Information on the current losses of the RF due to sanctions as of 17.03.2026.
1. Ukrainian drones attacked an aircraft repair plant in the Novgorod region of the RF.
– Last night, the 123rd aviation repair plant in the city of Staraya Russa, Novgorod region, was attacked. This plant services the military transport aviation of Russia’s Aerospace Forces.
– The enterprise performs repair, modernization, and maintenance of military aircraft, including Il-76, Il-78, and L-410, as well as D-30KP, AI-20 engines, and auxiliary power units TG-16M. According to Russian aviation monitoring channels, two A-50 long-range radar detection and control aircraft might have been located at the facility.
– If damage to infrastructure or equipment is confirmed, this could affect Russia’s ability to repair and service military transport aviation.
2. The ruble fell to multi-month lows despite rising oil prices.
– The Russian ruble continues to weaken for the fifth consecutive week, despite a sharp rise in oil prices. Russian oil in RF ports is sold for more than $70 per barrel, and in India for nearly $100; however, this did not support the national currency’s exchange rate.
– In Moscow trading, the yuan rate reached 11.84 rubles — the highest since early September last year. On the OTC market, the dollar rose to 81.51 rubles — the highest level since late December, and the euro surpassed 93 rubles for the first time since January.
– Since the beginning of March, the ruble has lost 6% against the yuan, 5% against the dollar, and 2.5% against the euro, finishing four consecutive weeks in the negative — something not seen for at least half a year.
– The ruble’s weakening occurs due to a reduction in currency support from the state. The Russian Ministry of Finance suspended currency sales from the National Wealth Fund under the budget rule to preserve reserve balances, a significant portion of which has already been spent covering the budget deficit.
– As a result, the market effectively lost a significant volume of regular currency supply, which increased pressure on the ruble. According to estimates, the supply volume could have decreased by approximately 200 billion rubles.
– An additional factor is a structural problem: a strong ruble is incompatible with Russia’s chronic budget deficit, creating long-term pressure on the national currency.
3. Russia is trying to take advantage of the oil price surge.
– Due to the sharp increase in global oil prices caused by escalation in the Middle East and risks to shipping, Russia accelerated crude oil shipments.
– Moscow is trying to make the most of a short “window of opportunity” while the American tariff exemption for Russian oil shipments loaded before March 12 is in effect. The average sea export of Russian oil for the four weeks up to March 15 increased to 3.44 million barrels per day, which is 90,000 b/d more than before.
– In the last week, the figure reached 3.97 million barrels per day — the highest in approximately three months. This is partly due to the resumption of the port of Novorossiysk after attacks by Ukrainian drones, as well as increased shipments from Arctic and Pacific ports.
– Russia’s revenues have also increased. Gross export revenue for the week up to March 15 is estimated at approximately $2.07 billion, which is $890 million more than the previous week. The average four-week figure is about $1.38 billion per week — the maximum since October.
– The main volumes are directed to Asia. Flows to this region have reached 3.17 million barrels per day, with a significant portion of cargoes formally having “unknown” destinations and being redirected to India while en route.
– Deliveries to Turkey amount to about 160,000 b/d, to Syria about 90,000 b/d. At the same time, this dynamic underscores the growing dependence of Russian oil exports on market factors and a narrow circle of buyers.
– Without temporary geopolitical shocks and bypass schemes, Russian oil revenues remain vulnerable to sanction pressures and restrictions on global markets.
4. In Russia, levels of depression and anxiety are rising.
– The psychological state of Russians is noticeably deteriorating. According to monitoring by the Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences conducted in February 2026, the level of financial anxiety and psychological distress has increased in all socio-economic groups.
– Symptoms of depression were noted by 42% of respondents, and 27% reported difficult-to-control anxiety. Overall, 31% of Russians have pronounced anxiety-depressive symptoms. Researchers link this to economic pessimism, war fatigue, and decreasing expectations of its quick resolution.
– Financial problems are becoming an increasingly important factor of psychological pressure. 66% of Russians feel anxious about their finances — in December, this was 60%.
– The most significant increase in concern was recorded among public sector employees and residents of large cities. Anxiety about inflation is also rising. 84% of respondents are concerned about rising prices — this is 7 percentage points more than in the fall of 2025.
– Meanwhile, 60% of Russians consider the continuation of the war in 2026 to be the most likely scenario, which heightens expectations of a prolonged economic crisis and forces the population to prepare for a long period of instability.
5. The European Commission has refused to ease restrictions on Russian energy resources.
– The European Union does not plan to change its course on rejecting Russian energy, despite the energy crisis. This was stated by Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen during a meeting of energy ministers in Brussels.
– According to him, rejecting Russian oil and gas remains a fundamental position of the EU, as importing energy resources from Russia effectively means financing the war against Ukraine. Jørgensen emphasized that Europe has been overly dependent on Russian energy for too long, allowing Moscow to use it as a tool of political pressure.
– “It would be a mistake to repeat what we did in the past. In the future, we will not import a single molecule from Russia,” he stressed.
– Even amid instability in energy markets, the EU demonstrates readiness to maintain a firm stance on energy cooperation with Russia.
6. Hungary has urged the EU to lift tariffs on Russian and Belarusian fertilizers.
– Hungary has appealed to the European Union to temporarily lift tariffs and additional charges on the import of fertilizers from Russia and Belarus. Budapest explains this by the sharp increase in prices and the risk of shortages due to the war in the Middle East.
– In a letter to the European Commission, Agriculture Minister István Nagy warned that the rising cost of fertilizers could hit EU farmers and push up food prices.
– According to him, Hungary produces only nitrogen fertilizers and depends on the import of phosphorus and potassium, increasing the risk of reduced yields. Budapest’s initiative contradicts the current EU policy, which in 2025 increased tariffs to limit Russia’s export revenues.
– Despite this, the supply volume was estimated at approximately €2 billion in 2025, but at the beginning of 2026 it sharply decreased. Additional pressure on the market is created by supply disruptions and rising energy costs, particularly due to risks for shipping in the Strait of Hormuz region.
– In addition, Hungary also advocates for easing restrictions on the import of Russian gas, but this position is currently rejected in Brussels.
7. Chinese state companies are once again considering purchasing Russian oil.
– China’s state oil giants are once again considering purchasing Russian oil after a multimonth pause. This week, the trading divisions of Chinese companies Sinopec and PetroChina sent inquiries to suppliers regarding potential deliveries for the first time since November.
– The renewed interest is linked to a temporary easing of US sanctions and disruptions in the global oil market due to the Middle East war.
– According to sources, Chinese companies are assessing whether they can strike deals within the 30-day transitional period counted from March 12 by the US.
– No contracts have been concluded so far, but traders expect that agreements may appear soon. Despite rising prices, Russian oil remains cheaper than alternative supplies from Brazil and West Africa.
– An additional demand factor is the shortage of raw materials for Asian refiners. Shipments of Russian ESPO Blend oil from the port of Kozmino are already being sold at a premium to the Brent benchmark due to high demand from refineries in China and India.
– At the same time, the situation indicates the instability of Russian exports: even traditional buyers return to negotiations only under temporary sanction relaxations and global market instability.
8. North Korea could have earned up to $14 billion from Russia’s war against Ukraine.
– North Korea could have earned up to $14.4 billion by sending military personnel and supplying weapons to Russia during the war against Ukraine.
– This estimate is included in a report by the Institute for National Security Strategy. According to the study, since October 2024, Kim Jong Un has sent military contingents to Russia at least four times, with the total number of military personnel sent exceeding 20,000.
– Overall, from August 2023 to December 2025, North Korea’s income from arms exports and participation in the war could range from $7.67 billion to $14.4 billion. Direct payments for sending military personnel — including salaries and compensation in case of death — are estimated at approximately $620 million per year.
– The report notes that the full payment of these funds effectively undermines the key goal of international sanctions against Pyongyang — restricting the inflow of foreign currency to the regime. In fact, Russia’s war against Ukraine has become a new source of financial income for North Korea.
