Yesterday, one of the military personnel wrote a resonant post directly indicating that he sees the era of Starlinks on UAVs coming to an end.
This has stirred some in command and certain fighters, so perhaps it is necessary to write more specifically about this situation.
It turns out that there are people who see systemic information across all bands and work with it. One of these functions is the analysis of the success of Starlink flight missions. All Starlink flights.
If people are doing everything correctly, then by analyzing a significant period, they can observe future trends. One such trend is the increasing presence of Russian electronic warfare against Starlink. China has contributed significantly to the development process, which began back in 2023, and as a result, they have developed appropriate measures and are actively scaling them.
And people who see the overall picture have already noticed a steady trend in opposition to Starlink from Russia. This is normal; every tool has its window of opportunity, and for every sword, in time, a shield is built. Starlink is no exception.
Does this mean that tomorrow Starlink flights are over?
No.
Not even the day after tomorrow.
However, today there are already quite large areas closed off to Starlink. The neutralization of some means and strikes on certain locations have already ceased. Therefore, we no longer see reports of such events as before. I will not specify what I mean, those who can analyze will understand, and specifics won’t be provided for obvious reasons.
Additionally, the cost of a single Starlink strike is continuously rising. This trend is being discussed.
Why now, if the window of opportunity is still working?
Because people who understand how to work with such analytics and where these trends lead also understand how much time is needed to build duplicate solutions. And this is not quick.
You have to analyze the challenges, create a technical assignment, implement new technologies that allow the tool to work against Starlink, then test it, order a tender, receive a batch of products, train the crews to adapt to the new functionality, and all this time modernize already purchased means…
Well, it’s quite long. It’s a path that takes several months.
If you’ve already faced the closing of Starlink’s window of opportunity and only then begin to react, you’ve already lost this race. Your function becomes ineffective, you lose initiative, and you allow the enemy to build countermeasures for the next step. And we cannot afford to lose the initiative; too much is at stake this fall and winter.
Some people are already seeing that, say, the window of opportunity is starting to close in a few months, and we may not make it in time during this period, so they are raising the alarm. Because they don’t think in terms of the current situation; they think in terms of periods and the efficiency of functions during that period. And they are responding to this, I can assure you.
What are our threats?
Well, first of all, it’s clear that Russia will try to close off Crimea, Donetsk, and some other painful areas where they are losing billions from our strikes. Strategic targets have the advantage in defense, and Russia is currently working on this. I wouldn’t say it’s without success. This is the closer perspective that needs to be reacted to now.
Secondly, it’s the expansion of these electronic warfare zones to the front-strike zones and logistics. You don’t even need to cover everything there; you can just set up the electronic warfare systems in such a way that the Starlinks move only on permitted routes, where they can be shot down by anti-aircraft crews. This is a more distant perspective, but it exists.
What is our problem?
We need to control the enemy’s logistics, no matter what. And if zones are closed from Starlink, crews with radio-controlled drones should start working in these zones with the same intensity. Because, for example, if Donetsk, Selydove, Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, and a few other zones in Donetsk region are closed, and during the autumn Russian offensive after mobilization in Russia they concentrate appropriate forces and means in these cities, we could face serious problems.
What are the options for solving the problem?
These are radio-controlled drones that also have a target capture and guidance system not only through a daytime camera but also through a thermal imager, and have a connection that allows them to operate at a distance of about 100 km. Preferably even more.
Moreover, if we are talking about hunting logistics, these drones should be able to attack moving targets in an automated mode. And we have a problem with this.
Some drones can attack moving targets only if the reconnaissance drone is in the air. But reconnaissance wings are shot down by regular FPV drones, and hoping that the wing will retransmit the signal from the strike board during the entire reconnaissance/strike time isn’t realistic. And a lost reconnaissance means a lost striker in this situation.
So, the strike drone should have the ability to independently, without the wing above it, break into the logistics zone, capture the target, and after losing connection due to the radio horizon, independently catch up with and destroy the moving target. How many drones do you think we have that can do this?
Well. I, for example, know only 2. Well, you could say 2.5.
Why did this happen?
If you look at my post about Starlinkization and its threats, I wrote back then that we neglected the development of independent technologies in drones because we had Starlink. Why develop CRPA or visual navigation if Starlink, with its satellite constellation, shows your location in any navigation suppression because it’s cheaper?
Why develop cheaper and more massive mesh networks if there’s Starlink?
Why develop maneuverable fuselages and advanced target capture systems if with Starlink you will have a connection at any altitudes, and you could attach Starlink to a door with an engine and a battery, approach the target hand-guided at an altitude of 30-40 meters, set up an attack azimuth along the target’s movement or opposite, and attack, controlling the board until collision?
Technology is expensive. Starlink is simple and cheap. But these are not our technologies; they are Elon Musk’s technologies. And if for some reason we can’t use them, then what?
As someone who takes care of my unit, which is on a rather difficult sector of the front, I don’t want them to suddenly face a shortage of necessary means in winter. And here, too, it’s the same procedure I described above – forming new specifications and needs, testing solutions, tenders, supply, and modernization of existing means. And despite the fact that the front strike will be next after the middle, and its opportunity window is larger, well, the technical problems are also more complex, and enhancing means is much more difficult. Much more.
To summarize the post, the window of opportunity for Starlink hasn’t closed yet, but a trend is visible that carries some short-term risks, and this needs to be addressed, unlike before, when everyone shouted about the problem, and management ignored it for a month, two, three, and then boom – everyone rushed to resolve the problem that had been warned about ages ago.
But today, we have the chance to adequately react to an important trend and prevent a decline in function in time. And I hope we manage to do everything on time.
