So. October.
“Ukraine is facing decisive weeks. Therefore, I came to Kyiv today with the message: you can count on us.”
These are not the first “decisive weeks,” nor will they be the last. Such weeks have repeatedly emerged at various stages of the war. The words of the Chancellor of Germany, Friedrich Merz, perfectly set the “modality” and provide a pass to uncover the context: we are near another bifurcation point.
1. First: why it seems like “everything is bad.”
This is due to the coincidence of several factors.
In the spring, Ukraine gained a certain advantage in medium and long drone strikes (missiles aside, the advantage is with the Russians; there were expectations for ours, but they didn’t meet the declared timeline), which, besides its practical result, provided for a couple of months a morale-lifting picture (important in war).
All reservations that this advantage is temporary were naturally ignored. Well, that’s how psychology works.
By the fall, we reached a certain plateau: the Russians partially adapted (including becoming better at intercepting our drones and increasing the physical protection of objects), and the usual achievements began to be taken for granted.
The gasoline crisis in Russia hasn’t disappeared. It’s an important result. Just as noted in June-July, it has transitioned to a chronic phase. And this is not as spectacular.
The pace of energy facility destruction in the VOT has decreased. Why? Because there are fewer targets! Knocked out. The work hasn’t stopped, but who would be surprised by that?
A separate story is the work against Russian aviation. A lot of results at airfields. However, there’s no visibility.
Another package of targets is space objects and communication. Not to mention chemistry, petrochemicals, and more.
All of this has faded to the background because acute pain and vivid pictures narrow the focus.
This is the second (more important) factor: the Kremlin, faced with the lack of breakthrough achievements at the front, accelerated escalation against Ukrainian cities.
It’s painful for us. But such actions are actually a bad sign for Russia. They are trading strategy for tactics.
I emphasize once again: there is essentially no talk of “retaliatory strikes” from Moscow. This is an associated element of Russian aggression.
Stuck at the front – they ramp up strikes at the rear, especially since there is a technical solution (reactive drones) and a window of TEMPORARY advantage for Russia.
Now remember. In early July (!), that is, three months ago, Putin announced the “capture” of Kostyantynivka. What significant happened for the Russians on the front since then? The most notable – Putin falsely “captured” Sviatohirsk. But in fact, even with Kostyantynivka, there’s some “unsaid.”
There is certain pressure from Russians in the northeast of the Kharkiv region. There is maneuvering around Orikhiv and other points in the south. The Russian army has destroyed a couple more dozen villages and is turning Donbas into rubble. They are terrorizing Sumy, Kharkiv, Odesa, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Kherson…
What from this can Putin present as a spectacular victory?
Because there is another side.
2. Let’s take the most conservative estimate. For clarity – over a quarter, to show that this is not an anomaly, but rather some inertia.
Over the past three months (July-September) only SBS (!) inflicted losses of over 17 thousand killed (!!!) on the Russian army. And about the same number wounded. This is what is recorded on video.
SBS provides approximately 30-33% of verifiably confirmed Russian losses. That is, during the said period, Russia lost 50K+ killed and about the same number wounded. Total losses – around 110,000. I emphasize, this is a very conservative estimate.
The data from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is higher: in July, Russians lost 42+K, in August – 40+K, in September a record number – 46+K. Total number: 130+K.
Even if we take the average: how can the Kremlin justify (especially to foreign partners) the loss of about 120,000 people? With nothing.
Hence the shift in focus to the rear. Because there is nothing to bring to the negotiating table.
I will not focus on the operation in the Liman area, – specialists are extensively analyzing the details, the general outline can be read by Kostyantyn Mashovets.
I’ll just remind you that it all started in the spring with the demonstration of videos deep in the Russian rear – drones over temporarily occupied Luhansk, Donetsk, and Mariupol. Our troops seriously complicated the enemy’s logistics. And this work hasn’t gone anywhere. It will continue even when the operation formally ends.
As a result, the Russian army faced the risk of not securing the cities before winter and continuing to advance “from the fields.” Therefore, they are now assaulting as if there’s no tomorrow, to penetrate as much as possible.
For all outside observers, this means that in 2026 the operation to encircle the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration will definitely not be completed by Putin, and the fighting in a linear mode will continue at least until the summer.
This also means that conditional China will be able to economically exploit and pressure Russia for at least another year. Yes, Russians will burn more of our trains and post offices. But the war is taking on a rather complex character – for the Russian Federation, the positive agenda disappears entirely.
3. Usually, I start with our losses and victims. These reports are available, so I will not go into details now.
I will only note that, according to the UN, July and August 2026 became the bloodiest since 2022 in terms of civilian casualties.
In two months, the Russians killed over 800 people and wounded more than 5000. In September, Russians killed at least 200 people. That is, more than a thousand civilians killed and about 7.5 thousand wounded.
In July, the UN verified 17 Ukrainian children killed and 166 wounded. There were more only in 2022. This is Putin’s real “achievement.” And our pain…
In the economic sphere, the greatest (strategic) damage was done by the Russians to Ukrainian metallurgy. The problem is that restoring lost capacity is long and expensive. And a big question is whether support can be attracted for this.
Logic shows that the same Europeans are more likely to support the entomologists of the “Great Meadow” than metallurgists. But this is a question for the future and for specialists.
A very painful, but more tactical damage to agricultural producers, due to the blockade of exports. With de-escalation, a significant part can be regained here.
Retail chains, data centers, railways, medicine warehouses… This is all in the spotlight.
In summary. The difficult situation at the front and the reduced psychological effect of strikes on Russia, combined with the shift of Russian pressure to peaceful Ukrainian cities, ensured such a dramatic effect in terms of perception.
However, the dry statement of purely military facts does not show this drama. The conversion of pressure on the rear into destabilization of the front has at least not yet occurred.
Putin announced that after the farce with the “elections,” Russia would be ready to return to negotiations. But what is he going to bring? Repetition of the same demands without new arguments?
In June 2025, in the presence of Merz, Trump stated that sometimes you have to let the sides fight a little. A year has passed. Even more. The “Spirit of Anchorage” has managed to fade away. What has Putin achieved?
So, he is desperately preparing some groundwork for negotiations by the end of October.
Therefore, the coming weeks in the rear promise to be tough. Merz de facto openly stated this.
In October, a linear scenario predicts two massive Russian missile and drone strikes on Kyiv.
In November – a fork, including through the APEC summit, with polishing at the G20. Either acknowledgment of no shifts or a new turn.
4. Putin’s show of bravado in Valdai, pressure on Kyiv, and the escalation of “peacemaking” based on “neutrality” are explained by another factor, besides the need to present something in negotiations.
The Russian government presented a draft budget for 2027 with a framework until 2029. An intense public campaign on “blurring” this budget has been underway for several weeks. The attacks on bridges in Kyiv are also indirectly involved here.
If we sum up the assessments of quite loyal Russian (!) economists and market analysts, they are practically unanimous: such a budget is a war against Russia’s future.
The main expenditure item remains “defense” (media mistakenly portrayed some fantastic figures of military spending increase – this is a wrong interpretation).
The second largest block is servicing the national debt. The fact is, the debt situation is becoming increasingly fragile.
Real inflation and budget deficit indicators differ from official statements. High oil prices do not save because the Russian government is forced to allocate a significant portion of windfall revenues to oil companies to contain fuel prices (the damper). If this is not done, inflation will rise, the key rate will start growing again, and as a result, the debt will become even more expensive.
Even official Russian statistics show a sharp drop in profits and an increase in the loss-making of Russian companies in 2026. The number of defaults is rising, the number of bad debts is increasing, which the Central Bank of Russia is openly paying attention to: banks are increasing toxic “restructurings.”
The business’s own funds, along with budget injections, have been the primary source of investments in Russia. However, the budget for 2027 includes a series of levies aimed specifically at squeezing investors. The Kremlin intends to extract an additional 1.5 trillion rubles. For this purpose, VAT and several other parameters were raised last year.
This means the budget has fallen short, and Putin has squeezed the business dry, which provokes an accelerating decline in investments. This is what is called a war against the future. Because no military-industrial complex, regardless of inflated funding, can compensate for the functioning of a live economy. Clearly demonstrated in 2026.
The most amusing part: trying to downplay the damage from Ukrainian strikes, Putin stated at Valdai that strikes only on refineries caused damage equal to 1% of GDP. Apparently, he considered 1% to be an insignificantly small figure.
Even considering this minor amount, it’s 2+ trillion rubles. The entire growth of the Russian economy in 2026 was less than 1%.
And then there are marketplaces. And the agricultural sector. And so on. According to Putin, due to Ukraine’s active defense, the Russian economy has gone negative.
Therefore, Russia is extremely interested in any formulas that allow the lifting of sanctions and attracting cheap money to ease the stranglehold. That’s why they also pursue the Americans with intergalactic business projects.
Thus, Putin has stated that he does not intend to go for a sectoral truce in the form of halting mutual strikes. Their priority now is different – to lift the sanctions.
Because precisely the “Lindsey Graham Law.” And the European extension. Despite being accompanied by the disgrace with Friedman and Usmanov, Russian barbarism against civilians generally complicates Western politicians’ ability to ease measures on the Kremlin.
A vicious circle: for tactical pressure, Russia escalates against civilians, but strategically it’s against their interests.
It seems that the main plot before winter will be the battle for increasing/maintaining/lifting sanctions.
That’s why Russians now want to quickly bribe American partners with “Lukoil” (recall, this story has been ongoing for almost a year! Trump hit “Lukoil” and “Rosneft” at the end of October 2025). To fight for some concessions by the end of the year (while the current Congress still operates).
Otherwise, everyone will enter a very difficult winter.
5. For a complete picture, one should also add the external contour (I recorded the main milestones earlier).
Roughly summarizing the vectors: the pace of mutual destruction between Russia and Ukraine is increasing. High oil prices have softened the situation for Moscow, but this is temporary. The Kremlin is forced to resort to increasingly crude escalation, including intimidating Europe. This will not be forgotten in the long term.
Trump’s performances and other complications make pragmatic Europeans, on one hand, probe contacts for de-escalation with Russia. On the other hand, they increasingly understand both the consequences of a hypothetical collapse of Ukraine with insufficient support and the consequences of “removing Ukraine from the equation,” where promoting the story of “neutrality” is one tactic.
The narrow point is that the problem isn’t solved merely with money (which Europe doesn’t have in excess). There is an objectively growing demand in Ukrainian society for clarity on the European vector. If there’s no clarity or it’s negative, the base for internal erosion will expand. Russia, in fact, strategically targets this, hoping to exploit the situation in 2027 amidst European elections.
Therefore, specifics and a change in the quality of support will be of primary importance. The formula “here’s some money so you die more slowly” will work increasingly worse, and demand for an alternative will soar.
The level of escalation is such that I am still convinced: the chances for at least a partial freeze by the end of the year are not lost and have even slightly increased. The amplitude is too large, everyone is shaken. We can enter into resonance and collectively fall into something worse.
With strikes on bridges in Kyiv, Putin has de facto removed immunity from all Russian bridges. What traditionally happens on Putin’s birthday – we know: there will definitely be some kind of gift. Plus, Russian civil aviation is still flying, this topic hasn’t been tackled yet.
September was psychologically very difficult and painful in terms of damage but produced a lot of results. Because of this, October promises to be even more intense, as logic begins that no one wants to enter.
At this moment, it is especially important not to falter, to act pragmatically, without bravado, focusing on measurable things.
The primary task for everyone is not to falter themselves and to support their loved ones. This is very important. The home front’s duty is to withstand the blow fully. Next – to assist the army as much as possible. Everyone already knows how. Help your own, help those trusted and/or through those trusted. With the amendment that additional strength assessment is needed.
Everything will be more expensive and logistically slightly more complicated. A somewhat larger reserve is needed than we are used to. Do not postpone until the last moment. Leave a bit of room for maneuver. Evaluate soberly where it is worth slowing down to avoid disruptions.
What I hear from the military and specialists I trust convinces me personally: both at the front and at home, we will manage through winter. We just will. If we do not make fatal mistakes, nothing will succeed for the Russians.
