Timothy Ash / Translation by iPress
Senior strategist at RBC BlueBay Asset Management and associate fellow at Chatham House, Timothy Ash believes that Ukraine’s rapid accession to the EU is not only a matter of economic integration or political symbolism but also a strategic element of Europe’s future security. He argues that formal obstacles—from issues with the rule of law and corruption to budgetary disputes within the EU—can be overcome with transitional periods and clear political will. Setting a specific accession date could simultaneously accelerate reforms, attract investments, and more closely integrate Ukraine’s military potential into the European security system.
Ukraine’s EU membership is seen as one of the incentives that could encourage Ukraine to agree to a peace deal with Russia, which may entail significant concessions on other issues, such as forsaking NATO membership. Indeed, Ukraine’s EU membership was included in an 18-point peace “plan” that emerged after the Anchorage summit between Presidents Trump and Putin.
However, it is noteworthy that, while high-ranking European political leaders verbally support Ukraine’s aspirations to join the EU, in private discussions, European Commission officials emphasize the still immense amount of work needed to align Ukraine with the vast array of EU legal norms—acquis communautaire.
Issues such as corruption and deficiencies in the sphere of the rule of law are constantly mentioned, which are likely to delay accession. At the level of national governments, many difficulties are also expected: from Hungary’s position focused on protecting minority rights in Ukraine, to concerns in Poland and France about the impact of enlargement on the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Added to this are the concerns of current net beneficiaries of the EU budget—mostly Central and Eastern European countries—that the scale of financial costs of supporting Ukraine might worsen their position within the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).
It should be noted that current plans envisage an allocation of €100 billion to support Ukraine during the seven-year EU budget cycle, starting from 2028, on the condition that the war is over. If the war persists, actual expenses are likely to be significantly higher—€40-50 billion per year. Therefore, the widespread assumption is that Ukraine will have to overcome a huge number of obstacles before receiving the green light to join the EU.
In Ukraine, there has been talk of EU membership by 2027, and EU leadership has not particularly disputed this. However, signals from the European Commission’s bureaucracy and national governments seem different: full membership of Ukraine in the EU is unlikely for several more years, possibly even until the end of the next decade.
But even this seems somewhat unrealistic, as Ukraine’s membership in the EU will ultimately be a political decision. Let’s imagine a scenario – I understand that at this stage it is somewhat hypothetical given Trump’s constant appeasement of Putin – where Trump forces Putin to come to the negotiating table. If Trump seeks laurels for crafting a great peace deal, perhaps even the Nobel Prize, and for that Ukraine’s entry into the EU is needed, will European countries really want to say “no” to Trump while Europe still largely relies on the US for defense?
Will Ireland, Hungary, or Belgium really say “no”? And will they say “no” to ending this brutal war that continues to challenge European security if the only condition in return is Ukraine’s entry into the EU? I don’t see it.
The question is whether Trump himself will want to see Ukraine in the EU or, more broadly, whether he will support further EU expansion, given that on other issues he seems to be making efforts to weaken and undermine the EU. But so far, Ukraine’s EU membership has appeared in various peace presentations by Vitkoff and Kushner in PowerPoint, so perhaps it is worth taking their words literally.
I would argue that a swift accession of Ukraine to the EU is possible with political will in the West – in both the US and the EU. Regarding problematic issues such as the extension of the Common Agricultural Policy to Ukraine, adherence to the rule of law, and fighting corruption, long transitional periods could be foreseen.
Political will and imagination are needed. Solutions exist. And if such a compromise helps end the war, consolidates reforms, encourages investment and development in Ukraine, and integrates Ukraine’s security and military potential into the European space, it could do more for Europe’s security than NATO membership could do for Ukraine’s security. Meanwhile, NATO membership could do more directly for Ukraine’s own security.
Problems with corruption and the rule of law in Ukraine are indeed significant, and I do not downplay them. Perhaps they have been the greatest obstacle to Ukraine’s economic development throughout the period after gaining independence. But the prospect of EU membership will be a key tool for overcoming them.
Note: in the early 1990s, at the start of the transition period, the situation with the rule of law and corruption in Ukraine was no worse than, say, in Poland, Bulgaria, or Romania. I know this because I spent a lot of time in the region. But while these countries took advantage of the EU accession process, which combined “carrot and stick” methods to stimulate reforms, Ukraine did not have a real prospect of EU membership until perhaps 2013-2014 – the signing of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreement (DCFTA), followed by the Euromaidan and the war.
It is noteworthy that many of the same EU countries mentioned above still have problems with the rule of law and corruption. I would argue that Bulgaria and Romania were in approximately the same position as Ukraine is now, and perhaps Ukraine is even in a better position now if we compare it to Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, when a political decision was made to allow them to join the Union.
Also note that Bulgaria ranks 84th in the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index – only twenty positions higher than Ukraine, which ranks 104th. And this is after almost twenty years of Bulgaria’s EU membership. Double standards?
At the same time, Ukraine seems to be moving in a more positive direction regarding the rule of law and fighting corruption, with its active civil society exposing corruption and pushing the reform process forward. Various state anti-corruption agencies are making progress, particularly by identifying and responding to high-level corruption.
Perhaps the current course of Ukraine is better than that of many existing EU member states. Just look at the backsliding of reforms in Hungary under the previous Orbán regime. What has the European Commission really done to counter this?
Importantly, this war has shown how remarkably quickly Ukraine can change when faced with a critical threat or given a strong external impetus. Therefore, if the choice is either to resolve issues of the rule of law and corruption or not gain EU membership, I believe Ukraine will move rapidly along the reform path. This is precisely what happened with other Eastern European countries when they joined the EU.
It is hard to overstate how important it is to give Ukraine a clear perspective of EU membership and a roadmap of reforms it must undertake to achieve membership. I consider it critically important to set a membership date. It can be relatively distant if referring to full membership, or sooner if transitional mechanisms are envisaged.
However, potential investors in Ukraine need certainty about a specific date, just as was the case during the striking economic transformation of Central and Eastern European countries that took place in the process of joining the EU. We know one thing about the European Commission: just as after the Copenhagen Agreement of 1993, which set 2004 as the year of entry for Poland and other countries (in 1993, the European Council in Copenhagen defined the Copenhagen criteria, and the decision on the accession of ten countries on May 1, 2004, was made by the European Council in Copenhagen in December 2002 – iPress), it is a bureaucratic machine that methodically achieves set goals, like a metronome. Ukraine needs a date no less than EU membership itself.
European states should already be clear: a) Russia is an existential threat; b) the American security “umbrella” over NATO in Europe is no longer present or is unreliable — this is evidenced by the Trump administration not holding the Putin regime accountable for its ongoing hostile actions against Europe and instead flirting with it; c) Ukraine is currently the most effective military force in Europe capable of deterring Russia, and significantly ahead of most European states in military technology and understanding the future nature of war.
Therefore, Ukraine is critically important for the future defense of Europe. And Europe should be interested in Ukraine’s successful economic development and its social and political stability. What is the best guarantee of this? EU membership.
Without any “ifs” and “buts” – that is the reality. Either European leaders are a bunch of fools, or they can see a clear strategic path to ensuring Europe’s defense against the Russian threat, which will not disappear as long as Putin remains in power. And, according to this logic, only Ukraine in the EU can provide such a guarantee.
Now let’s imagine that Ukraine is not accepted into the EU quickly enough. In my opinion, this would mean a failure of economic development, followed by social and political instability. All of this would happen in a militarized state with a huge arsenal, ballistic missiles, a potential close to nuclear, and eventually, likely, corresponding ambitions.
In the meantime, Russia will continue to try to destabilize Ukraine to undermine the security, political stability, and welfare of Europe. Is this what the EU wants?
And who is saying all this? I have been analyzing Ukraine for almost 40 years: I first came to Kyiv in 1987, lived here and in Russia, visited Ukraine hundreds of times, and have written thousands of materials about its political economy.
Previously, Ukraine experienced failures because it remained a bridge between the East and West—it didn’t fully belong to either camp, but was pulled in different directions by both sides, while rent-seeking oligarchs used their ties with Russia for personal enrichment. During this period, the country never fully developed.
In 2013-2014, and arguably in 2004-2005, and now, defending Ukraine and Europe in this war, Ukrainians have clearly shown that they do not want to remain in Russia’s sphere of influence, but seek a European perspective.
We owe them for the blood shed and must fulfill this promise. And if this requires breaking a few EU rules and established norms, so be it. In times of crisis, the EU is capable of extraordinary decisions. And currently, it’s about an existential security crisis for Europe, and Ukraine offers a solution.
The question is whether there are true leaders in Europe capable of realizing this.
