Today, we return to the format “briefly from different directions.”
1. Sumy (Northern Slobozhansky) Direction
Advanced enemy units (Russian troops) from the composition of the “Sever” group, having crossed the state border, continue to fortify in the border area on the territory of Sumy region, Ukraine, along the directions of Hrabovske — Riasne and Kolotyliivka — Pokrovka, trying to hold the border areas near the villages of Pokrovka, Popivka, Vysoke, Hrabovske.
Currently, they are trying to fully take control of the village of Pokrovka and advance to the village of Riasne. The depth of penetration of Russian troops into the territory of Sumy region, Ukraine, along these directions averages 1-2 km.
2. Southern Slobozhansky (Kharkiv, Vovchansk) Direction
Apparently, the advance of the forward units of the tactical group (TG) Russian troops “Belgorod/Kharkov” in recent weeks has been halted. Although the forward units of the 44th Army Corps (AC) and the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) continue their attempts to advance south along the eastern bank of the Siversky Donets River in the general direction of Synelnykove — Symynivka.
It is evident that the command of this TG is trying to create conditions for further advancement of their main forces in the direction of Vovchansk — Bily Kolodyaz, preliminarily covering them from the western flank.
It is clear that the counterattacks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the area of the village of Prilipka, which occurred during the battles for the area Synelnykove — Tzehelne — Vilcha — Lyman, had a corresponding effect — the forward infantry groups of the enemy, who broke through to Hrafts’ke and Symynivka (presumably from the 128th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade/omb), found themselves in a difficult tactical situation due to a sharp complication of their logistical support.
After all, the enemy is forced to supply its forward assault groups, which broke through to Hrafts’ke and Symynivka, through relatively narrow “corridors” which are essentially flanked by fire.
Moreover, it is clear that Russian troops cannot yet advance from Vovchansk in the southeast direction, as they are forced to continue fierce battles with the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the southeastern outskirts of the city, where the latter still hold several positions.
3. Kupiansk Direction
The shift of the main efforts by the command of Russian group “Zapad” in the Kupiansk area to the zone of the 47th Tank Division (TD) of the 1st Tank Army (TA) did not lead to a radical change in the situation in this direction.
Evidently, the assault units of the 153rd Tank Regiment (TR), as well as the 245th and 272nd Motorized Rifle Regiments (MRR) of the 47th TD, have not managed to break through to Kupiansk Vuzlovyi and thereby contribute to the division and elimination of the AFU bridgehead east of Kupiansk.
Moreover, units of the 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade, the 121st and 122nd Motorized Rifle Regiments of the 68th Motorized Rifle Division of the 6th Combined Arms Army were unable to “break” the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine along both banks of the Oskil from north to south in the area of the city of Kupiansk itself.
In this regard, after nearly a month of fierce battles, the enemy managed to advance 3.5-3.7 km in the direction of Stepova Novoselivka — Pishchane, acting along the railway leading to Kupiansk, but further advancement of the enemy towards Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi, Kivsharivka, and Kurylivka was halted. Separate small enemy infantry groups periodically penetrate the eastern outskirts of Kurylivka and attempt to gain a foothold on the northeastern outskirts of Kivsharivka, but there is no stable enemy control over these areas.
Attempts by the enemy to attack from north to south towards Lyman Pershyi — “Zaoskillia” (eastern district of Kupiansk), Lyman Pershyi — Kucheryvka, and Vilshana — Petropavlivka also did not bring them success. Battles in the area of Lyceum №7, “Oskol” stadium, the Milk Canning Plant, and the “Ambar” wholesale store continue without significant changes in the positions of the parties.
4. Dobropillia Direction
It is evident that recently the enemy’s “Center” Command has been forced to significantly limit the scope of its offensive actions in this direction. This primarily concerns the sector of its 51st Combined Arms Army.
Currently, the Russian command has concentrated its efforts in the sector of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, trying to break through to the approaches of Dobropillia from the south, mainly in the direction of Pokrovsk — Hryshyne.
At the same time, the 51st Combined Arms Army, whose units and formations suffered considerable losses in previous battles for Myrnohrad and the bridgehead at Kazennyi Torets, is forced to significantly limit its offensive actions, conducting sporadic attacks only in the directions of Rodynske — Shevchenko and Sukhetske — Bilytske, trying to direct them as close as possible to the main axis of the 2nd Combined Arms Army’s offensive Hryshyne — Novooleksandrivka. In other words, to cover the advance of the 2nd Combined Arms Army from the flank (namely, from the north).
In turn, in the directions of Dorozhne – Novyi Donbas, Nove Shakhove – Vilne, the enemy has somewhat reduced their attacking/assault actions, in some places almost to a minimum. Furthermore, having reached the quarries south of Kucheri Yar, the enemy has not yet made focused attempts to capture Kucheri Yar itself with significant forces, periodically acting to the north with only small infantry groups.
Meanwhile, the command of the 2nd Combined Arms Army of the “Center,” where, evidently, the Russian command of this group is currently concentrating its main efforts, is trying at any cost to break through to Novooleksandrivka through Hryshyne. They have tactical success. The advanced units of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, after a month of active and persistent battles for Hryshyne, managed to occupy it and approach Novoaleksandrivka from the east and south.
Additionally, the enemy continues to advance in the direction of Udachne — Serhiyivka, where their advanced units occupied a mine north of Udachne and approached Serhiyivka from the south.
It is evident that in the Dobropillia direction, in the near future, the enemy will try to break through to the northwest on the adjacent flanks of the 2nd and 51st Combined Arms Army and reach the area of Novohryshyne — Dobropillia (village) — Chernihivka — Shevchenko. That is, to reach the near approaches to the city of Dobropillia from the south.
However, a similar task from the southeast and east, which is likely supposed to be resolved by the 51st CAA, currently does not seem as “unambiguously solvable.” At least the intensity of attacks/assault actions in the sectors of both armies (2nd and 51st CAA) currently differs noticeably in this regard.
If the 2nd CAA (27th MSD, 15th, and 30th MRB), which is reinforced by part of the forces of the 41st CAA, is quite active, continues to accumulate assault infantry in the frontline units and subdivisions, and conducts determined and persistent offensive actions on various sections and directions, then the 51st CAA has actually limited such actions only to its left flank (adjacent to the 2nd CAA).
This means that at least in the operational zone of the UC “Center,” Russian forces can no longer SIMULTANEOUSLY break through to Dobropillia from the south, southeast, and east. That is, they are ALREADY forced to resolve this problem gradually, step by step.
It is likely that initially the 2nd CAA will break through from the side of Pokrovsk to the near approaches to Dobropillia from the south, then the main efforts of the UC “Center” command will obviously be shifted again to the 51st CAA’s sector, which has to solve a similar task from the east and southeast. After that, the assault on Dobropillia will actually begin.
However, at the moment, the offensive of the UC “Center” on Dobropillia does not seem entirely advisable from the point of view of operational necessity. This is apparently determined by the priority for the opponent (Russian forces) of the Slavyansko-Kramatorsk direction during its summer campaign.
Firstly, Dobropillia is clearly “not in that direction.”
Secondly, the encirclement and subsequent assault on Dobropillia will not only take up the opponent’s “acute shortage” of time but also divert significant forces and resources that could be used much more effectively in the context of the upcoming offensive operation on Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, on the Lyman, Slavyansk, or Kostyantynivka directions.
Thirdly, to break through to Dobropillia and subsequently organize and conduct its assault, it is obvious that the Russian command will have to reinforce specifically the UC “Center,” as this grouping, even before breaking through to Dobropillia, is ALREADY forced to limit its offensive actions in scale and scope due to a lack of its own forces (for example, the 51st CAA will have to be significantly reinforced to restore its ability to advance on a more or less wide front, and the 2nd CAA, after its HYPOTHETICAL breakthrough to the near approaches to Dobropillia from the south, as a result of which it is likely to suffer significant losses, will require similar manipulations as already needed for the 51st CAA now).
Photo: 5th Separate Heavy Mechanized Brigade
