned around in the South China Sea and is now heading to India.
– Such cases are not isolated — at least seven tankers have altered their course from China to India. This indicates a lack of stable demand and a forced “manual” restructuring of logistics in real-time. Formally, the reason was a temporary easing of restrictions, which allowed India to sharply increase purchases — to about 30 million barrels per week. However, such volatility only underscores the vulnerability of Russian exports: Moscow is forced to rely on situational decisions and geopolitical fluctuations.
– Notably, China, which in recent months has effectively been the “buyer of last resort,” no longer guarantees stable demand. As a result, Russian oil is forced to “search” for a buyer during transportation, increasing costs, risks, and reducing delivery efficiency.
– Even the potential return of other Asian buyers does not change the fundamental problem: Russia’s export model increasingly resembles a crisis — with discounts, unstable routes, and dependency on the political decisions of third countries.
10. Greece is overtaking Russia’s role as Europe’s gas hub.
– Greece is strengthening its position as a key energy hub for Central and Southeastern Europe amid the EU’s systematic rejection of Russian gas. The country, which previously remained on the periphery of the energy market, is transforming into one of the centers of Europe’s new gas architecture.
– The operator DESFA is promoting a “vertical gas corridor” to Romania and Ukraine, forming an alternative to the supply of Russian gas. LNG plays a key role: the US has already become the dominant supplier, providing over 86% of Greece’s imports by 2025.
– This means effectively displacing Russia even from those market segments where it previously retained influence. Infrastructure is rapidly expanding: terminals are operational in Revithoussa and near Alexandroupolis, and Helleniq Energy plans a new floating terminal in Thessaloniki.
– A new energy center is already forming in the country, increasingly independent of fossil fuels from Russia. In a broader context, this is another blow to Moscow’s position: Europe is not just reducing Russian gas imports but building an alternative infrastructure that makes Russia’s return to this market structurally unlikely even after the war ends.
